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Deutsche Zusammenfassung 
Automatisiertes Fahren ist einer der großen Trends in der Automobilindustrie. Neueste tech-
nologische Entwicklungen und Prototypen deuten darauf hin, dass die Einführung des auto-
matisierten Fahrens technisch schon bald möglich ist. Trotz der Fortschritte in der Syste-
mentwicklung selbst, ist der Sicherheitsnachweis immer noch ungelöst. Ohne weitere 
Forschung und Weiterentwicklung von Test- und Validierungsmethoden ist eine sichere Ein-
führung des automatisierten Fahrens nicht nachzuweisen. Derzeit verlangt die ECE-
Typgenehmigung, dass das System für den Straßenbetrieb sicher sein muss und kein inak-
zeptables Risiko besteht. Dies basiert auf der Annahme, dass ein menschlicher Fahrer das 
Fahrzeug steuert und in kritischen Szenen die Kontrolle übernimmt. Für höher automatisierte 
Systeme ist die Überwachung durch den Fahrer jedoch nicht mehr vorgesehen. Daher müs-
sen neue Methoden des Sicherheitsnachweises entwickelt werden, die die Sicherheit in au-
tomatisierter Fahrt ohne menschliche Überwachung gewährleisten. 
Zunächst werden bestehende Validierungsmethoden für das automatisierte Fahren analysiert 
und strukturiert, um daraus offene Forschungsfragen zu Risikometriken abzuleiten. In dieser 
Arbeit liegt der Schwerpunkt dabei auf szenariobasiertem Testen und Feldtests. Ein Feldtest 
ist ein Test im realen Verkehr. Anhand der auftretenden Unfallhäufigkeit wird das Risiko des 
Systems in einem statistischen Ansatz abgeschätzt. Szenariobasiertes Testen erfordert hin-
gegen die Identifizierung von Testfällen, um das Testen von der Straße in die Simulation 
oder in ein Testgelände zu verlagern. 
Ziel jeder Sicherheitsvalidierung ist, das Risiko der Technologie abzuschätzen und Sicher-
heit gemäß den Anforderungen aller Gesellschaftsgruppen nachzuweisen. In dieser Arbeit 
werden zwei verschiedene Risikobegriffe verwendet. Das durchschnittliche Risiko eines 
Systems, z.B. die Häufigkeit tödlicher Unfälle, wird als makroskopisches Risiko (MaR) be-
zeichnet. Das Risiko in einer einzelnen Verkehrsszene wird als mikroskopisches Risiko 
(MiR) bezeichnet. Aufgrund der großen Entfernung zwischen zwei Unfällen im heutigen 
Verkehr kann das MaR nicht ohne umfangreiche Datenanalyse bestimmt werden. Da die 
durchschnittliche Entfernung zwischen zwei Unfällen hoch ist, Eine sehr große Testdistanz 
ist erforderlich, um genügend Unfalldaten für eine aussagekräftige statistische Auswertung 
zu sammeln. Daher ist die Frage entscheidend, wie MiR-Metriken, angewendet auf Szenen 
einer Messfahrt, zur Extrapolation von MaR verwendet werden können. Ein weiterer Ver-
wendungszweck von MiR-Metriken ist die Identifizierung kritischer Szenen in aufgezeich-
neten Daten oder online während Testfahrten. Aus diesen Daten können Testfälle für den 
szenariobasierten Test abgeleitet werden. 
Die drei wichtigsten Forschungsfragen dieser Arbeit befassen sich mit der Definition von 
MaR-Anforderungen und einem Top-Down-Ansatz zur Definition von MiR-Metriken, mit 
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denen das MaR aus kritischen Szenen extrapoliert und Testfälle identifiziert werden können. 
Diese drei Fragen werden im Verlauf der Arbeit noch in weitere Unterfragen aufgeteilt. 
Was sind die Anforderungen an MiR-Metriken und wie kann die Eignung der Metri-
ken für die Extrapolation von MaR und die Identifikation von Testfällen falsifiziert 
werden? 
Bereits heute sind zahlreiche MiR-Metriken vorhanden, die zum Teil auch schon für die bei-
den beschriebenen Ansätze verwendet werden. Daher wird in dieser Arbeit ein Bewertungs-
prozess etabliert, der beide Ansätze abdeckt. Die Metrik soll geeignet sein, Szenarien zu 
identifizieren, die für den Fahrer oder die Automatisierung sehr anspruchsvoll sind, um dar-
aus Testfälle abzuleiten. Gleichzeitig soll die Metrik das Risiko in einer Szene beschreiben, 
sodass eine Extrapolation von MiR zu MaR möglich ist. Um zu bewerten, ob eine Metrik 
für diese Zwecke geeignet ist, werden Anforderungen definiert. Da die Erfüllung aller An-
forderung und damit die Eignung der Metrik nicht immer nachweisbar ist, wird stattdessen 
eine Falsifizierungsstrategie vorgeschlagen, die zwei Schritte enthält: Zunächst werden Test-
szenen definiert, die von einer Metrik korrekt bewertet werden müssen. Wenn keine Falsifi-
zierung durch die Testszenen erreicht wird, wird die Metrik auf aufgezeichnete Daten von 
vom Menschen gefahrenen Fahrzeugen angewendet. Wenn die tatsächliche Unfallrate der 
Hochrechnung des Risikos auf der Grundlage der Metrik innerhalb statistischer Toleranzen 
widerspricht, ist die Eignung der Metrik falsifiziert. Da der letzte Falsifizierungsschritt sehr 
aufwändig ist, werden Design-Richtlinien festgelegt, die zu einer aussagekräftigen Metrik 
führen, wenn sie bei der Entwicklung der Metrik befolgt werden.  
Welche Methoden und Metriken können verwendet werden, um das MaR des automa-
tisierten Fahrens aus kritischen Szenen in Feldtests zu extrapolieren? 
Bei Feldtests wird die Sicherheit eines Fahrsystems basierend auf der Auftretensrate von 
Ereignissen bestimmter Kategorie, z.B. Unfälle mit Todesfolge, mit Hilfe eines statistischen 
Nachweises ermittelt. Handelt es sich bei dem untersuchten Ereignis nicht um einen Unfall, 
sondern um eine kritische Szene, erhöht sich die Auftrittsrate; und bei gleicher statistischer 
Signifikanz sind weniger Kilometer erforderlich. Das Auftreten von kritischen Szenen allein 
gibt jedoch keine Auskunft über das Unfallrisiko. Wenn davon ausgegangen wird, dass der 
Fahrer eine Kritikalität über einer bestimmten Schwelle zu verhindern versucht und dass das 
Auftreten einer Kritikalität über diesem Wert aus der Beobachtung in einem Feldtest extra-
poliert werden kann, wäre es möglich auf das Auftreten von Szenen mit noch höherer Kriti-
kalität und sogar Unfällen hochzurechnen. Zunächst wird untersucht, ob bestehende Metri-
ken, Datenerfassungen und Extrapolationsmethoden die abgeleiteten Anforderungen 
erfüllen. Anschließend wird die Extremwerttheorie als statistisches Instrument zur Extrapo-
lation des Risikos ausgewählt. Voraussetzung ist, dass es sich bei hochkritischen Ereignissen 
um Extremereignisse handelt, die nicht durch eine Approximation einer Verteilung aller auf-
tretenden Kritikalitätswerte angenähert werden können. Abschließend wird eine Metrik ba-
sierend auf diesen Designrichtlinien entwickelt. Die Metrik verwendet eine modellprädiktive 
Optimierung, um die Trajektorie mit den minimalen Fahranforderungen in einer bestimmten 
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Szene zu finden. Die Metrik erfüllt alle definierten Testfälle und vergleicht die Fahranforde-
rungen mit dem geschätzten menschlichen Fahrkönnen. Nach den festgelegten Designricht-
linien wird eine Sensitivitätsanalyse für willkürlich festgelegte Parameter und den Einfluss 
der Parameterdefinition auf das Ergebnis durchgeführt. Zu diesem Zweck wird der highD-
Datensatz analysiert, der aus Drohnenvideos aufgenommen wurde. 
Was ist das akzeptable MaR für automatisiertes Fahren?  
Die allgemeine Erwartung ist, dass die Einführung von automatisierten Fahrzeugen die An-
zahl der Unfälle zumindest langfristig und pro Fahrleistung verringert. Gleichzeitig ist es 
offensichtlich, dass die Einführung neue Risiken für die Gesellschaft mit sich bringt, wie bei 
fast jeder neuen Technologie. Vermutlich werden Erstkunden aufgrund der neuen Erfahrun-
gen und des persönlichen Nutzens bereitwillig Risiken oder Ungewissheiten in Bezug auf 
Risiken akzeptieren. Andererseits haben Passanten, die keinen persönlichen Vorteil verspü-
ren, vermutliche höhere Anforderungen. In dieser Arbeit werden akzeptable Risiken aus Un-
fallstatistiken, Risikoakzeptanzstudien und dem Vergleich mit anderen Technologien abge-
leitet. Basierend auf den Anforderungen werden Einführungsstrategien unter Ungewissheit 
diskutiert. Die zugrundeliegenden Annahmen dabei sind, dass Benutzer die Hypothese ak-
zeptieren, dass Fahrzeuge sicher sind, während Passanten und die Gesellschaft die Hypo-
these eher ablehnen.
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Summary 
Automated Driving is one of the trends in the automobile industry. Latest developments in 
technology and prototypes suggest that the introduction of automated driving is near. Despite 
the advances in the systems themselves, the safety approval is still unsolved. Without further 
research and improvement in verification and validation methods, a safe introduction of au-
tomated driving is not justifiable. Currently, the ECE type approval certifies that the system 
is safe for road operation and that there is no unacceptable risk involved, based on the as-
sumption that a human driver is able to control the vehicle and decides about trajectory in 
critical scenes. For higher automation, human surveillance is not available any more. Hence, 
new methods of safety approval and risk assessment need to be installed to substitute the 
current type approval. 
To begin with, state of the art safety validation methods for automated driving are analyzed 
and structured to derive open research questions concerning risk metrics. In this thesis, the 
focus is on scenario-based testing and field-testing. Field-testing means straightforward test-
ing in real traffic. The risk of the system can be estimated in a statistical approach by the 
occurrence rate of accidents. Scenario-based testing requires the identification of test cases 
to shift testing from the road to simulation or proving grounds. However, the target of each 
safety validation is to estimate the risk of the technology ultimately proofing that the safety 
exceeds the required safety according to all viewpoints in the whole society. In this thesis, 
two different terms of risk are used. The average risk of a system, e.g. the occurrence rate of 
fatal accidents, is called macroscopic risk (MaR). The risk in a single traffic scene is called 
microscopic risk (MiR). Due to the high distance between two accidents in today’s traffic, 
MaR cannot be estimated without an extensive amount of data. Thus, it requires an enormous 
mileage to gather enough accident data for significant statistic evaluation. Hence, an im-
portant research question is how MiR metrics that evaluate the risk of single scenes without 
accidents can be used to extrapolate MaR. Another use of MiR metrics is the identification 
of critical scenes in recorded data or online, during test-drives. These data can be used to 
derive test cases for the scenario-based testing approach. The three most crucial research 
questions address the definition of MaR requirements and a top-down approach for defining 
MiR metrics that are eligible to extrapolated MaR from critical scenes and identify test-
cases. They will be further refined in the course of this dissertation. The three questions are:  
What are the requirements for MiR metrics and how can their eligibility for the ex-
trapolation towards MaR and the identification of critical scenes be falsified? 
As there are many MiR metrics available as state of the art, an assessment process is estab-
lished in this thesis that evaluates both use-cases. The metric shall identify scenarios that are 
highly demanding for the driver or the automation. At the same time, the metric shall de-
scribe the risk in a scene, so extrapolation from MiR towards MaR is possible. To evaluate 
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if a metric is eligible for those purposes requirements are defined. As it is challenging to 
verify if a metric fulfills all requirements, a falsification strategy is established instead that 
contains two steps: First, test scenes are defined that must be assessed correctly by a metric. 
If falsification by the test scenes is not achieved, it is applied on recorded data of human 
driven traffic. If the true accident rate corresponds to the extrapolation of risk based on the 
metric within statistical tolerances, the metric’s eligibility is not falsified. As the last falsifi-
cation step has a high effort, design guidelines are established that lead to a potent metric if 
followed in the development process. 
Which methods and metrics can be used to extrapolate MaR of automated driving from 
critical scenes in field-testing? 
In field-testing, the safety of a driving system is derived based on the occurrence rate of 
certain events, e.g. fatal accidents. If the event under investigation is a critical scene instead 
of an accident, the occurrence rate increases and less mileage is required for the same statis-
tical significance. However, the occurrence of critical scenes alone has no information on 
accident risk. If it is assumed that criticality above a certain threshold is prevented by the 
driver if possible, and that the occurrence of criticality above this value can be extrapolated 
from the observation in a field test, the occurrence of scenes of higher criticality and even 
accidents could be extrapolated. First, it is investigated if state of the art metrics, data col-
lections and extrapolation methods fulfill the derived requirements. As a result, extreme 
value theory is selected as statistical tool for extrapolation of risk, assuming that highly crit-
ical events are extreme events that cannot be approximated by a fit of all occurring criticality 
values. Finally, a metric that has proven itself so far, is presented. The metric uses model 
predictive optimization to find the trajectory with the minimum driving requirements in a 
given scene. The metric fulfills all defined test cases and compares driving requirements 
with the estimated human driving skill to describe criticality. Following the established de-
sign guidelines, a sensitivity analysis is conducted on uncertain parameters to research the 
influence in parameter choice on the extrapolation result. For this purpose, the highD-dataset 
that was recorded from drone footage is analyzed. 
What is the acceptable MaR for automated driving?  
The common expectation is that the introduction of automated driving will reduce the num-
ber of accidents at least long-term and per mileage. At the same time, it is obvious that the 
introduction will induce new risks to the live of modern society, as almost every new tech-
nology does. Probably, early adopters will willingly accept risks or uncertainty about risk 
due to the new experience and the personal benefit. In contrast, passers-by that feel no per-
sonal benefit likely have higher requirements. In this thesis, acceptable risks are derived 
from accident statistics, risk acceptance studies and comparison with other technologies. 
Based on the requirements, introduction strategies under uncertainty are discussed with the 
assumption that user are likely to accept the hypothesis that vehicles are safe and fulfill their 
individual requirements, while passers-by and the society are more likely to reject the hy-
pothesis. 
 1 
1 Introduction and Scope 
Recently, demonstrations from car manufacturers, suppliers and tech companies suggest that 
automated vehicles are technologically feasible and will be introduced to customer in the 
near future. The common expectation is that the introduction of automated driving will re-
duce the number of accidents at least long-term. The Vision for Safety1 program of the Na-
tional Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) of the United States as well as the 
Visio Zero2 of the European Union rely on the expected safety benefit of automated driving. 
However, the introduction of new technology is not without risk. At the same time, we know 
that a statistical proof of superior safety based on accident statistics cannot be performed 
without introducing automated vehicles to the market due to the high required mileage3,4. 
State of the art development and testing procedures from advanced driver assistance systems 
are insufficient because they rely on the active supervision of the driver at all time.5 The 
problem of a statistic proof of safety is that it is based on accident statistics and as accidents 
are relatively rare events, it requires a high mileage to come to a statistically significant 
result. This raises the first question: 
How to monitor the current risk level in test drives and after the introduction besides acci-
dent statistics?  
As statistic on accidents is not feasible before an introduction, the question rises if other 
metrics could be used to derive the accident risk. If the accident risk in critical scenarios can 
be described, the total accident risk could be extrapolated. Metrics for the description of 
proximity to accidents exist, e.g. the well-known Time-to-Collision6. However, the connec-
tion to accident probability is unknown. Additionally, the definition of a general criterion 
that covers all types of scenarios is challenging. To conquer this challenge, a top-down ap-
proach that starts with the definition of requirements and test cases is the scope of this dis-
sertation. 
Besides statistical safety approval in real-world tests, other test concepts are available to 
assess driving functions. Guidelines for the development of safe systems are given in 
ISO 26262:2018 for functional safety and ISO/PAS 21448:2019 for the safety of the in-
                                                 
1 U.S. Department of Transportation NHTSA: A Vision for Safety 2.0 (2017). 
2 Tingvall, C.; Haworth, N.: Vision Zero (2000). 
3 Winner, H.; Weitzel, A.: Die Freigabefalle des autonomen Fahrens (2011). 
4 Kalra et al.: How Many Miles of Driving Would It Take? (2016). 
5 Donner, E. et al.: RESPONSE 3 - Code of Practice (2007). 
6 Hayward, J. C.: TTC (1972). 
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tended functionality (SOTIF). At the end of the development, the system validation is de-
manded. ISO 26262:2018-4 suggests execution of tests in the validation process, including 
simulation and long-term tests. However, the test case generation is based on expert 
knowledge, so completeness is unlikely to be achieved. In SOTIF, the term of unknown sce-
narios is of importance. Due to the open world application, a test can never cover all possible 
scenes. Some might even be unknown because there is no data or because the scenario does 
not happen in current traffic, but will in the future. As an approach to reduce the number of 
unknown scenarios, a data driven test case generation process7 is suggested to discover un-
known unsafe scenarios to add them to a test catalogue.  
Numerous studies collected data for human driven traffic in the past and critical scenarios 
were identified (see Benmimoun8 for an overview). Metrics to identify critical scenarios are 
well established. As the amount of information collected in past studies includes only ego 
vehicle information and sometimes information about one preceding object, new opportuni-
ties result when the data are enhanced. Highly sophisticated datasets cannot only be accu-
mulated in test drives with advanced environment perception. Due to the advances in image 
processing, vehicle trajectories can be recorded from video footage as it was done in the 
highD-dataset9. 
Which metric can match the detail of modern datasets and identify critical scenarios effec-
tively? 
Those datasets offer the opportunity to improve identification-metrics, because the whole 
traffic scenario can be analyzed and ideally, no relevant object is missing. It will be dis-
cussed, which requirements a metric that is designed to analyze large scale data have to 
fulfill. 
Based on the scenarios, SOTIF suggests a process in which the function is analyzed and 
improved iteratively. SOTIF demands that the process shall be repeated and the function 
improved until the residual risk is acceptable. So quantitative risk requirements are necessary 
as well as a method to quantitatively estimate the risk of the system. It is commonly dis-
cussed that automated driving functions will improve traffic safety. However, there is also 
much skepticism in society and individuals. Hence, the following question is addressed in 
this thesis: 
What is the acceptable risk for all groups of our society?  
It is out of question that today’s traffic is not without risk and likely, this will not diminish 
completely with the introduction of automated driving. Gasser et al.10 argue that accidents 
                                                 
7 Wachenfeld, W. et al.: Safety Assurance based on an Objective Identification of Scenarios (2016). 
8 Benmimoun, M.: Automatisierte Klassifikation von Fahrsituationen (2015), pp. 30–36. 
9 Krajewski, R. et al.: The highd dataset (2018). 
10 Gasser, T. M. et al.: Rechtsfolgen zunehmender Fahrzeugautomatisierung (2012). 
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that are known from today’s traffic will be partly prevented due to the lack of human error, 
but new types of accidents will happen due to new automation risks. Wachenfeld et al.11 add 
that it is also unknown, whether the distribution of accidents over different severity classes 
will change (Figure 1-1). However, it has to be assumed that the future distribution and fre-
quency of accidents are highly relevant for risk acceptance.  
 
Figure 1-1 (Unknown) future distribution of accidents (Wachenfeld et al.11 after Gasser et al.12) 
Besides the general expectation for increased safety, there are no defined quantitative ac-
ceptable risk levels. For the derivation of the acceptable risk, all viewpoints in society should 
be addressed because once deployed, autonomous vehicle will likely influence passengers 
as well as passers-by. An important baseline is the risk in the current traffic that is known 
from accident statistics. Another consideration is the benefit for passenger or society. If ben-
efits are overwhelming, higher risks are acceptable.13 
The three questions introduced above are the key questions that include the scope of this 
thesis. The estimation of risk is always based on an estimation under uncertainty. Hence, the 
different approaches of safety assessment will be analyzed together with their individual 
strengths and weaknesses. From the requirements side, the risk requirements are defined and 
compared with the extrapolation methods and the expected uncertainty level. 
1.1 Methodology and Structure 
This thesis follows a question driven top-down methodology. Its structure is depicted in Fi-
gure 1-2: 
 In this chapter, three basic questions that are in scope of this thesis were discussed 
above. Below, key terms that are used throughout this thesis are defined.  
                                                 
11 Wachenfeld, W.; Winner, H.: The Release of Autonomous Vehicles (2016), p. 426. 
12 Gasser, T. M. et al.: Rechtsfolgen zunehmender Fahrzeugautomatisierung (2012). 
13 Grunwald, A.: Societal Risk Constellations (2016). 
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 In chapter 2, the state of the art of validation approaches of automated driving are 
analyzed with attention to real world data evaluation and risk requirements. As there 
are limited data from automated test drives available, the research is extended to-
wards data analysis of manual and assisted driving. The metrics that are used in the 
process of extrapolating risk and identification of critical scenarios are in focus. Ad-
ditionally, risk levels that are normative or accepted at present in other technologies 
are discussed. 
 In chapter 3, the basic research questions introduced above are further refined and 
extended based on the findings in the state of the art. Nine refined research questions 
are deduced. 
 In chapter 4, the risk requirements are derived based on an analysis of the require-
ments from the different stakeholders and the market penetration in relation to con-
ventional traffic. The research questions concerning macroscopic risk are addressed 
and the consequences for the introduction phase discussed. 
 In chapter 5, requirements for metrics that describe risk in traffic scenes are derived. 
Based on the requirements a falsification strategy for risk metrics is derived and ap-
plied on state of the art metrics. As falsification for advanced metric is challenging, 
design guidelines are established that lead to an eligible metric. Different approaches 
to define a metric in accordance with the requirements and guidelines are discussed 
and a suitable metric is suggested.  
 In chapter 6, the developed metric is applied using the falsification method. First, test 
cases derived in chapter 5 are applied. Additionally, data from a German motorway 
that were collected by drone footage with a total mileage of about 50,000 km are 
evaluated. It is discussed, whether the results are eligible to extrapolate the accident 
risk from. Research questions concerning risk extrapolation are addressed here. 
 In chapter 7, the results are discussed and summarized, with focus on the research 
questions, the developed method and its implication on a future safety validation. 
Open research questions are formulated. 
 In chapter 8, a conclusion about the achieved progress is given together with an out-
look towards the next steps in safety validation. 
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1.2 Definition of Terms 
In this chapter, key terms used in the following parts are introduced and defined.  
1.2.1 Automated Driving 
The scope of this thesis is the validation of automated driving. Therefore the taxonomy ac-
cording to SAE J3016 is used (Figure 1-3). For this thesis, it is sufficient to differentiate 
between systems with SAE level two and lower (AD2-) and systems with SAE level three 
and higher (AD3+). Current series-production vehicles provide assistance systems of AD2-. 
Their validation is established and out of scope of this thesis. A key concept here is that all 
scenarios must be controllable by the average driver. The driver is always in charge of the 
driving tasks and monitors the system. Intervention is either necessary when the AD2- sys-
tems reaction requires it, as discussed by Weitzel14, or when a fault of the electric and elec-
tronic system (E/E system) is present, which is covered by ISO26262 on functional safety. 
The safety validation of AD3+ systems on the other hand requires new approaches as the 
driver does not need to monitor the driving environment. 
 
Figure 1-3 SAE level of automated driving15 
                                                 
14 Weitzel, D. A.: Kontrollierbarkeit nicht situationsgerechter Reaktionen (2013). 
15 SAE International Standard J3016: Taxonomy for Automated Driving Systems (2014). 
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1.2.2 Scene, Situation and Scenario 
The term scene was defined by Geyer et al.16 and further extended by Ulbrich et al17. In this 
thesis following the definition by Ulbrich is used: 
“A scene describes a snapshot of the environment including the scenery 
and dynamic elements, as well as all actors’ and observers’ self-represen-
tations, and the relationships among those entities. Only a scene represen-
tation in a simulated world can be all-encompassing (objective scene, 
ground truth). In the real world it is incomplete, incorrect, uncertain, and 
from one or several observers’ points of view (subjective scene).” 17 
The definition is further explained in Figure 1-4. 
 
Figure 1-4 Definition of a scene17 
In literature, the term situation is often used as a synonym for the term scene. However, 
according to Ulbrich, a situation also includes goals and values of the function in addition to 
                                                 
16 Geyer, S. et al.: a unified ontology for generating test and use-case catalogues (2013). 
17 Ulbrich, S. et al.: Defining and Substantiating the Terms Scene, Situation, and Scenario, p. 983. 
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all aspects of a scene that are relevant for those goals and values. The difference between 
scene and situation is of minor importance in this thesis. Hence, the term scene will be used.  
While a scene is only a snapshot of the vehicles’ condition and the surroundings, a scenarios 
spans over a timespan. It either can be defined by several scenes that follow each other with 
changing states of dynamic objects, or can have an initial scene with definitions of the fol-
lowing maneuvers that evolve form the starting point. In this thesis, the term scenario always 
addresses a scenario with data points at each time step, so the first specification will be used. 
1.2.3 Safety Performance and Risk 
To describe the safety level of a system or of the current traffic. The term Safety Performance 
(SP) according to Wachenfeld18 is used. It is described as the average distance until an acci-
dent occurs. As it is necessary to differentiate between different severity categories when 
discussing risk and not only accident likelihood, the SP can be given for each severity cate-
gory (e.g. fatal accidents: index f; accidents with injuries: index wI; accidents without inju-
ries: index nI (no injuries)). 
According to ISO 26262 risk is the severity of an accident multiplied with the frequency or 
likelihood of the accident. The frequency of accidents is either given per year (symbol f) or 
per distance (symbol ℱ). 
So ℱ is the reciprocal of SP when the severity level is defined. In ISO26262, different se-
verity levels are combined by assuming a factor of ten between severity categories, meaning 
that an accident with injuries is handled as ten times more severe than an accident without 
injuries and an accident with fatalities is handled as 100 times more severe. The combination 
of different severity level into a single value of risk or SP is further discussed in subchapter 
4.3.  
In this thesis, the risk in a single traffic scene and the average risk of a fleet of vehicles are 
relevant. SP and risk according to ISO26262 address the average risk of a vehicle or a fleet 
of identical vehicles. This is called Macroscopic Risk (MaR). The risk in a single scene is 
called Microscopic Risk (MiR). It is described by MiR metrics when applied on data. 
1.2.4 Criticality and Criticality Metric 
The term criticality metric is refered to a broad family of metrics in literature (see section 
2.2.2.2.1). In this thesis, the term criticality is defined as the temporal or spatial closeness to 
a potential collision in a driving scene or scenario, or the magnitude of a driving dynamic 
reaction required to prevent an accident. A criticality metric describes the criticality or as-
pects of criticality in a scene or scenario. The reaction can either be assessed a posteriori by 
                                                 
18 Wachenfeld, W. H.: Dissertation, How Stochastic can Help to Introduce AD (2017), p. 25. 
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measuring the vehicle state or a priori by environment perception and prediction of the re-
quired reaction. A criticality metric does not necessarily deliver information about risk or 
accident probability. However, a risk metric is also a criticality metric but not vice versa. 
Often the purpose of the metric is the classification into critical and uncritical scenes. This 
requires definition of a threshold above or underneath of which the scene would be critical. 
Examples for a classification in major Naturalistic Driving Studies (NDS) and Field Opera-
tional Tests (FOT) are given in Appendix A. 
All metrics handled in this dissertation describe risk or criticality on action level of driving. 
Scenes were the action itself is easy but the decision making or the information reception is 
difficult are not considered. An example would be driving in a sandstorm were the action 
level is not directly influenced because driving straight might be still possible. Amers-
bach19 20a defines a total of six layers to decompose the driving task (Figure 1-5) and criti-
cality could be described on all levels. Metrics on actions level are necessary and sufficient 
to describe risk, as insufficient behavior on lower levels will result in risky action later on: 
A late detection of a front object could be detected on information processing level, but re-
sults in an emergency braking on action level. 
 
Figure 1-5 Decomposition levels20b 
                                                 
19 Amersbach, C.; Winner, H.: Functional Decomposition (2017). 
20 Amersbach, C.; Winner, H.: Funktionale Dekomposition (2018).a: -; b: p.4 
1 Introduction and Scope 
10 
1.2.5 Coordinate Systems and Notation 
In this thesis, two different two-dimensional Cartesian coordinate systems are used: a world 
coordinate system that is used to describe positions and directions on a road plane and a 
(horizontized) ego-vehicle coordinate system that describes positions of objects in relation 
to the vehicle as well as the accelerations and velocities of ego-vehicle and objects. The 
position of an objects always refers to the geometric center of the vehicle, length, width and 
yaw angle must be known in order to describe a bounding box around the object. Whenever 
it is necessary to differentiate between the two coordinate systems, the letter e for ego-vehi-
cle centered system or w for world centered system is indicated at the lower left of the vari-
able as depicted in Figure 1-6 (e.g. 𝑥𝑤  for an x-position in world coordinates). As the slip 
angle is assumed to be zero, yaw angle and course angle are identical and the velocity 𝑣𝑦𝑒  
of the ego-vehicle is zero.  
 
Figure 1-6 Coordinate systems 
In addition to the two Cartesian coordinate systems, a curvilinear coordinate system with the 
index c is introduced in section 5.3.2.8. The road curvature is used for the longitudinal axis 
in order to efficiently handle driving that follows the lane on motorways with small curva-
ture. 
 
Ego Object 1
Object 2
𝑥𝑤
 𝑤
𝑥𝑒
 𝑒
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2 State of the art Requirements and Ap-
proaches for Safety Validation 
This chapter analyzes the current state of safety validation. First, the current expectations 
and requirements towards AD3+ are introduced and comparisons to other technologies are 
drawn. Second, the state of the art of safety validation for AD3+ is summarized and struc-
tured with focus on risk metrics. 
2.1 How Safe is Safe Enough? 
In this subchapter, the basis for the definition of safety requirements is discussed. First, pub-
lication for the derivation of safety requirements for AD3+ are briefly discussed. Next, the 
fundamental basis for safety requirements that is used in norms is summarized, before a 
comparison with the requirements in aviation and pharmacy is drawn. 
2.1.1 Existing Considerations for AD3+ 
It is broadly assumed that AD3+ shall increase the safety on public roads and reduce the 
number of traffic victims compared to human driven traffic. The Ethics Commission Auto-
mated and Connected Driving of the German Federal Ministry of Transport stated that “the 
licensing of automated systems is not justifiable unless it promises to produce at least a 
diminution in harm compared with human driving, in other words a positive balance of 
risks”21. Besides this statement, other approaches exist: 
Wachenfeld introduces a limited introduction22 (that is also called risk-limited introduc-
tion23), where AD3+ is introduced without a sufficient proof (but still with the expectation) 
of superior safety. The driven distance and the accidents from the sold series vehicles are 
monitored, gaining additional knowledge about the performance, and ideally allowing more 
vehicles to be deployed, because the uncertainty of the safety performance assessment de-
creases. 
                                                 
21 Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure: Report of the Ethics Commission (2017), p. 4. 
22 Wachenfeld, W. H.: Dissertation, How Stochastic can Help to Introduce AD (2017), pp. 102ff. 
23 Winner, H.; Wachenfeld, W.: Risk-limited Introduction of Automated Driving, (2017). 
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Kalra et al.24 even suggest that with the deployment of AD3+, we can accelerate the devel-
opment of the systems due to the gained knowledge and the recorded data that can be used 
in machine learning. Hence, AD3+ could be introduced even with inferior safety, assuming 
a certain improvement rate per mileage. In the end, the system would outperform human 
driver due to this learning effect. If the improvement rate is high enough, lives are saved at 
the cost of a higher risk directly after the introduction. A balance of risk that is positive in 
total, compared to a delayed and careful introduction, would permit this increased initial 
risk. 
Though, the approaches of Kalra and Wachenfeld do not demand a proof of safety before the 
introduction. Nevertheless, they do not contradict the abovementioned statement of the eth-
ics commission, because the system ultimately promises increased safety. 
Another question is how to evaluate a shift in different severity categories. It might be pos-
sible that the accident rate of minor accidents would increase dramatically, but the accident 
rate of more severe accidents would decrease. Hydén suggests that a reduction of minor 
accidents typically results in a reduction of more severe accidents. This is also called thy 
Hydén triangle.25 However, it is possible that this does not hold true for AD3+.26 Possible 
reasons include minor accidents due to unexpected slow-speed maneuvers in mixed traffic 
or high-velocity crashes without braking due to false-negative obstacle detection. The first 
would increase the minor accident rate with no influence on severe accidents. The latter 
would lead to the opposite, if the false-negative detection only happens at higher velocities. 
To cope with the different severity levels, Wachenfeld suggest a monetary approach moti-
vated from insurance practices to combine the different accident rates.27 Its application and 
consequences is further discussed in section 4.3.2. 
2.1.2 Fundamental Safety Requirements28 
This section discusses normative approaches to describe risk requirements. Defining risk 
requirements is challenging in nature as the assessment and comparison of risks is challeng-
ing for humans. It is illustrated from a small excursion: 
The recent publication of the German Federal Statistical Office29 again reports an increase 
in average life expectancy of newborns. Since the recording of mortality tables began in 
                                                 
24 Kalra, N.; Groves, D. G.: The Enemy of Good (2017). 
25 Hydén, C.: Method for traffic safety evaluation (1987). 
26 Wachenfeld, W.; Winner, H.: The Release of Autonomous Vehicles (2016), p. 426. 
27 Wachenfeld, W. H.: Dissertation, How Stochastic can Help to Introduce AD (2017), pp. 26ff. 
28 This section and its sub-sections is taken from Junietz, P. et al.: Macroscopic Risk Requirements (2019) and 
only modified slightly. 
29 Destatis: Kohortensterbertafeln für Deutschland (2017). 
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1871, we observed a doubling of the average life expectancy. One should assume that people 
are very lucky with this development. But a look into daily media reporting shows that peo-
ple are not only very skeptical about technical achievements but they are even afraid of ef-
fects that are obviously responsible for the aforementioned increase in life expectancy - for 
example medical and agricultural advances. People are concerned, for example, about man-
made radiation and air pollution by industrial plants or transportation but also about the side-
effects of medicine, the consumption of meat of uncontrolled origin, bacteria in green salad, 
dioxin in free-range eggs, etc. 
Nevertheless, the facts speak for themselves: The most common natural causes of death in 
Germany - and this is representative for industrial countries - are cardiovascular diseases 
with 39%, followed by cancer with nearly 25% and, well behind, by diseases of respiratory 
and digestive system with 7% and 4%. It is interesting to note that non-natural causes of 
death, i.e. mainly suicides and accidents, contribute only 4%30 31. From the medical point of 
view there is no doubt regarding the factors that really kill us - smoking, overweight, high 
blood pressure, diabetes, and physical inactivity. Everybody is able to control those factors 
and to prevent the consequences but why are we not doing this consistently? Moreover, why 
are we so concerned regarding other factors that are less risky but not readily controllable 
by ourselves? Why do our risk perception and risk acceptance seem contradictory? (comp. 
Fritzsche32a) 
There is obviously a discrepancy between objectively existing risks on the one hand and 
their perception and acceptance by individuals as well as by society on the other. It is im-
portant for that purpose, among other things, whether people enter into the risk voluntarily 
or not, whether they feel a personal benefit, and whether the risk is natural or synthetic. 
Moreover, risk perception depends on risk communication32b,33,34. 
We have to ask ourselves, whether it is even possible to deal with risk in an objective manner. 
What the consequences of the described difficulties with risk perception and acceptance are 
for the introduction of new, complex technologies like for example highly automated driv-
ing. 
2.1.2.1 Quantitative Risk Assessment 
The usual quantitative risk definition “risk equals frequency times severity” is illustrated in 
Figure 2-1 (left). Due to the double logarithmic scale, constant risk is represented by a line. 
                                                 
30 Destatis: Pressemitteilung Nr. 022 (2017). 
31 Destatis: Gesundheit - Todesursachen in Deutschland (2017). 
32 Fritzsche, A. F.: Wie sicher leben wir? (1986).a: pp.1-3; b: -  
33 Grunwald, A.: Societal Risk Constellations (2016). 
34 Slovic, P.: The perception of risk (2011). 
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Considering the occurrence of unintended events (frequency) and extent of damage (sever-
ity), ideally two areas are defined. In the green area, the system is in a safe state; the corre-
sponding risk is accepted. In the red area, the system is in an unsafe state; the corresponding 
risk is not accepted. The borderline between these two areas is probably not sharp; there can 
be a kind of transition area. 
Although this simple definition is very useful for many questions in technology and insur-
ance industry, it neglects aspects like aversion against high severity, lack of controllability, 
and personal benefit, which are relevant for risk perception and acceptance by individuals 
and society. Intensive research on risk perception and risk acceptance started in the second 
half of the last century. Different authors analyzed risk acceptance and risk-benefit constel-
lations in various studies (Douglas35, Crouch36, Gibson37, Kinchin38, Kletz39. Starr40,41 and 
Webb42). Fritzsche discussed risk acceptance relating to voluntary nature of exposure based 
on the above mentioned studies43. Slovic concludes similar results in a more recent, updated 
publication.44 Their results are summarized in Figure 2-2. It is interesting that both authors 
conclude similar risk numbers despite the major gap of several decades. The reason might 
be that risk perception studies reached their peak in the 70’s with the introduction of nuclear 
power. Junietz et al.45 suggest correcting the numbers with a factor derived from the change 
in mortality rate. 
For voluntary activities, Fritzsche found that the willingness to accept risks is nearly unlim-
ited, depending on the experienced personal benefit. We can see this by the example of high-
risk sport or other leisure activities, e.g. free climbing, motorcycling etc.. Job-related activ-
ities are important for a deeper understanding of the subject. Acceptance is relatively well 
investigated in this field and there is a common understanding of accepted individual mor-
tality risk in the order of 10-5 per person and year, for example by professional associations 
and insurance companies, on the one hand. On the other hand, job-related risks are useful to 
bridge the gap between voluntary and involuntary risks. 
                                                 
35 Douglas, M.; Wildavsky, A.: How can we know the risks we face? (1982). 
36 Crouch, E. A.; Wilson, R.: Risk/benefit analysis (1982). 
37 Gibson, S. B.: Risk criteria in hazard analysis (1976). 
38 Kinchin, G. H.: Design Criteria, Concepts and Features Important to Safety and Licensing. ANS (1979). 
39 Kletz, T. A.: Hazard analysis, its application to risks to the public at large (1978). 
40 Starr, C.: Social benefit versus technological risk (1969). 
41 Starr, C.: Benefit-cost relationships in socio-technical systems (1971). 
42 Webb, G. A.; McLean, A. S.: Insignificant levels of dose (1977). 
43 Fritzsche, A. F.: Wie sicher leben wir? (1986). 
44 Slovic, P.: The perception of risk (2011). 
45 Junietz, P. et al.: Macroscopic Safety Requirements for Highly Automated Driving (2019), 7. 
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Fritzsche found that for involuntary risks, e.g. death of passengers due to a train or airplane 
crash, the acceptance level is an order of magnitude lower than for job-related risks. More-
over, acceptance decreases another order of magnitude, if the risk is caused by major tech-
nology, e.g. chemical industry or nuclear power generation. Beside the fact that the experi-
enced personal benefit of those technologies is low (at least from a subjective point of view), 
the low degree of self-determination or rather controllability by individuals plays an im-
portant role for the low acceptance level as well as the potentially high number of mortalities 
(severity). Nevertheless, the studies, summarized in Figure 2-2, show that it is generally 
possible to deal with risk, risk perception, and acceptance in a quantitative manner.  
To implement safety requirements based on risk acceptance, several concepts have been de-
veloped in different application areas. Because of the relationship between railway and road 
traffic, it is useful to refer to the CENELEC safety standard EN 50126. The development of 
this standard has been started in the 1990’s, where safety requirements based on quantitative 
risk analysis have been implemented and ALARP, MEM, and GAMAB have been intro-
duced as principles for risk acceptance. Those principles are briefly explained in the follow-
ing sections. 
2.1.2.2 As low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) 
ALARP tries to assess what is technically feasible considering economic sense and social 
acceptance. Between the two regions of generally unaccepted and broadly accepted risk, 
there is a tolerance range where risk is undertaken only if a benefit is desired and where each 
risk must be made as low as reasonably practicable. 
Derivation of risk figures is not directly applicable because EN 50126 failed to give certain 
values for generally unaccepted and broadly accepted risk. However, other authors, for ex-
ample Risk & Reliability Associates, deliver both values46: The two key levels seem to be 
located around road death statistics (about 10-4 per person and year) and the chances of being 
struck by lightning (about 10-7 per person and year). If something is more dangerous than 
driving a car, the risk is unacceptable. If something is less dangerous than being struck by 
lightning, it is not required to be reduced further. In the range between these two figures, 
cost benefit studies are appropriate to reduce the risk to as low as reasonably practicable. 
Especially this lower ALARP limit corresponds very well with the acceptance criterion for 
major technology risks shown in Figure 2-2. 
                                                 
46 Risk & Reliability Associates Pty Ltd, Consulting Engineers: Risk and Reliability (2004). 
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2.1.2.3 Minimum Endogenous Mortality (MEM) 
MEM is based upon age- and gender-specific mortality rates47. Although the absolute values 
of the mortality rates change with birth cohort, they show a typical development over age as 
well as a significant minimum at an age of about 10 years, which is about 5∙10-5 per person 
and year. The related mortality at an age of 10 years is defined as “minimum endogenous 
mortality”48. The MEM principle demands that a new system does not significantly contrib-
ute to the existing minimum endogenous mortality. EN 50126 specifies that the individual 
risk due to a certain technical system must not exceed 1/20th of the minimum endogenous 
mortality, considering that people are normally exposed to the risk of several technical sys-
tems. This means that the acceptable individual risk of a certain technical system is 2.5∙10-6 
per person and year, when using latest mortality rates as a basis (EN 50126 uses mortality 
rates from the 80’s). This value corresponds very well with the acceptance criterion for in-
voluntary risks shown in Figure 2-2. 
2.1.2.4 Globalement au moins aussi bon (GAMAB)49  
GAMAB, (or GAME globalement au moins équivalent), requires, unlike MEM, the exist-
ence of a reference system with – currently – accepted residual risks. According to GAMAB, 
residual risks caused by a new system must not exceed those of the reference system. In 
other words: a new system must offer a level of risk generally at least as good as the one 
offered by any equivalent existing system. Hence, it is necessary to identify the risk of an 
equivalent existing system. 
Looking for the acceptable risk of highly automated driving in a certain application area 
according to GAMAB, the current risk of an equivalent existing system in the same applica-
tion area needs to be identified. To derive acceptance requirements for a controlled-access 
highway pilot, the current risk on German Autobahn during manual driving is analyzed. Ta-
ble 2-1 shows average distances between two accidents referring to severity levels according 
to ISO 26262. However, for other AD3+ systems, there might be no reference system be-
cause the use-case is not covered by today’s vehicle fleet. 
                                                 
47 Destatis: Kohortensterbertafeln für Deutschland (2017). 
48 Although the mortality statistics does not differentiate between endogenous and exogenous causes for the 
death. 
49 English: generally at least as good as 
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Table 2-1 Accidents on German Autobahn50 
Sever-
ity 
ISO 26262 Severity 
level 
Average distance be-
tween two accidents of 
this level 
Accident rate per driven 
distance 
Fatal S3 660  106 km 1.52  10-9/km 
Severe 
Injuries 
S2 53.2  106 km 1.88  10-8/km 
Injuries S1 12.5  106 km 8.00  10-8/km 
w/o In-
juries 
S0 7.5  106 km 1.33  10-7/km 
 
Figure 2-1 (right) shows the observed accident rates on Autobahn versus severity levels ac-
cording to ISO 26262. Comparing risks of the different severity categories requires 
weighting of the different levels. However, there is no standardized way (see also Baum51, 
Hydén52 and Wachenfeld53). The lines of constant risk in Figure 2-1 assume that the differ-
ence between adjacent severity levels is one order of magnitude, or in other words that an 
accident with fatalities is assessed with a ten times higher severity than an accident with 
severe injuries. However, that does not mean that a fatal accident is definitely ten times 
worst. The factor of ten fits to the current accident frequency, which could change in the 
future e.g. due to enhanced passive safety. However, this assumption allows defining a band 
of constant risk in current traffic, which can be used as reference. As already discussed in 
section 2.1.2.2, the risk will not be accepted above the upper envelope. Beyond the lower 
envelope, the risk might be accepted. Between both lines is a transition area. In accordance 
with the ALARP principle, this is a tolerance zone where risk is undertaken if a benefit is 
desired and where each risk must be made as low as reasonably practicable. 
In Figure 2-2, the results of the application of the different risk acceptance principles are 
displayed related to the risk acceptance limits of the different expositions explained previ-
ously. The different approaches for the mortality risk are summarized. On the one hand, it 
shows that the application of different risk acceptance principles delivers comparable and 
consistent results. On the other hand, it demonstrates that we have to deal with a relatively 
broad range of applicable acceptance criteria.  
                                                 
50 Steininger, U. et al.: Validation of Assisted and Automated Driving (2016). 
51 Baum, H. et al.: Volkswirtschaftliche Kosten durch Straßenverkehrsunfälle in Deutschland (2010). 
52 Hydén, C.: Method for traffic safety evaluation (1987). 
53 Wachenfeld, W. H.: Dissertation, How Stochastic can Help to Introduce AD (2017), pp. 26ff. 
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Figure 2-1 Left: Illustration of risk; Right: Quantitative accident risk on German highways54,55 
 
Figure 2-2 Application of different risk acceptance principles to highway accidents, translated from Stein-
inger and Wech56, based on Fritzsche57, GAMAB is based on the risk on German controlled-access highways, 
MEM is based on the current mortality tables. 
Considering the impact of voluntary exposure, different groups of users have to be distin-
guished, for example users of highly automated driving systems and other traffic partici-
pants. Finally, a comparison with other technologies – especially other traffic systems and 
                                                 
54 Steininger, U. et al.: Validation of Assisted and Automated Driving (2016). 
55 Schöner, H.-P.: Challenges and Approaches for Testing of Highly Automated Vehicles (2014). 
56 Steininger, U.; Wech, L.: Wie sicher ist sicher genug? Sicherheit und Risiko zwischen Wunsch und Wirk-
lichkeit (2013). 
57 Fritzsche, A. F.: Wie sicher leben wir? (1986). 
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technologies that deliver a high personal benefit – seems to be useful. Additionally, a de-
crease in total mortality risk is expected in the future, following the trend in the last decades 
and centuries. Therefore, risk acceptance might change over time.  
2.1.3 Introduction Strategies and Risk-handling in other Domains 
Automated driving challenging is not the only technology with a challenging safety valida-
tion. In the following risk-handling in pharmacy and aviation is briefly discussed. The ex-
ample of aviation is obvious because it is another traffic system, where more and more au-
tomation was introduced in the past. Pharmaceutics are especially interesting because 
weighting risks and benefits is crucial because every (new) medicine has side-effects. 
2.1.3.1 Pharmaceutical Risk/Benefit-Analyses 
When introducing new medicines to the market a pharmaceutical risk/benefit-analyses is 
mandatory and established. It is typically done by clinical studies in comparison to no treat-
ment (absolute risk/benefit) and treatment with alternative drugs (relative risk/benefit).58 Ad-
ditionally, the supervision of the product in the market is mandatory. When the estimation of 
the risk/benefit changes, the product needs to be re-evaluated. In analogy to the introduction 
of automated driving, this would mean a supervision of accident statistics. If the system does 
not meet the requirements, a mandatory update or even a prohibition would follow. This 
would happen for example, if side effects become known that were not discovered in clinical 
studies before market introduction.  
Another aspect is product liability. For pharmaceutical products, the manufacturer is not li-
able when damages occur that are considered acceptable during the risk/benefit analysis. 
Even more, if the threats were not considered during the analysis but would not have changed 
the results (e.g. because the occurrence rate is low or the benefits are overwhelming), there 
is no liability.59a  
There is no mandatory quantitative measure for conducting the risk/benefit analysis because 
weighting the different factors is challenging and varies from case to case. Instead the anal-
ysis shall be assessed using scientific findings according to the legislation in Germany 
(§84(2) No. 1, AMG59b). It is also practice weighing fatal risks with very low occurrence rate 
but benefits in curing a non-fatal diseases.60,59c However, the introduction of AD3+ will even 
influence passers-by that have no direct benefit. In pharmacy, it concerns usually the same 
                                                 
58 Hart, D.: Die Nutzen/Risiko-Abwägung im Arzneimittelrecht (2005). 
59 Besch, V.: Produkthaftung für fehlerhafte Arzneimittel (2000), p. 54.a: p. 54; b: p. 58; c: pp. 61-62 
60 Dieppe, P. et al.: Balancing benefits and harms (2004). 
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individual. Therefore, it is questionable if the transfer of risk to others due to societal benefits 
is reasonable.  
If the same logic were applied to AD3+, that would mean that a risk/benefit analysis shall be 
conducted comparing additional risks e.g. due to systematic failures to the benefit of reduc-
ing accidents. Similar to pharmaceutics, it is impossible to guarantee that all risks are known 
before the introduction. Hence, a field surveillance should be mandatory, re-evaluating the 
risk/benefit analysis at a regular basis. The manufacturer would not be liable, even if new 
risks occur that do not change the overall assessment. 
2.1.3.2 New Technologies in Aviation61 
In aviation, passengers are exposed to a technical system without having personal control. 
Although severe accidents happen, its safety is accepted by most of the population. Aviation 
has become increasingly automated in the past, although today’s systems are still comparable 
to SAE level 2 because they are supervised by the crew. However, it is not directly compa-
rable because the safe state is very difficult to obtain. This increased difficulty is compen-
sated by reaction time that is usually longer than in a vehicle. Due to the long travelling 
distance and the fact that accidents mostly happen during take-off and landing, accident rates 
are typically given per flight and not per travel distance. Accidents and critical scenes are 
strictly reported and collected in a database, so we have even more profound data compared 
to road traffic. To compare annual risks for the average person, the average driving distance 
and the number of flights per year is used. One fatal accident happens about once per ten 
million flights62. With a typical exposure of two flights per year, the risk of a fatal accident 
would be lower than the risk of involuntary exposure finv and about one order of magnitude 
lower than driving on a highway. However, with 20 flights per year, one would be exposed 
to a risk that is in the same order of magnitude. Therefore, the levels of risk are in fact com-
parable, if only driving on Autobahn is considered. However, users typically drive on all 
types of roads. The risk of car accident is at least one order of magnitude higher in total, so 
the superior reputation of air traffic is justified. Additionally, accidents of lesser severity are 
much more frequent in vehicles traffic compared to aviation. 
As mentioned before, aviation has become increasingly automated over the past decades. 
The detailed collection of data in aviation allows an analysis per generation of airplanes, 
which was summarized by Airbus Industries62. As depicted in Figure 2-3, with every intro-
duction of a new technology generation, the fatal accident rate for this new generation was 
higher than state of the art. Due to the low number of new airplanes at introduction, this trend 
                                                 
61 This section is taken from Junietz, P. et al.: Macroscopic Risk Requirements (2019) 
62 Airbus: Commercial Aviation Accidents 1958-2016 (2017). 
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cannot be observed in the total accident rate. Nevertheless, the introduction was clearly ben-
eficial to society in total because after an introduction phase of five to ten years, the new 
generation achieved the lowest accident rate of all. 
Judging from this data, new generations of airplanes are not tested in a way to prove statis-
tically that the system is superior to the former. In fact, this is impossible; because the 
knowledge about the new system’s behavior is incomplete and only field experience can 
reduce the unknowns. Like AD3+, statistical testing is neither economically feasible nor 
necessary because the strict supervision of air traffic allows efficient improvement in case 
of critical scenes or accidents. However, the highest automation in commercial air traffic is 
still comparable to SAE level 2, so human error is still a factor. Nevertheless, the leap in 
accident rate occurred with the introduction of technology, either because of flaws in human-
machine-interaction or in the technology itself.  
 
Figure 2-3 Fatal accidents with different generations of airplanes in commercial traffic. Dotted line means 
less than one million flights a year. First generation: Early commercial jets, Second generation: More inte-
grated Auto Flight System, Third generation: Glass cockpit and Flight-Management-System, Fourth genera-
tion: Fly-By-Wire with flight envelope protection.63  
                                                 
63 Airbus: Commercial Aviation Accidents 1958-2016 (2017), p. 17. 
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2.1.4 Summary for Existing Safety Requirements64  
Most approaches try to define safety requirements focused on the requirements for a whole 
society while requirements of individuals are often neglected. However, there are studies 
that establish risk acceptance criteria dependent on the type of exposure or the individual 
benefits.  
Comparing the risks in other domains shows that directly after introduction the risk is higher 
than expected. Additionally, in pharmaceutics, a market observation and a re-evaluation of 
the risk is mandatory. In aviation, accidents and critical situations are monitored. One could 
argue that it is unethical to release a system that is not tested in the best way possible. How-
ever, one could also argue the opposite. First, it is impossible to completely test a system 
operating in an uncontrolled environment because there might still be scenes that the tester 
was not aware of. These “unknown unknowns” cannot be tested. Second, a stricter approval 
process would prevent technical progress because a profit-oriented development would be-
come impossible. It seems possible if not likely that the accident rate of automated vehicles 
will behave in a similar to aviation. We should be aware of that possibility and focus on the 
improvement of the system in case of a detected critical scene or accident. A similar thought 
is also expressed by Kalra and Groves65. The delayed introduction of AD3+ could in fact 
risk the lives of many people because the system is believed to improve safety over time. 
With a combined testing strategy of simulation, proving ground tests, and real traffic tests, 
it is still unlikely to complete a logical proof of safety because every validation test has 
certain underlying assumptions. In order to deal with this uncertain safety performance, ac-
cidents, unexpected critical scenes, and near misses must be monitored similar to air traffic, 
in order to find flaws in the system (including infrastructure and human interaction) with the 
chance to improve them.  
Research questions that can be derived for the definition of macroscopic safety requirements 
are discussed in subchapter 3.1. 
2.2 Safety Validation Approaches 
This subchapter discusses existing approaches for test and safety validation. The focus is on 
the dynamic product test that is defined as a test where the object-under-test (OuT) is exe-
cutable and able to produce an assessable result66. 
                                                 
64 Parts of this subchapter are taken from Junietz et al.: Macroscopic Risk Requirements (2019) 
65 Kalra, N.; Groves, D. G.: The Enemy of Good (2017). 
66 Nörenberg, R.: Effizienter Regressionstest von E/E-Systemen (2012). 
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2.2.1 Categorization of Dynamic Testing of AD3+ 
In order to compare the different approaches, the assessment methodology introduced by 
Junietz et al.67 is used. It is explained briefly in this section. As this is a validation test, the 
estimation of the safety performance SP is the overall target instead of the improvement of 
the function as in testing during development. The test is separated into three dimensions 
with seven sub-dimensions in total (Table 2-2) that are explained in the following. Each sub-
dimension has a best-case value for a full test approach. Every deviation from the full test 
approach should be justified and the consequences on the test outcome discussed.  
Object under Test (A): What is tested? 
The OuT is divided into two sub-dimensions. First the OuT itself (A.1), tests can be executed 
with the whole vehicle or on system, sub-system, or component level. All tests might be 
equally valuable in order to estimate the SP, but it should be discussed and reasoned, when-
ever the test is not on vehicle level. Hence, the scale level is nominal. The OuT can be tested 
on different abstraction levels (A.2). This can be the real OuT or a simulation. In general, 
the test in the real OuT is most valid, while validity of deviation and the consequences for 
the trust in the result must be discussed. 
Stimulus (B): How is tested? 
The Stimulus is divided into three sub-dimensions containing all test elements that are not 
part of the OuT. For the test case selection itself, the full test approach would be the full 
coverage of all possible scenarios without any effort in reducing the mileage or the number 
of test scenarios. A reduction could be achieved by using knowledge about the OuT (B.1) or 
the surroundings (B.2). However, even without this reduction, the test might not cover all 
possible driving conditions due to a lack of information about the current or future traffic 
scenes. If the test scope is reduced e.g. due to a limited use-case, this reduction should be 
justified. In many cases, tests are executed in an artificial environment, a simulation or on a 
proving ground. This abstraction of the stimulus is the third sub-dimension (B.3).  
Assessment Criterion (C): How is assessed? 
The assessment is divided into direct measurement of the accident risk or the abstraction 
using an estimated accident probability and severity e.g. as in ISO 26262. This is often done 
because of insufficient data to derive an exact accident risk. In addition, the scale level can 
be ordinal instead of a ratio scale because the exact value is difficult to estimate.  
 
                                                 
67 Junietz, P. et al.: Evaluation of Safety Validation Approaches (2018). 
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Table 2-2 Categories for the Assessment of Safety Validation Methods68 
Test dimension Sub-dimension Scale 
level 
Full test approach 
OuT 
representative 
(A) 
OuT (A.1) nominal Whole vehicle 
OuT abstraction level (A.2) ordinala Real entity 
Stimulus (B) Used OuT knowledge for 
selection (B.1) 
ordinala Not any / full coverageb 
Used surround system 
knowledge (B.2) 
ordinala Not any / full coverageb 
Stimulus abstraction level 
(B.3) 
ordinala Real world 
Assessment 
criterion (C)  
Abstraction of assessment 
(direct or indirect) (C.1) 
ordinal Accident risk / SP 
Assessment scale level (C.2) ordinal  ratio 
a. An improvement of the scale level to an interval scale level might be achievable due to an application of appropriate scientific methods 
(measurements, analyses etc.) 
b. Although full coverage might not be reached, it should be mentioned here for reasons of completeness. 
2.2.2 Real World Testing 
Testing with a real vehicle in the real traffic comes closest to a straightforward full test ap-
proach in dimension A and B. In the following, section 0 describes a deduction of the re-
quired testing strategy and effort for a full test approach in all dimensions. Furthermore, it is 
discussed, why it is impossible to achieve a full test in dimensions B.1 and B.2. Section 
2.2.2.2 discusses existing studies that use criticality metrics as an indirect assessment crite-
rion (C.1).  
2.2.2.1 Estimating the Effort for a Full Test Approach 
A full test approach offers the chance of valid test environment and high completeness of 
driving scenes, if the test is executed on sufficient driven distance. Based on today’s fre-
quency of severe accidents, Winner and Weitzel69 calculated a minimum testing distance of 
more than 100 million km to prove superior safety of the OuT compared with the reference 
frequency of severe accidents. They assumed that the occurrence of an accident is Poisson 
distributed, that the OuT is in fact twice as safe as the reference, and a 5% error probability. 
If statistical proof of a reduction of fatal accident on German controlled-access highways is 
required, the testing mileage increases to more than 6.6 billion km.70 Kalra and Paddock 
                                                 
68 Junietz, P. et al.: Evaluation of Safety Validation Approaches (2018), p. 3. 
69 Winner, H.; Weitzel, A.: Die Freigabefalle des autonomen Fahrens (2011). 
70 Wachenfeld, W.; Winner, H.: The Release of Autonomous Vehicles (2016). 
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calculate a similar mileage for the US71. Wachenfeld72a generalizes the calculations by intro-
ducing the distance factor ad that is multiplied with the reference distance (e.g. average dis-
tance between fatal accidents) to determine the required mileage to proof increased safety. 
Figure 2-4 visualizes the distance factor that is dependent only on the true OuT’s SP and the 
desired error probability,. The steepness of the dotted line is dependent from the SP of the 
OuT compared to the reference (index bench). The figure also shows that a proof of de-
creased safety also requires high mileage, if the OuT is not significantly worse than the ref-
erence. 
With typical distances between fatal accidents as reference, the required testing mileage is 
too high to allow an economically feasible proof of safety. Even with a perfectly safe OuT a 
distance factor of three is derived for an error probability of 5% indicated by the vertical 
axis. 
Instead of field tests on random routes in an unsupervised test, the route could be chosen 
according to known challenges for the automation (e.g. direct sunlight during dusk) in a 
supervised field test. So knowledge about the OuT (B.1) would be used and deviation in test 
result should be discussed. 
 
Figure 2-4 Distance factor for different SP (modified from Wachenfeld72b) 
                                                 
71 Kalra et al.: How Many Miles of Driving Would It Take? (2016). 
72 Wachenfeld, W. H.: Dissertation, How Stochastic can Help to Introduce AD (2017), p. 47.a: p. 47; b: p. 78 
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2.2.2.2 Extrapolating the Accident Risk from Critical Scenes 
One of the reasons why the required driving distance in real world testing is so high is the 
low frequency of accidents from which the SP is estimated. Faster evaluation is desirable not 
only to reduce the testing effort, but also to accelerate the response to road traffic abnormal-
ities after the introduction based on field monitoring. If, instead of accidents, critical scenes 
could be used as a basis for statistical evaluation, evaluation could be done earlier or faster, 
as the number of events per distance is higher. 
Typically, the metric algorithms assess recorded data. Then either scenarios are identified 
and their occurrence rate used for safety evaluation73, or the distribution of metric values is 
used directly to assess the safety. This section introduces state of the art metrics and extrap-
olation methods. 
2.2.2.2.1 State of the art Metrics 
The so called time-headway (THW)74 or time gap (as in ISO 15622) describes the time that 
the front of the ego-vehicle needs with the current velocity to reach the point where the rear 
of the preceding vehicle is at the same point in time. There is no information whether there 
might be a conflict with the current motion state or not. 
The by far most known class of metrics are the Time-to-X (TTX) metrics. They typically 
assume a constant vehicle motion. As the most simple prediction method, constant velocity 
and course angle is assumed. Models that assume constant acceleration and turn rate also 
exist. Then, the time to a certain event is calculated assuming no other interaction. This event 
can either be a collision to calculate the Time-to-Collision (TTC)75, or the departure of the 
road to calculate the Time-to-Edge-Crossing (TTEC)76. Both metrics only provide the time 
left until the incident without any indication, if the prevention of the incident is physically 
possible or requires increased driving skill. However, they are fast to compute and require 
only few measurements from the environment. These metrics should only have a correlation 
to accident probability, if the driver is inattentive, because there is no information about the 
difficulty of accident prevention.  
Metrics77 that calculate the available reaction time of the ego-vehicle are Time-to-Brake 
(TTB), Time-to-Steer (TTS), and Time-to-Kickdown. The maximum value of the three met-
rics is also called Time-to-React (TTR). The main difference to the aforementioned metrics 
is that they include information about the difficulty of the prevention of an accident. How-
ever, there is no information about the difficulty of the maneuver once the driver reacts. As 
                                                 
73 Guo, F. et al.: Near Crashes as Crash Surrogate (2010), pp. 9-12. 
74 Forbes, T. W.: Human factors in highway design, operation and safety problems (1960). 
75 Hayward, J. C.: TTC (1972). 
76 Gordon, T. J. et al.: Multivariate analysis (2013). 
77 Hillenbrand, J. et al.: Situation assessment algorithm (2005). 
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adaption to the aforementioned time-based metrics, Winner et al.78 suggest using the recip-
rocal as measure for criticality. Using the reciprocal, results in a monotone increase of criti-
cality with increasing value. 
At least for braking maneuvers, the metrics required deceleration (AREQ)79 and brake thread 
number (BTN)80 provide information about the difficulty of the reaction. Both calculate the 
required deceleration to prevent an accident that would have happened with constant move-
ment of the involved vehicles, similar to the TTX metrics. BTN is additionally normalized 
with the maximal physically possible deceleration that is dependent from the available fric-
tion coefficient. However, it is uncertain how the driving difficulty and hence the accident 
probability is correlated with those metrics. Another disadvantage of BTN is that only lon-
gitudinal scenarios, where the accident is prevented by braking only, are considered. Jans-
son81 suggests a combined metric that calculates the necessary acceleration, also in multiple-
object scenarios. However, all aforementioned metrics (except THW) can only be applied in 
scenes, where constant driving would result in an accident. Scenarios where the object and 
the ego-vehicle would miss each other are not considered because no reaction is necessary. 
Nevertheless, they might be critical because minor disturbance would result in a collision. 
The Time-to-closest-Encounter (TTCE)82 calculates the time to the closest approach of the 
vehicles with constant driving or other prediction models. A similar mechanism is used for 
the Post-Encroachment-Time (PET)83 that calculate the time difference between a vehicle 
leaving an area and the next car entering the same area. In other words, the time gap between 
two vehicles is calculated when the vehicles drive in an angle up to 90 degrees e.g. in cross-
ing scenarios. Hence, PET can be considered as the extension of THW beyond longitudinal 
scenarios. 
A separate class of metrics uses the measured movement of the ego-vehicle that is evaluated 
a posteriori without any prediction of the scenario outcome. This is helpful in particular when 
the environment information is incomplete. In large studies, vehicles are often only equipped 
with basic sensor setups to reduce costs. Unusual high values of the recordings of the vehi-
cle’s motion (e.g. acceleration and steering angle) are an indication for a critical scene. With 
a single driver, the individual driving behavior would influence the result. Hence, those met-
rics are typically used in the evaluation of large datasets such as naturalistic driving studies 
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(NDS, e.g. SHRP284) or field operational tests (FOT, e.g. euroFOT85), typically together with 
other metrics (e.g. TTC). Appendix A summarizes the used thresholds that indicate an ex-
treme maneuver . On an even larger scale, accelerations from smartphone data is used86 to 
locate areas with increased braking activity.  
Metrics that are used in trajectory planning evaluate the whole environment and are feasible 
for multi-object scenarios and cannot only rely on constant behavior. The target is to find a 
suitable trajectory that fulfills the driving mission of the ego-vehicle, while assessing the risk 
due to the environment information. 
Yi87 separates trajectory planning methods into geometric based, sampling based, potential 
field methods and optimization methods. In sampling-based methods, the prediction of the 
environment is often integrated. Otherwise, it is predicted in a previous step. 
Geometry or maneuver based sampling is a simple and fast way to find suitable evasion or 
braking maneuvers. Schmidt88 describes the computation of evasive trajectories in multi-
object scenarios. Using the driving dynamic potential, the reachable areas are computed de-
pending on the environment. Stählin89 parameterizes sigmoid curves to find suitable evasion 
trajectories. Similar approaches are described by Rodemerk90 and Käfer91. 
Sampling methods that use varying inputs for acceleration or steering, are suitable to cover 
complicated maneuver combinations but they are also used for assessing the criticality of a 
scene: 
The most common sampling method is Monte-Carlo sampling92, where model inputs are 
generated at random following a given distribution function. The results are different epi-
sodes based on the identical scene. Broadhurst et al.93 assess the criticality of future out-
comes, where the inputs are distributed following a normal distribution. Eidehall and Peters-
son94 add an additional probability distribution for a reaction to other objects depending on 
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their relative position. With Gaussian distribution of inputs, higher acceleration are un-
derrepresented, so the computational effort is high in order to cover all possible trajectories. 
Zhao et al.95 therefore use the method of importance sampling, where a different density 
function is used that favors rare events. After the sampling, criticality is assessed by the 
relative proportion of accident-free trajectories. Though, one could argue that the majority 
of trajectories that are generated is more or less straight, but there is no information about 
the difficulty of the accident-free trajectories. There is also no guarantee that all relevant 
trajectories are included, especially in scenarios that require more than one maneuver such 
as a double lane-change. Furthermore, the effort increases when more trajectories shall be 
covered. To conquer this challenge, Stumper et al. 96 use Chebyshev polynomials with sam-
pled acceleration inputs and varying initial positions of object vehicles. The resulting criti-
cality assessment is used as feature for a machine learning approach in order to assess criti-
cality directly from the initial position.97 
Instead of sampling, the different future trajectories can be represented by probabilistic 
methods as in Eggert et al.98,99 They present a Gaussian prediction that uses different distri-
butions for lateral and longitudinal prediction and a survival analysis that is based on likeli-
hood of collision based on trajectory prediction. Uncertainties are addressed by defining the 
steepness factor of the resulting risk distribution depending on environment, and maneuver 
prediction uncertainties.  
To find the single best trajectory regarding certain conditions, optimization or potential field 
methods can be used. A potential field uses a distribution of costs, typically based on sur-
rounding objects that reflect the ego-vehicle. Optimization methods include the driving mis-
sion and criticality in a joint cost function to find the trajectory with the minimal costs. 
Sometimes, constraints are set to prevent the collision with objects.100,101,102 
2.2.2.2.2 Accident risk extrapolation – existing studies 
The primary use case for aforementioned metrics in this thesis is the extrapolation of acci-
dent risk or at least the accident probability. This section summarizes existing studies apply-
ing metrics together with extrapolation methods. To extrapolate the accident probability from 
the metrics described above, there are two different methods that are analyzed in this section, 
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highlighting the metrics used and possible consequences. The two methods are correlation 
methods and statistical extrapolation of extreme values. 
Stipancic et al.103 use correlation between the numbers of critical braking maneuvers col-
lected from smartphone data. Maneuvers with an acceleration of less than -2 m/s² are classi-
fied as “high braking events”, acceleration of more than 2 m/s² classified as “high accelera-
tion events”. Especially at intersections, the correlation between the frequency of these 
events and crashes with a Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient of about 0.5 - 0.6 was 
observed, suggesting a monotonous relation, but strongly depending on the selected thresh-
old and filter parameters of the GPS data. An approach to link the severity of the crash was 
inconclusive. 
Songchitruksa and Tarko104 first suggested using Extreme Value Theory (EVT) to derive 
crash frequencies from criticality metrics. They used PET to analyze conflicts during right 
turn in crossing scenes. For most crossings, the four-year average of collisions was in the 
95% confidence interval of the observed counts. However, for some crossings there were 
overestimations and underestimations outside the interval. The authors assume that the same 
values of PET can occur in different scenes with different inherent risk, so there is no mo-
notonous relation between PET and risk. However, EVT appears to be a valuable method for 
extrapolating the crash frequency. The authors contributed four key considerations for the 
application of EVT: 
“1. Crash proximity measure corresponding with the studied type of crash 
must be defined. 
2. A valid crash proximity measure must be observable and possess a con-
tinuous characteristic that can represent crash-free operations as well 
as characterize a collision. 
3. A definitive boundary between crash and non-crash must exist. 
4. The risk estimation method should include a bias-variance trade-off, a 
choice of r value [the choice of a threshold for asymptotic observa-
tions], and identification of nonstationarity and associated covari-
ates.” 104b 
The first consideration in particular is crucial for the design of criticality metrics and is often 
neglected. The type of accidents predicted depends on the metric used. If all types of acci-
dents shall be predicted, one or more metrics that address all types of accidents are required. 
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Guo et al.105 analyzed near-crash events in the 100-Car NDS. The metrics that determined 
the near-crash were metrics that measure the driver’s action a posteriori (acceleration, yaw 
rate) and TTC. They found that the causes of crashes are also found in near-crashes and 
analyzed six causes (distraction, surface conditions, traffic density, lighting, weather and 
visual obstruction). They found a correlation between the frequency of occurrence of near-
crashes and crashes in all six categories. However, the relationship was strongly dependent 
on the scenario (e.g. conflict with lead vehicle: 380 near-crash; 15 crash, single-vehicle con-
flict: 48 near-crash; 24 crash). This suggests that the metrics may not be sophisticated 
enough, e.g. critical scenes solved by other vehicles or requiring only a minor driver action 
are not detected. 
Jonasson and Rootzén106 analyzed data from the same study using the minimum TTC in a 
scenario as criticality metric and applied EVT to estimate rear-striking crashes from near-
crash scenes. They estimated the crash probability to be 2∙10-5 in a rear-striking near crash-
scene. However, 14 rear-striking crashes and 384 rear-striking critical scenes indicate that 
the probability is 175 times larger than the estimate. The authors argue that the crashes oc-
curred in slow moving traffic, while the near-crashes occurred in free-flowing traffic. Again, 
the circumstances of the critical scene vary, so the metrics do not apply to both scenes. Najm 
et al.107 used their methodology to predict a crash probability of 1.3∙10-5 using data from 
SHRP2. The result is in the same order of magnitude as before. A further indication of the 
discrepancy of the prediction compared to the true events could be the entity of TTC to return 
a comparable criticality only with similar relative velocity (comp. Junietz et al.108), since the 
necessary reaction time or TTB develops as follows: 
 𝜏TB = −
𝑑long
𝑣rel
+
𝑣rel
2𝜇𝑔
= 𝜏TC +
𝑣rel
2𝜇𝑔
 (2.1) 
TTB has a component that is proportional to the relative velocity that must be reduced to 
zero to prevent a collision. This is not covered by TTC, which proves that scenes with dif-
ferent relative velocities are incomparable. 
Gordon et al.109 first analyzed various criticality metrics for lane departure crashes in the 
SHRP2 NDS. Using a statistic method called Seemingly Unrelated Regression Models, they 
identified TTEC as the best metric (out of three) to predict the number of lane departure 
crashes. They used EVT together with TTEC and compared the estimated rate of lane depar-
ture events with the events that had occurred on a monitored highway over four years. Ac-
cording to the estimate, departure events were about seven times more likely than the actual 
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lane departure accident rate. However, not every lane departure necessarily leads to an acci-
dent. Therefore, TTEC contradicts the third consideration from Songchitruksa and Tarko 
(see above), as there is no clear limit in TTEC when an accident occurs. The authors also 
pointed out that there is a difference between crash risk and injury risk. Hence, two different 
methods for estimating the potential severity in the near-crash scenes are presented, the es-
timation by the relative velocity weighted with the object’s masses (impulses) and the what-
if crash simulation when no evasive action was taken. 
Asljung et al.110,111 applied both TTC and BTN to two different data sets and further applied 
EVT with both metrics. In a validation step, they compared the estimated crash rate with the 
MaR known from accident statistics. It was expected that the actual accident rate was within 
the 5% error interval of the estimated value. However, in this study only BTN was accepted 
as a valid metric. No collisions were estimated with TTC alone. The authors conclude that 
criticality metrics describing proximity to an inevitable collision state are better suited than 
metrics describing proximity to collision.  
In conclusion, EVT in particular promises valid extrapolation if an adequate metric is found. 
When applying EVT, the validity of the metric for the type of accident should be discussed. 
Some requirements for these metrics are available, but seem to require refinement, as some 
have proven to be more useful than others, although they are appropriate metrics according 
to the requirements. 
2.2.2.2.3 Introduction to Extreme Value Theory 
In the previous section, it was shown that EVT became the dominant method in extrapolating 
crash likelihood based on critical scenes. This section explains why EVT is useful and how 
it is applied. The origin of EVT lies in financial statistics and the prediction of natural disas-
ters. It is designed to extrapolate the occurrence of rare events based on measurements or 
observation of events of lesser severity. Popular examples are the daily losses of stock port-
folios or the occurrence rate of high sea levels exceeding dike height.112,113 By analogy with 
these examples, the accident occurrence rate could be extrapolated from observations that 
are scenes of a particular criticality or proximity to an accident. In contrast to the two exam-
ples, however, it is unclear for most metrics whether an increased value is actually always 
closer to an accident. Nevertheless, EVT should be applicable, but the choice of metric in-
fluences the result. Until now, only metrics that address a particular type of accident, e.g. 
front-to-rear collisions was used with EVT. 
If the values of a criticality metric applied to the data are considered as independent obser-
vations, a distribution function could be fitted to determine the occurrence rate of accidents. 
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However, there is insufficient data on the outline of the fitted distribution, so the fit is dom-
inated by uncritical scenarios, while the interesting part, the occurrence rate of accidents, is 
underrepresented. When the whole data is used, a fit is dominated by the uncritical part due 
to the high occurrence rate, which is problematic especially when the tail of the distribution 
is a so-called “fat-tail”, i.e. the occurrence rate is (much) higher than with a normal distribu-
tion. In these cases, a normal distribution could be the most accurate approximation to the 
overall observation of criticality values. Nevertheless, it still underestimates the occurrence 
rate in the tail. The approximation of the extreme values is done with generalized extreme 
value (GEV) distributions of three different types (Gumbel distribution for exponential de-
crease, Fréchet distribution for polynomial decrease and Weibull distribution that reaches 
the occurrence rate of zero)114a. 
In the following, the underlying mathematical principles are described, which lead from ob-
servation to the approximated distribution: 
If we have a criticality metric I that describes an accident condition, when it exceeds the 
value 𝐼𝑐. The probability distribution that the maximum of all n observations is less than the 
value z is described as: 
 
𝑃{max(𝐼1, … , 𝐼𝑛) ≤ 𝑧} = ∏𝑃{𝐼𝑖 ≤ 𝑧} = {𝐹(𝑧)}
𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (2.2) 
The standard approach in statistical modelling would be to estimate F from data, which is a 
good fit when many data points are available that are similar to z but inaccurate when the 
density of data points is low. As an alternative approach, EVT directly estimates 𝐹𝑛.  
Three different types of extreme value distributions are known (Gumbel, Fréchet and 
Weibull) that can be combined into a single formula whose shape-parameter 𝜉 defines one 
of the three types defined for {𝑧: 1 +
𝜉(𝑧−𝜆)
𝜎
> 0}  and the three parameters satisfying the 
conditions −∞ < 𝜆 < ∞, 𝜎 < 0 and − ∞ < 𝜉 < ∞ .114a In this chapter, only formulas for 
𝜉 ≠ 0 are given. The formulas resulting for 𝜉 → 0 and are given by Coles114b. 
 
{𝐹(𝑧)}𝑛 ≈ 𝐺(𝑧) = exp {− [1 + 𝜉 (
𝑧 − 𝜆
𝜎
)]
−1 𝜉⁄
}  (2.3) 
The three parameters are fitted from data, typically using a maximum likelihood approach, 
which is neither further described nor used in this thesis. This approach according to equation 
(2.3) is the so-called block-maxima approach, since the maximum of the measurements is 
used. For frequent data collection, the so-called peak-over-threshold approach is advanta-
geous.114c Instead of equation (2.2), the probability distribution for a value greater than 𝐼thr +
𝑧  is formulated as follows under the condition that 𝐼thr is exceeded: 
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𝑃{𝐼 − 𝐼thr > 𝑧|𝐼 > 𝐼thr} =
1 − 𝐹(𝐼thr + 𝑧)
1 − 𝐹(𝐼thr)
, 𝑧 > 0 (2.4) 
For 𝐼thr that are large compared to majority the recordings I:
115a 
 
𝑃{𝐼 − 𝐼thr > 𝑧|𝐼 > 𝐼thr} ≈ 1 − (1 +
𝜉𝑧
?̃?
)
−1 𝜉 ⁄
 
for   > 0 and (1 +
𝜉𝑧
𝜎 ̃
) > 0, where ?̃? = 𝜎 + 𝜉(𝐼thr − 𝜆) 
(2.5) 
Again, there are various methods for estimating parameters. In the following, the maximum 
likelihood approach ℓ(?̃?, 𝜉) is used for n observations maximizing the following equa-
tion:115b 
 ℓ(?̃?, 𝜉) = −𝑛log?̃? − (1 +
1
𝜉
)∑log(1 +
𝜉𝐼𝑖
?̃?
)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (2.6) 
A procedure for selecting the threshold value 𝐼thr is also required.
115c,116 There are no defin-
itive criteria for selection, as it is a trade-off between high variance when the threshold is 
high and there are few observations above the threshold, and bias when the threshold is too 
low and the asymptotic basis of the model is violated.115d Two methods are available. The 
first method uses the assumptions that the mean value of observation over the threshold is 
linear with increasing threshold, as described by Coles115e. The plot of the mean values is 
called the Mean Residual Life Plot. The threshold can be estimated before the parameter is 
estimated. This method is used in chapter 6. The second method is carried out after the pa-
rameter estimation and assumes that parameter estimates are stationary. The threshold is se-
lected as the highest value where the parameters remain approximately constant. For both 
methods, there are no limits that define which threshold is still valid. 
When the parameters are estimated, the occurrence rate 1/m of observation beyond a certain 
value 𝑃{𝐼 > 𝐼𝑚} is of interest, which is computed as follows
115f: 
 
𝑃{𝐼 > 𝐼𝑚} = 𝛾thr [1 + 𝜉 (
𝐼𝑚 − 𝐼thr
?̃?
)]  −1 𝜉⁄   =1/m 
where 𝛾thr = 𝑃{𝐼 > 𝐼thr} 
(2.7) 
Which can be rearranged to: 
 
𝐼𝑚(𝑚) = 𝐼thr +
?̃?
𝜉
[(𝑚𝛾thr)
𝜉 − 1] (2.8) 
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The probability 𝛾thr can be determined directly from the recordings. However, the variance 
should not be neglected, as well as the variances of the other parameter estimates.117a The 
variances for the parameters ?̃? and 𝜉 can be approximated by numerical means by maxim-
izing the equation (2.6), which leads to the variance-covariance matrix, or by analytical cal-
culation of the inverse Hessian matrix.117b The variance of 𝐼𝑚 is than approximated by the 
delta-method.117a 
Plotting Im over m yields the so called return level plot, which shows the occurrence rate of 
observations of the value Im.  If the observations are regular, this can be transformed into the 
average distance between two occurrence of this level and the distance between two occur-
rences Ic indicates the estimated distance of accidents. An example is given in Figure 2-5, 
where the green solid line is the estimate, dashed-red lines are the 95% confidence interval 
of parameter estimate and the value one of the BTN represents the accident.  
For safety validation, the worst-case estimate of the safety performance is of particular in-
terest. This is the return period in the lower 95% confidence interval on the return level, 
which corresponds to an accident (comp. Figure 2-5). 
 
Figure 2-5 Return level plot by Asljung et al.118 
2.2.3 Formal Verification 
Formal verification is technically not a dynamic testing method, because the OuT is not ex-
ecuted. Instead, it is proven that the implemented function does not violate formalized rules. 
The following assumption need to hold true in order to prove safety by formal verification: 
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 The rules must prevent accidents 
 Proof that the model does not violate the rules exists 
 The system and the model show identical behavior regarding the rules 
Especially if the system is tested on subsystem level, formal verification could be helpful 
verifying the planning algorithm. If it is guaranteed that the sensor input is sufficient and the 
planned trajectory is executed accordingly, safety on planning level could be guaranteed. 
Using formal verification for AD3+ validation was mainly suggested by Shalev-Shwartz et 
al.119 from Intel/Mobileye but also other authors have discussed the concept120. They showed 
that with formalized traffic rules and sensor inputs that are ideally correct or their maximal 
errors known, a formally safe system could be designed regarding the trajectory planning. 
With formal verification of the planning, the role of dynamic testing would reduce to the 
environment perception sensors and the trajectory control. However, especially the valida-
tion of the sensors is still a challenge because it is highly dependent on the different envi-
ronment conditions. Additionally, the other traffic participants’ behavior must be formalized 
and it is unclear if this is feasible in mixed traffic.   
2.2.4 Scenario-based Testing 
The idea of scenario-based testing is that instead of real world driving, only relevant test 
cases are extracted and tested in simulation or on test track. A scenario contains several 
scenes with the scenery (static objects), dynamic objects and the self-representation (e.g. 
skills, field of view) of the objects. The scenario in a test case could be defined with given 
object trajectories, or with object goals and a modelled object behavior.  
The scenario based testing has several deviations from the full test approach. First is the 
selection of scenarios that are tested. As not all possible scenarios can be tested due to eco-
nomic reasons, a selection or identification is required. Typically, scenarios that are chal-
lenging for the systems are selected as well as scenarios that are likely to happen. In other 
words, information about the OuT and the surroundings are used. Both are part of the cate-
gory stimulus (B.1 and B.2). Additionally, there is abstraction of the stimulus (B.3) because 
the representation of the environment is artificial and dependent on the simulation tool or 
the conditions on the test track. It should be argued if deviation from the real entity change 
the test result. In simulation, the environment is discrete and often modelled without infor-
mation about material and surface entities that are important for perception sensors. On prov-
ing grounds, the variety of the scenario might be limited e.g. because the road surface is 
always the same and the test track only offers limited objects to be placed on and at the side 
of the road. In simulation the OuT is abstracted and deviation should be considered as well 
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(A.2). Especially modelling sensors together with the environment to generate realistic ef-
fects is still unsolved as summarized for Radar sensors by Holder et al.121. 
Scenario-based testing involves the identification of test scenarios, the execution in a con-
trolled environment, and the assessment of the test result. The project PEGASUS122 aims to 
collect driving scenarios in a database in order to derive test cases. In Figure 2-6, the general 
method is depicted. It is separated into three main parts: the processing of the available in-
formation sources, the database where different information is collected, and the assessment 
and testing process, which is based on the scenario database. In all three parts further pro-
gress in research is required that is out of scope of this thesis. In the following the focus is 
especially on the use of MiR metrics in scenario-based testing. 
MiR metrics can be applied in two substeps of the overall method: first in the identification 
of critical scenarios and second, in the assessment of simulated test runs. However, the as-
sessment of test runs towards the estimation of SP is challenging because the exposure to the 
scenario is artificial and a human or a capable function could have anticipated the threat to 
avoid it. It remains unknown how often the scenario would occur in real-world driving. Also, 
the test scenarios are likely known during development so they are never surprising for the 
function and testing only the identified scenarios might overestimate the SP. 
Therefore, scenario based testing is eligible for comparing the performance of different driv-
ing functions or human drivers but not necessarily the overall safety. If all scenarios are 
handled accident-free, a high confidence in SP might still be established depending on the 
number of scenarios and the coverage of real driving. Nevertheless, the maturity level of the 
test process should be qualified, which will be discussed in section 2.2.5. In the following 
sections, the scenario identification will be discussed further, be it with metrics or other 
means. Besides the extraction from data, scenarios can also be identified using knowledge 
about the system and its surroundings or by using ontologies to derive scenarios that cover 
all possible driving scene.  
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Figure 2-6 Scenario-based testing approach in PEGASUS project123 after Wachenfeld et al.124 
2.2.4.1 Identification from Knowledge 
Test Scenarios can be derived from knowledge about the system or the occurring traffic con-
ditions. Possible approaches involve the analyses of critical driving scenes that are known 
from human driven traffic or the analysis of future traffic in a hazard analysis and risk as-
sessment (HARA) as suggested in ISO26262. Büker et al.125 suggest an identification pro-
cess based on HARA. They argue that it is impossible to find all scenarios that will be critical 
for AD3+ from data of today’s traffic. The underlying causes for the HARA are separated 
into three classes: First is the influence of the environment on the system, meaning that the 
system is unable to handle the environment conditions. As a result errors in the environment 
perception occur. Second is the influence of the automation on other traffic participants. The 
driving behavior of AD3+ might differ from the human behavior other traffic participants 
are used to. Misunderstandings e.g. due to passive and careful driving might be the conse-
quence causing distress in human drivers around the AD3+ vehicle and ultimately causing 
accidents. The third group contains errors caused by the interaction between the automation 
and the driver of the automated vehicles. Especially the so called mode confusion, a state in 
which the driver is unaware if the system is active or not might be an issue. After the HARA 
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125 Büker, M. et al.: Identifikation von Automationsrisiken hochautomatischer Fahrfunktionen (2019). 
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underlying causes in scenarios are derived based on an analysis of the chain of effects. Es-
pecially for the first two groups of underlying causes, the test scenarios for simulation are 
derived. The results from the third group could be used to derive guidelines for human ma-
chine interfaces. 
Even when core entities of a scenario are defined there is still a great number of possible 
concrete scenarios because of the high number of parameters. Amersbach et al.126 analyze 
typical scenarios and suggest a total number of possible scenarios in the order of magnitude 
of 1013 assuming reasonable discretization steps for the entities road width, infrastructure, 
moving objects and environment conditions. An approach to overcome the challenge of huge 
scenario numbers that cannot be generated or handled manually is the scenario creation with 
ontologies that are able to generate realistic scenarios based on formalized rules. Bagschik 
et al. 127 suggest an ontology using a 5-layer model as depicted in Figure 2-7.128 The model 
does not include digital information yet, which are added in a sixed layer by Sauerbier et 
al.129 The entities in the scenario are connected by logical constraints that prevent physically 
impossible combinations of scenarios and decide whether all traffic objects drive according 
to traffic rules (or not). The road level consists of elements described by the German guide-
lines for possible road layouts for motorways130 (Autobahn Regelquerschnitt) and could be 
adapted in case deviation from these layouts should be allowed. In the infrastructure layer, 
other static elements such as boundaries or signs are arranged and the orientation towards 
each other described with logical constraints. The third layer contains temporary manipula-
tion of the previous layer such as a construction site, which is not yet implemented in the 
cited publication. In the fourth layer, all static and dynamic objects are initialized including 
maneuvers and the relation to each other. Constraints prevent accidents and other illegal 
maneuvers (e.g. overtaking on the right, speeding). The fifth layer includes weather and 
lightning conditions. Constraints prevent combination of conditions such as direct sun light 
and fog. The layers are connected logically, e.g. heavy rain results in wet road conditions. 
Using the ontology with less than 1000 attributes, a very large number of scenarios can be 
generated automatically. However, a completeness in stimulus (B) cannot be reached as the 
discretization is finite and the environment representation is not (yet) detailed enough. Cur-
rently, environment entities such as the shape of cars and the reflectivity of surfaces is not 
covered. 
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Figure 2-7 5-layer ontology by Bagschik et al.131 adopted from Schuldt132 
2.2.4.2 Identification from Data 
Besides the scenario generation from knowledge, recorded data can be used. One reason 
might be to gather information about the relevance or the exposure of the scenarios that are 
identified from knowledge. The reason is that a huge amount of scenarios can be generated 
using ontologies, but without any information about relevance, their importance cannot be 
weighted. For this purpose Krajewski et al.133 collected trajectory data using a drone and 
image processing. The occurrence rate of maneuvers such as lane change can be analyzed 
and the likelihood of whole scenarios derived. However, the data contains only AD2- traffic. 
As the likelihood of scenarios might change with AD3+ introduction, it is unknown, if the 
results can be extrapolated. Until AD3+ reaches a relevant field penetration, the occurrence 
rate from AD3+ perspective can only be assessed in real world test drives and even then only 
for today’s traffic that might change over time. However, a scenario that is likely does not 
necessary need to be involved as a test case in a scenario-based test concept because the idea 
is to select test cases that are challenging for the system and hence represent an effective test. 
To identify critical test cases, MiR metrics, similar to those described in section 2.2.2.2.1 
can be used. Wachenfeld et al.134 suggest a step-wise filter of uncritical scenarios starting 
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with simple metrics that process huge amount of data efficiently. Hallerbach et al. 135 de-
scribe how simulation data can be used to identify critical scenes by modifying object be-
havior and by injection of sensor or map errors using a smaller amount of data as baseline. 
For AD2- traffic, various studies were conducted which identified critical scenes using dif-
ferent trigger conditions (see Benmimoun136a for a detailed description). All studies use the 
drivers reaction (e.g. steering, vehicle motion sensors) to identify critical scenes a posteriori. 
Some also use environment perception sensors to calculate TTC or to detect lane departures. 
In all studies, the identified scenarios are later analyzed manually using the recorded video 
data. The largest study is SHRP2137 with the predecessor 100-Car-Study138. The trigger con-
ditions rely mainly on the vehicle motion sensor (e.g. acceleration, yaw rate) and on TTC. 
Benmimoun136b improved the findings further developing a heuristic that is based on similar 
information, but with more complex trigger condition depending on the driving state. They 
are summed up in Appendix A. In those studies, the trigger conditions are always designed 
based on the available data, which is limited to video image and one front object. Studies 
performing scenario identification based on a whole environment model from a sensor setup 
that would suit AD3+ systems are not available (or not published). 
2.2.5 Maturity Level of the Test Process 
Despite all effort in the design of the test suite, it will most likely be incomplete. This is 
because of a lack of experience of automated vehicles on the roads and because of the un-
known future development of road traffic, as the vehicles shall operate in an open world. 
Winner et al.139 describe this problem as the dark matter problem. An easy task is to derive 
test cases from recorded accident scenes because the scene can be reconstructed. These are 
known knowns. Critical scenes that do not result in accidents but that are relevant test cases 
require metrics to be identified. However, if there is data of those scenes so they are observ-
able. They are named known unknowns because there is the general possibility for identifi-
cation. Incompleteness of the test suite is the result. However, it is unlikely that there will be 
a complete test process testing every scene that will happen in the future. No-one knows how 
the traffic will evolve after the introduction of AD3+ either due to different behavior of the 
new vehicles or due to changes in road network. Scenarios that cannot be derived from ob-
servations of the current traffic are called unknown unknowns. Some of these unknown un-
knowns might be identified using knowledge based methods but completeness is unlikely.  
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Figure 2-8 Decreasing Trend of new events141 
Koopman at al.140 describe the problem using the terms edge case and corner case. Where a 
corner case results of the combination of parameters that are not rare individually but the 
unique combination of several parameters results in a critical corner case. This case is easy 
to identify with knowledge based methods. Edge cases are scenes that were not expected 
before and are therefore difficult to gather based on knowledge-based methods.  
The maturity level of the test process can be defined by the number and occurrence rate of 
new edge cases that the automation cannot deal with or at least that result in an unexpected 
system behavior. Winner et al.141 suggest measuring the maturity level using real world driv-
ing measuring the occurrence rate of surprising scenes. New surprises can be collected and 
saved to complete the test catalog further. The remaining surprises can be estimated by ex-
trapolation of the decay in new surprises (Figure 2-8). Strategies to find those surprises in 
test drives are virtual assessment or silent testing in field operation described by Wachenfeld 
et al.142 and Junietz et al.143 or by identification using MiR metrics. 
However, it is difficult to estimate the remaining surprises because of the unknown distribu-
tion of new events. Koopman144 argues that assuming an exponential decrease of new sur-
prises instead of a long-tail distribution, the remaining unknowns might be underestimated. 
Especially if there are surprises that occur only in a very unique combination of scene pa-
rameters so that they are reasonably rare to neglect them in the safety approval on their own 
are problematic, if they occur in a high number. Identifying one new of those rare surprises 
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(and improving the test catalogue by adding the scenario) does not improve the test catalogue 
significantly, because the surprises per distance do not significantly decrease resulting in a 
long-tail distribution. 
2.2.6 Summary of Safety Validation Approaches 
All presented testing strategies have deviations from a full test approach, so it is unknown 
whether the true safety performance can be determined with sufficient certainty or only with 
a large error band. Furthermore, apart from the qualification of the maturity based-on real-
world surprise rates, there is no method to quantify the uncertainty (apart from the statistical 
uncertainty in field tests). Figure 2-9 gives an overview of the shortcoming of the different 
dynamic testing methods. The unsupervised field tests lead to a safety performance with 
quantifiable error probability but the required distance for small uncertainty is too large to 
be feasible. All other approaches have shortcomings in the different categories that lead to 
uncertainty that is often not quantified (or not quantifiable). 
 
Figure 2-9 Assessment of different test strategies145 
 
                                                 
145 Junietz, P. et al.: Evaluation of Safety Validation Approaches (2018), p. 4. 
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In several ways, risk metrics are of outmost importance. MiR metrics are used in the scenario 
based test for identification of relevant scenarios and for the indirect risk assessment of field 
tests with extrapolation of accident risk. MaR metrics are required for the description of 
safety requirements. Existing studies about the extrapolation of critical scenarios towards 
accident probability and crash risks show some promising results because the statistical un-
certainty is quantifiable. However, this does not include and must not be mistaken with un-
certainty that origins in the method and is mainly dependent of the used metrics and the data 
quality.  
Those existing studies uniformly use relatively simple metrics. The metric BTN shows the 
most promising results and corresponds to the definition of criticality from section 1.2.4 
because the requirements on use of the available friction coefficient are described. However, 
the metric only works in longitudinal traffic. While metrics for combined scenarios with 
multiple objects are available, there were not specified to fulfill requirements for extrapola-
tion methods. Although, most large-scale datasets do not contain enough information to ap-
ply those metrics on. 
Hence, the focus in this thesis is the improvement of MiR and the derivation of MaR require-
ments. Additionally, the quantification of uncertainty needs to be discussed. In the next chap-
ter, research questions concerning metrics are derived. 
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3 Derivation of Research Questions 
In the following, the start of the art is analyzed and research questions concerning risk met-
rics are derived.  
3.1 Research Questions for Macroscopic Risk Met-
rics                                                 
Based on the findings in chapter 2.1, it is known that different groups in a society might have 
different risk perception and therefore different requirements towards technology. However, 
most customers or passers-by will not provide quantitate requirements for AD3+. Hence, 
quantitative requirements based on all different viewpoints shall be derived. Only if all nec-
essary and justified viewpoints are considered, final acceptance of AD3+ is likely or even 
possible. This brings us to the fist research question: 
Q 1 Which viewpoints are necessary to be considered for a sufficient derivation of require-
ments for macroscopic risk? 
The viewpoints will likely differ based on the individual benefits (of AD3+), because it is 
known that with personal benefit comes higher risk acceptance (section 2.1.2). In section 
2.1.3.1 it is explained that this is even applied when a non-vital benefit comes with the minor 
probability of severe or even fatal consequences with the example of pharmaceutics. In sec-
tion 2.1.3.2 introduction of new technologies in aviation is analyzed with the result that risk 
might increase directly after introduction, but is reduced continuously by gaining knowledge 
after the introduction and by monitoring accidents and critical scenes. Nevertheless, there 
should be risk requirements for the first introduction, also if the total number of vehicles is 
small. However, it is impossible to give a high-certain estimation of the accepted risk when 
it comes to accidents after the introduction of AD3+. Instead, the acceptable risk is deduced. 
In addition to acceptable risk, other criteria might influence acceptance. Hence, the second 
research question is formulated as follows: 
Q 2 Which acceptance criteria result, if all viewpoints identified in Q 1 are analyzed scien-
tifically? 
Currently, there is no quantitative requirements analysis based on the different lifecycle 
phases, viewpoints and field penetration rate. Wachenfeld146 introduces the risk-limited in-
troduction, names important stakeholders and analyses the requirements for the society. 
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However, this introduction concept does not include quantitative requirements for individu-
als. Depending on the introduction phase, different safety targets might apply. When all 
viewpoints are combined, the third research question is relevant: 
Q 3 What is the influence on introduction concepts due to the acceptance criteria derived 
in Q 2? 
With the now defined quantitative risk requirements, introduction strategies such as the risk-
limited introduction need to be analyzed. Requirements likely increase with field penetration 
similar to aviation. The main question will be if the gained knowledge due to the experience 
in the field is sufficient to reduce the uncertainty of the estimated safety performance enough. 
3.2 Research Questions for Microscopic Risk Met-
rics 
A major challenge in approving AD3+ vehicles are the high requirements for preventing rare 
events with low occurrence rate, such as scenes that could result in fatal accidents. Statistical 
approval requires high effort due to the baseline of rare accidents. If only the driven distance 
between two accidents is used as observations for statistical extrapolation of the average 
occurrence rate, a high driving distance is required because a distance factor between mile-
age and distance between events higher than ten is realistically required for a statistical esti-
mation (comp. section 0). If not only the distance between accidents is measured but also the 
distance between scenes with a certain criticality is used to extrapolate the likelihood of 
accidents, a smaller mileage would be sufficient. To describe criticality in scenes, metrics 
are required that are called microscopic risk (MiR) metrics. Another purpose of MiR metrics 
is the identification of critical scenes to derive test-cases in a scenario-based test approach. 
Here, high requirements apply on false-negative detection rate, i.e. Scenes that are not de-
tected even if they should. Even a single scenario constellation that is missed by the MiR 
metrics in the evaluation has a severe influence on the total SP if this scenario ultimately 
results in an accident. 
Chapter 2.2.2.2.1 introduces studies using metrics for extrapolation of accident risk as well 
as for identification of critical scenarios. Metrics that have been applied on large-scale da-
tasets include the vehicle data and sometimes one additional object or information about 
road boundaries. Metrics that use only vehicle motion sensors such as acceleration or steer-
ing wheel angle can detect critical scenes and could even be sufficient to describe criticality 
on an ordinal scale. However, they do not assess whether the reaction was necessary. Hence, 
they cannot be applied on scenes where an accident was close but there was no reaction of 
the driver. Those metrics are developed in bottom-up approaches, as the available data does 
not allow complex computations because the majority of the environment is unknown. For 
the purpose of macroscopic risk extrapolation, similar metrics (as for identification) were 
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used in past studies (comp. chapter 2.2.2.2.1) as the available dataset do not allow the appli-
cation of more complex metrics. Findings of the studies were that the used metrics were not 
able to predict the MaR in all types of accidents: For example, Songchitruksa and Tarko147 
found that the used metric (PET) did not perform well when applied on data from different 
crossings. They assumed a non-ordinal connection between the metric and risk when com-
paring different scenes. Therefore, the first research questions for MiR metrics is: 
Q 4 What are the requirements on microscopic risk metrics for extrapolation of MaR using 
EVT? 
Highly detailed data that will be available in the future or is already available such as the 
highD-dataset148 raise the opportunity to define metrics in a top-down approach. The defini-
tion of criticality for this purpose and the specification of requirements for the metric’s per-
formance is necessary. Additionally there are requirements on data that should be discussed 
as well. 
Q 5 What are the requirements on data for application of microscopic risk metrics? 
A side effect of metrics that fulfil the requirements derived for Q 4 is that they can also be 
used for identification of critical scenarios to derive test cases. Currently, the identification 
process still requires manual inspection because of the high number of false positive detec-
tions due to thresholds that are designed not to miss potentially critical scenes. However, for 
scene identification, different requirements might apply compared to extrapolation: 
Q 6 What are the requirements on microscopic metrics for identification of scenarios? 
State-of-the-art metrics are not designed to be applied on data as detailed as described above. 
Hence, it is likely that the definition of metrics and criticality from section 1.2.4 needs to be 
redefined. Ideally, a metric or set of metrics that addresses both use-cases is found. Following 
a top-down approach in development of a new metric, tests that verify the eligibility shall be 
defined. However, a fulfilled test-case can never verify the eligibility of the metric for appli-
cation in extrapolation or identification. Hence, according to Popper149 and Zahar150, the hy-
pothesis that a metric is eligible for application should at least be falsifiable in order to hold 
up as a scientific statement. Therefore, a falsification strategy needs to be developed: 
Q 7 How can the eligibility of MiR metrics for the use cases MaR extrapolation and identification 
of scenarios be falsified? 
After defining a falsification strategy, the state-of-the-art should be analyzed before design-
ing a new metric. Metrics that utilize environment information typically extrapolate future 
trajectories of objects. Different strategies include worst-case assumption such as WTTC, 
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best guess assumption (e.g. constant velocity or constant turn and constant acceleration) or 
probabilistic predictions (especially in metrics used in trajectory planning). An overview and 
categorization of different prediction methods is given by Schreier151. As risk assessment for 
the purpose of this dissertation is not necessarily done online, an a posteriori assessment 
would also be possible, when the objects (future) trajectories are already known. Based on 
the start-of-the-art review, metrics for trajectory planning might be eligible as well. They 
should be analyzed first, before developing new metrics. The following research questions 
apply: 
Q 8 Do state of the art metrics fulfil all requirements derived in Q 5 and Q 6? 
Due to the lack of sufficient data, falsification might not be achieved for all metrics. There 
is, however, reason to believe that state-of-the-art metrics are insufficient especially for ex-
trapolation because they are either not designed for highly detailed data or (in the case of 
trajectory planning) not for the addressed use case which is the assessment of criticality. As 
it will be equally challenging to falsify a new metric due to the lack of data, design guidelines 
are proposed that should be followed in order to define metrics that are eligible potentially. 
Q 9 What are design guidelines for the development of MiR metrics according to the require-
ments derived in Q 5 and Q 6? 
Based on the design guidelines, a metric will be designed and implemented that has to prove 
itself based on data that is available currently or in the future. All research questions men-
tioned in this subchapter will be addressed in chapter 5. 
                                                 
151 Schreier, M.: Bayesian environment representation, prediction, and criticality assessment (2016), p. 136. 
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4 Macroscopic Risk 
In this chapter, the research questions from subchapter 3.1 are addressed. These are: 
Q 1 Which viewpoints are necessary to be considered for a sufficient derivation of require-
ments for macroscopic risk? 
Q 2 Which acceptance criteria result, if all viewpoints identified in Q 1 are analyzed scien-
tifically?  
Q 3 What is the influence on introduction concepts due to the acceptance criteria derived in 
Q 2? 
The first question is addressed in subchapter 4.1, the second in subchapters 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4, 
and the third in subchapter 4.5. 
4.1 Viewpoints on Safety Requirements 
Q 1 Which viewpoints are necessary to be considered for a sufficient derivation of require-
ments for macroscopic risk? 
To address this question, the difference between viewpoints on safety requirements and 
stakeholder for safety validation has to be pointed out to begin with. A basic analysis of 
stakeholder for a safety validation in general is presented in Junietz et al.152. This includes 
the industry (OEM and supplier), and the three government branches: executive, legislature 
and judiciary. The state institutions shall represent the interest of the people, as safety vali-
dation requires expert knowledge. However, the state should address the fundamental re-
quirements for safety out of this group and consider all viewpoints. The goal of this chapter 
is to find necessary viewpoints sufficient for definition of MaR. In subchapter 2.1, it was 
pointed out that the individual benefit influences risk acceptance. According to this, view-
points should be distinguished between users or passengers and non-users or passers-by. 
Wachenfeld153 already covers the viewpoints of users and of the whole society but not of 
other individuals. Additionally, for the user it might be a difference based on his type of 
exposure, whether it is voluntarily or job-related (comp. Figure 2-2), and for passers-by in-
dividual benefits might result as well, e.g. due to the increased overall road safety.  
In addition to requirements by individuals, state institutions should define requirements that 
go beyond the fate of individuals and mainly care about total accident numbers over several 
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years or decades. In the following, this is described with the term “society” as a separate 
viewpoint. Obviously, the industry has an interest in safety as well, which should be also 
dependent on branding and marketing strategies. Other companies or state organs are addi-
tional stakeholders as discussed by Junietz et al.154 They are out of scope of this thesis, be-
cause they are not directly threatened in terms of threat to their life or health. 
To summarize, the three viewpoints that have to be addressed are: 
 users or passengers (further called users) 
 non-users or passers-by (further called passers-by) 
 society as a whole 
Different requirements might result for the three groups in the accident categories of fatal 
accidents (index f), accidents with injuries (index wI) and accidents without injuries (index 
nI). 
From now on, the frequency of accidents per time (e.g. per year) is described by the symbol 
f, while requirements that are given per distance are described by the symbol ℱ. Assuming 
an average travel distance per year ?̅?, the time-based frequency 𝑓 can be transmitted to a 
distance-based frequency ℱ and vice versa. In case of Germany, ?̅?2016,GER = 4000 km/a is 
assumed as an average travel distance according to recommendations for ISO26262 appli-
cation155 and assuming an average velocity of 100 km/h. 
4.2 Fatal Accidents156 
First, requirements for fatal accidents are derived because requirements on the occurrence 
rate will be the highest out of the three accident groups, and the requirement definition can 
be formulated based on a broad basis of existing studies (comp. section 2.1.2).  
4.2.1 MaR for the User 
The fatal risk for the user is assumed equivalent to the risk of a fatal accident of an AD3+ 
vehicle (neglecting a higher damage with more than one user at the same time). As depicted 
in Figure 2-2, the type of exposition is relevant for accepting risks. In most use cases, AD3+ 
functions are used voluntarily; they must be actively bought and activated. Professional use 
is also plausible but business usage is not expected during the first introduction phase, at 
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156 This chapter was taken from Junietz, P. et al.: Macroscopic Risk Requirements (2019) and extended slightly. 
 4.2 Fatal Accidents 
  51 
least not as a mandatory prerequisite. Job-related use by choice (e.g. E-mails or video-con-
ferences) is plausible from the beginning on, but is classified as voluntary use as long as not 
mandatory. It might become relevant with the first driverless systems for trucks, or if regu-
lation allows longer driving duration for truck drivers using AD3+ systems. Involuntary use 
is excluded in typical use cases because it will not be mandatory to use the systems outside 
of professional use. Nevertheless, requirements for professional use should be derived from 
Figure 2-2, as professional use is plausible in foreseeable future.  
Figure 2-2 concludes that the accepted frequency for a person’s death per year finv is  10−6 a⁄  
for involuntary exposure, 10−5 a⁄  for professional exposure (fprof), and a theoretically unlim-
ited risk for voluntary exposure with typical acceptance rates fvol of up to  10−2 a⁄ . In general, 
the accepted risk varies with the benefit for the user or focus group. Most of these consider-
ations are from the 70’s and 80’s regarding discussions on safety of nuclear power plants. 
However, similar to MEM, these assumptions are still valid in general, but should be adapted 
to today’s level of safety. A factor that compensates the increase in general safety based on 
the development of MEM is suggested and used in the following. (Reduction based on the 
decrease of accident rate would be another approach with a similar outcome.) In the follow-
ing, the lower risk today compared to the numbers above is indicated by its index with year 
and country of the underlying statistic. 
Reducing the accepted risk for professional exposure fprof and using the average travelled 
distance per year ?̅?157, results in ℱprof,2016,GER equal to  1.4 ∙ 10−9 km⁄ .. Similar rates are also 
present in the US (ℱprof,2013,US = 2.5 ∙ 10
−9 km⁄ )158. For other countries, data about mile-
age on different road types is not always available. The accident rate on all roads’ combined 
mileage is in a similar order of magnitude for most developed countries.159,160  
However, the substitution of conventional driving also suggests comparing the risk of to-
day’s driving with the suggested rate of ℱprof. In the following, both considerations will be 
examined and compared. For today’s driving risk, driving on controlled-access highway 
(Autobahn) in Germany will be taken as a reference. This has several advantages. First, driv-
ing on controlled-access highways is one of the safest, if not the safest way of travelling in 
a car, especially when taking the accident rate per mileage as reference. Second, it is possible 
that the first AD3+ system will drive on a controlled-access highway because of the reduced 
complexity. Third, accident data on highways are well documented. Even minor accidents 
often result in the involvement of police because of traffic disturbance. Data about estimated 
                                                 
157 As the annual driving distance might be higher for professional exposure the requirements might even be 
higher. Though, it is unknown which use-case for professional exposure will be the first. 
158 U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration: Fatality Rate per VMT (2013). 
159 Oguchi, T.: Achieving safe road traffic—the experience in Japan (2016), p. 115. 
160 U.S. Department of Transportation NHTSA: Comparison of Fatality Rates (2016), p. 10. 
4 Macroscopic Risk 
52 
travelling distance is more accurate than on other roads because traffic surveillance measures 
the traffic density based on which the estimated travelled distance.  
To derive the upper limit for tolerable frequency by users, the experienced benefits caused 
by the new technology justifies an increased risk (comp section 2.1.2). As a new technology 
is introduced replacing the former, the increased risk could be derived from the MEM prin-
ciple from EN 50126. According to the principle the increased risk by the new technology 
should be smaller than 1/20th of the MEM. In the following, the GAMAB principle and the 
MEM principle are combined using GAMAB as a baseline risk and MEM as the increased 
risk. Note that only the risk for the user is considered in this section. This is not applicable 
to non-users or society at all as a whole, what will be discussed in the following sections. 
Depending on the individual, even higher risk is acceptable. Here, a careful person is as-
sumed as user. As described above, voluntary risk acceptance might be as high as 10-2/a.  
 
𝑓f,User ≤ 𝑓GAMAB + 𝑓MEM/20 
⟹ 𝑓f,,User ≤ ℱf,gamab ∙ ?̅? + 𝑓MEM/20 
⇒ ℱf,User ≤ ℱf,gamab + 𝑓MEM/20/?̅? 
ℱf,User,2016,GER ≤ 2.15 · 10
−9/km;   𝑓f,User,2016,GER = 8.6 · 10
−6/a 
(4.1) 
Interestingly, the order of magnitude according to equation (4.1) corresponds to the accepta-
ble frequency for professional exposure. This strengthens the hypothesis that both estima-
tions result in acceptable values for users of automated vehicles. However, higher risk could 
be accepted by the user (similar to motorbikes or extreme sport) but the user should be aware 
of this potentially increased risk. 
Obviously, not all users will have the same individual requirements. Early adopters and in-
novators are typically the first to use a new product and might have different risk acceptance. 
While the general risk acceptance might be similar to regular users, the uncertainty of the 
current risk is higher for the first users after the introduction. Rogers concludes: 
“Because the innovator is the first to adopt, he or she must take risks 
that can be avoided by later adopters, who do not wish to cope with the 
high degree of uncertainty concerning the innovation when it is first in-
troduced into the system.”161 
In the following, the acceptable risk according to equation (4.1) will be used for all users but 
the acceptance of a higher uncertainty for the first users will be discussed. 
4.2.2  MaR for Passers-by 
For all other traffic participants, AD3+ has no direct benefit (besides the decreased total risk 
for all traffic participants assuming that AD3+ is safer than the average driver). However, 
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non-users could have a lower risk acceptance threshold because they are skeptical about the 
new technology or might even have (subjective) disadvantages e.g. due to slow vehicles on 
the road (comp. section 2.1.2 and Grunwald162). Wachenfeld163 deduces risk requirements 
for the society and does not consider passers-by as a separate group. However, the risk of 
new types of accidents is extraordinary important because non-users would blame AD3+ 
systems for those accidents despite a potential reduction of the total number (comp. Gasser 
et al.164). New risks could be caused for example by systematic software failures, functional 
insufficiencies, or cyber-attacks. The total new risk of the technology for an individual non-
user should be below 𝑓inv, or in concrete figure for Germany and year 2016: 
 𝑓inv,2016,GER =
2.5 ∙ 10−7 a⁄ .  
So, how can the individual risk for a non-user be calculated? As long as there are not many 
AD3+ vehicles on the roads, the exposure is very low and the probability that the individual 
traffic participant is involved in an AD3+ accident is low. Therefore, the risk is multiplied 
with the field penetration ratio 𝜂 that will increase over time after the introduction. The risk 
for passers-by is diluted by the exposure to vehicles equipped with AD3+. 
 𝑓f,new,2016,GER ∙ 𝜂(𝑡) ≤ 𝑓inv,2016,GER = 0.25 · 10
−6/a 
⟺ ℱf,new,2016,GER ≤
1
𝜂(𝑡)
∙ 6.25 · 10−11/km 
(4.2) 
According to equation (4.2), the accepted risk for a single AD3+ vehicle decreases with in-
creasing number of AD3+ vehicles in the field. This is intuitively obvious since exposure 
multiplies with the number of potential single threats. So when only few AD3+ vehicles are 
in the field, the passers-by’s requirements are neglectable due to the dilution factor. With 
increasing field share, requirements increase.  
This calculation deliberately neglects that the non-user also has benefits if the system is safer 
than the human driver it replaces. However, long distances of AD3+ systems must be driven 
before there is statistical proof of those benefits. Before this is an undeniable statistic fact, 
skepticism due to the (subjective) disadvantage of the new technology might stay dominant. 
4.2.3 MaR for the Society 
For society, the fate of individuals is of lesser importance. Benefits and costs of the intro-
duction of AD3+ systems are measured by the total number of accidents and whether they 
are reduced over time. In general, a decreasing trend of accident rate throughout the years 
                                                 
162 Grunwald, A.: Societal Risk Constellations (2016). 
163 Wachenfeld, W. H.: Dissertation, How Stochastic can Help to Introduce AD (2017), p. 83. 
164 Gasser, T. M. et al.: Rechtsfolgen zunehmender Fahrzeugautomatisierung (2012), p. 11. 
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can be observed in Germany165 and the US166. However, in Germany it is observed that this 
trend has been diminishing over the last 5 years for accidents with injuries and even had a 
slight increase during these years. For fatal accidents, a similar trend is observable as well.  
When introducing AD3+ systems, there will likely be a non-zero risk of severe accidents and 
therefore it is likely that AD3+ will be involved in those severe or even fatal accidents. How-
ever, since the total number of AD3+ vehicles will be insignificant compared to the majority 
of AD2- vehicles, it will take a while until accident numbers and mileage increase in order 
to evaluate the systems with significance (comp. Figure 2-4). So, what are the requirements 
by society, if individual accidents do not influence the total number significantly? 
What is the upper total accident rate limit accepted by society? 
The overall target is to reduce the amount of accidents over time with the introduction of 
new technology. If we follow the argumentation of Wachenfeld167 and Kalra168, we should 
allow a certain risk in order to bring AD3+ systems to the market and allow gaining further 
knowledge. At the same time, it would not be acceptable for the whole society if the total 
risk increases in a noticeable way. 
However, there is no way to check how accident numbers would have evolved without the 
technology as soon as it has entered the market. Wachenfeld interpolates the accident num-
bers of the years 1992-2014 and suggest a standard deviation of 39 fatal accidents per year 
as a reference169 for a maximum deviation caused by AD3+. However, in the last decade, the 
decrease of fatal accidents and accidents with injuries diminished. At the same time, the 
annual travel distance increased. Hence, it seems justified to use recent numbers as reference. 
When using the accident rate for fatal accidents ℱd , an exponential regression is a better fit 
than a linear regression. Interestingly, this is also the case for accidents in aviation (comp. 
section 2.1.3.2). The standard deviation of the exponential regression for all years since 2010 
results in:  
 
𝜎ℱf(𝑁, 𝑖0) = √
1
𝑁 − 𝑖0
∑ (ℱf,i −ℱf,exp(𝑖))
2𝑁=2016
𝑖0=2010
= 9.4 ∙ 10−11
1
km
 (4.3) 
Multiplying the standard deviation with the average annual mileage in 2016 results in 22.9 
fatal accidents per year, which is slightly lower than what Wachenfeld calculated. However, 
it must be pointed out that the type of regression and the number of years influence the result. 
It is also possible to use other factors of the standard deviation as a measure. However, the 
                                                 
165 Destatis: Verkehrsunfälle - Fachserie 8 Reihe 7 - 2015 (2015). 
166 U.S. Department of Transportation NHTSA: Fatality Analysis Reporting System (2017). 
167 Wachenfeld, W. H.: Dissertation, How Stochastic can Help to Introduce AD (2017), pp. 102ff. 
168 Kalra, N.; Groves, D. G.: The Enemy of Good (2017). 
169 Wachenfeld, W. H.: Dissertation, How Stochastic can Help to Introduce AD (2017), p. 84. 
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results will be in a similar order of magnitude. Below, the result from equation (4.3) will be 
used.  
The requirement by society should be a risk from AD3+ significantly lower than the de-
scribed exponential trend observed in the latest data. As a result, AD3+ should be at least 
one standard deviation σℱf better than the predicted performance of conventional driving. 
However, society should give AD3+ systems time to reach this high safety reference. Similar 
to air traffic, it is necessary to monitor the performance to enable improvement in functions, 
infrastructure, and user experience. In the following scenario, it is suggested to allow addi-
tional risk of one standard deviation at the beginning of introduction and demand a risk three 
standard deviations lower than the extrapolation, when full field penetration is reached. Fur-
thermore, the change between the beginning and the full field penetration is assumed linear 
with 𝜂(𝑡). Therefore, the acceptable risk not only depends on the development of the risk in 
conventional traffic over the years, but also on the field penetration ratio 𝜂(𝑡).  
 ℱf,acc,soc(𝑡) ∙ 𝜂(𝑡) +ℱf,exp(𝑡) ∙ (1 − 𝜂(𝑡)) 
≤ (ℱ
f,exp
(𝑡) +𝜎ℱf) ∙ (1 − 𝜂(𝑡)) + (ℱf,exp(𝑡) +3 ∙ 𝜎ℱf) ∙ 𝜂(𝑡)        
⇔ ℱ𝑓,acc,soc(𝑡) ≤ ℱf,exp(𝑡) + 𝜎ℱf
1 − 4𝜂(𝑡)
𝜂(𝑡)
 
(4.4) 
To compare the different requirements with each other, a field share 𝜂(𝑡) is required to de-
scribe all requirements on a time-based level. It is assumed that 𝜂(𝑡) develops similarly to 
the field share of other driving functions such as electronic stability control (comp. 
Wachenfeld170). Full field share is assumed to be reached after 30 years and described by a 
cosine function from 0 to π: 
 𝜂(𝑡) = (1 − cos 𝜋 ∙ 𝑡/𝑇) 2;  0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 ⁄  (4.5) 
However, the true development is highly speculative. A slower penetration is also likely e.g. 
due to high costs and remaining challenges in the validation.  
4.2.4 Summary of Safety Requirements  
In the previous sections, safety requirements based on three different viewpoints were de-
duced. For society, the acceptable risk depends on the market share of AD3+. The authors 
suggest allowing an increase in total risk by one standard deviation of the predicted accident 
rate, so AD3+ can be introduced although the knowledge about its safety level is not yet 
complete. In addition to society’s requirements, passers-by (as part of society) have in-
creased requirements for new risks that come with automation. For users, constant risk re-
quirements are used in the following discussion although they might increase with the cur-
rent traffic safety over the years. However, the user’s requirements are only dominant in the 
early introduction phase (comp. Figure 4-1) when the market share is relatively low. From a 
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market share of about 10%, the requirements of society (and non-users) are dominant. How-
ever, if the field share reaches 100%, there are no non-users remaining, at least on Autobahn. 
However, it has to be assumed that AD2- driving will coexist for a long time.  
In the following table, the requirements are summed up. Since data for the accident rate on 
the whole road network is in the same order of magnitude for developed countries (see 
above), similar figures result. As discussed in section 4.2.2, early-adopters might have an 
increased acceptance for uncertainties of risk. As the risk requirements at the beginning of 
introduction are dominated by the user’s requirements, introduction despite remaining un-
certainty in risk might be feasible. This will be discussed in detail in subchapter 4.5. 
 
 
Figure 4-1 Safety requirements for the different focus groups ever time and field penetration rate171 
                                                 
171 Junietz, P. et al.: Macroscopic Safety Requirements for Highly Automated Driving (2019), p. 8. 
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Table 4-1 Summary of Safety Requirements 
Description Symbol Value based on German 
data from 2016 
   
User requirements   
Per Distance ℱd,User 2.2 · 10
−9 km⁄  
Per Time 𝑓d,User 8.6 · 10
−6 a⁄  
   
Passers-by requirements for 
new risks 
  
at 𝜂 =0.1 ℱd,new 6.3 · 10
−10 km⁄  
at 𝜂 =0.1 𝑓d,new 2.5 · 10
−6 a⁄  
at 𝜂 =1 ℱd,new 6.3 · 10
−11 km⁄  
at 𝜂 =1 𝑓d,new 2.5 · 10
−7 a⁄  
   
Society requirements   
In 5 years at 𝜂 =0.095 ℱd,soc 1.8 · 10
−9 km⁄  
In 5 years at 𝜂 =0.095 𝑓d,soc 7.2 · 10
−6 a⁄  
In 30 years at 𝜂 =1 ℱd,soc 2.9 · 10
−10 km⁄  
In 30 years at 𝜂 =1 𝑓d,soc 1.2 · 10
−6 a⁄  
4.3 Requirements for Accidents of Lower Severity 
The requirements derived above are based on studies focusing on the acceptance of fatal 
risks. For accidents without fatalities there is no such profound background research about 
accepted risk for injuries or property damage based on type of exposure. For this reason 
requirements cannot be deduced in the same way. Only for society’s requirements the rele-
vant figures are available because they are based on accident statistics. 
Instead, there are several possibilities to deduce requirements for crash frequencies of less 
severity based on above findings for fatal accidents. They are discussed in the following. For 
simplification, the possible severity levels are separate into fatal accidents, accidents with 
injuries (Index wI) and accidents without (no) injuries (Index nI).  
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4.3.1 Reduction according to Hydén Triangle 
As introduced in subchapter 2.1, Hydén172 assumes that a reduction of less severe accidents 
goes always hand in hand with a reduction of more severe accidents. His findings are based 
on accident statistics over the years and are supposedly accurate for AD2- traffic. So can this 
be expected for AD3+ vehicles as well and what are the consequences concerning MaR re-
quirements? Due to the paradigm shift from human to machine driving, there is no guarantee 
that the same behavior as discovered by Hydén can be observed. This is easily clarified by a 
hypothetical systematic fault in scenes with lower speeds where there is no hazard of higher 
severity. The frequency of less severe accidents might even increase, while the other catego-
ries decrease. Obviously it is also possible that systematic faults happen only at high speed 
with the inverse effect. 
However, it would be plausible to demand the same quotient between MaR requirements 
and current accident statistics for all severity levels. That means that the demand for a rela-
tive reduction in fatal accidents triggers the same demand for all categories. For users and 
passers-by it follows: 
 ℱnI,user
ℱnI,exp
≡
ℱwI,user
ℱwI,exp
≡
ℱf,user
ℱf,exp
 (4.6) 
 ℱnI,inv
ℱnI,exp
≡
ℱwI,inv
ℱwI,exp
≡
ℱf,inv
ℱf,exp
 (4.7) 
For the society’s requirements equations (4.3) and (4.4) are used with the extrapolated fre-
quencies for accidents with property damage and with injuries ℱwI,exp and ℱnI,exp as basis. 
4.3.2 Monetary Balance 
The aforementioned approach requires the same relative reduction of accidents in all three 
categories. So if there were no fatalities at all, but no reduction in total accident numbers, 
the requirements would be failed. In order to weight an increased reduction in one category 
with a reduced reduction in another, Wachenfeld173 suggests a monetary balance between 
different severity categories using average accident costs ?̅? of the different severity catego-
ries for the German national economy174. If the occurring accident frequency (index occ) is 
not below the number of acceptable accident frequency (index acc), balancing between the 
different costs could be done in the following way: 
                                                 
172 Hydén, C.: Method for traffic safety evaluation (1987). 
173 Wachenfeld, W. H.: Dissertation, How Stochastic can Help to Introduce AD (2017), pp. 26ff. 
174 Baum, H. et al.: Volkswirtschaftliche Kosten durch Straßenverkehrsunfälle in Deutschland (2010). 
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 ℱnI,occ ∙ ?̅?nI + ℱwI,occ ∙ ?̅?wI + ℱf,occ ∙ ?̅?f ≤ ℱnI,acc ∙ ?̅?nI + ℱwI,acc ∙ ?̅?wI
+ ℱf,acc ∙ ?̅?f 
(4.8) 
It might be ethically questionable to derive safety requirements that allow shift between the 
categories, as it allows the compensation of fatalities with monetary damages. Alternatively, 
it could be allowed to compensate increases in the categories of less severity with a decrease 
in higher severity but not vice-versa. This is also in accordance with the German constitution 
(Grundgesetz Article 2(2)) that protects life and physical integrity. In addition to equation 
(4.8), the following conditions apply: 
An increased accident frequency of fatal accidents would not be tolerated: 
 ℱf,occ ≤ ℱf,acc (4.9) 
Accidents with injuries can be compensated by an increased reduction of fatal accidents but 
not of accidents without injuries: 
 ℱwI,occ ∙ ?̅?wI + ℱf,occ ∙ ?̅?f ≤ ℱwI,acc ∙ ?̅?wI + ℱf,acc ∙ ?̅?f (4.10) 
An increase in accidents with property damage without injuries could still be compensated 
according to equation (4.8).  
4.3.3 No Requirements for Lower Severity Categories 
Opposite to the approaches discussed above, one could also argue that no additional require-
ments for less severe accidents are necessary, because saving lives outweighs preventing 
injuries. However, it is questionable, if this is applicable when injury number or even per-
sonal damages increase dramatically. Hence, requirements following equation (4.6) and/or 
(4.8) to (4.10) are favorable. Alternatively, equations (4.8) could be used as soft require-
ments, with mandatory or optional system updates when (4.9) and/or (4.10) are violated. 
4.4 Acceptable versus Accepted Risk 
In the previous sections of this chapter, risk requirements that should be acceptable are de-
rived. This was done using past studies of accepted risks, current accident statistics from 
road traffic as well as aviation and a dilution of the risk for passers-by because of the expo-
sure that is dependent of the field penetration. However, there is no guarantee that those risk 
requirements are accepted later on. There exist studies that try to evaluate accepted behavior 
and risk of future AD3+ vehicles (Liu et al.175). However, other studies show that novices in 
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risk assessment are unable to estimate the accurate fatality risks176. People tend to underes-
timate risk they are in control of and overestimate risk coming from an unknown or uncon-
trollable cause. So risk acceptance for a final product is not only dependent from facts but 
from the perceived risk that is also influenced by media and personal experience of individ-
uals including the perceived benefit (comp. section 2.1.1 and Grunwald177). 
4.5 Introduction Strategy 
The findings from Figure 4-1 do not contradict risk-limited introduction. With the assumed 
market share development, the requirements by the user is dominant for the first five years 
after introduction. However, the statistical proof by unsupervised real-world driving is still 
unfeasibe before the introduction. After the introduction phase of five years, the require-
ments increase with market share. Assuming that the AD3+ vehicles drive the same annual 
distance ?̅? as the average vehicle, the distance driven is calculated as follows: 
 
𝑠AD3+ (𝑡AD3+) = ?̅? ∫ 𝜂(𝑡)d𝑡
𝑡AD3+
0
 (4.11) 
After five years, the total mileage would add up to 2.74 ∙ 107 km. Assuming that the initial 
safety performance was twice as good as the reference, the statistical proof of safety would 
be complete according to Figure 2-4. However, as the social requirements increase over time, 
a system that is twice as good as the current safety level, would be obsolete within five years. 
Another issue is that the society might decline the system in the initial state. Hence, further 
considerations are required. 
As the society is skeptical about the system, it might demand proof for increased safety. As 
discussed earlier, this could be done by rejecting the hypothesis that the system’s safety is 
inferior with a confidence interval of 5%. So the null-hypothesis (H0,soc) would be: 
H0,soc: The systems safety is equal to the reference safety of the society. 
The one-tailed directional alternative hypothesis of lesser safety that must be rejected would 
be: 
H1,soc: The systems safety is inferior to the reference safety of the society. 
As in Wachenfeld178, the hypothesis could be rejected by evaluating the occurring accidents 
and the driven distance. Assuming that accidents occur exactly in the frequency that corre-
sponds to the systems average performance, the minimal reference frequency that results in 
                                                 
176 Slovic, P. et al.: Facts and fears: Understanding perceived risk (1980). 
177 Grunwald, A.: Societal Risk Constellations (2016). 
178 Wachenfeld, W. H.: Dissertation, How Stochastic can Help to Introduce AD (2017), pp. 73–79. 
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a rejection of H1,soc, can be determined. It can be regarded as the proven safety of the system 
as a worst-case assumption.179  
H1,soc is rejected for the reference ℱref, if the following condition is fulfilled with 𝑘f as the 
occurring number of fatal accidents, assuming that the probability can be calculated with 
an Bernoulli process B: 
 𝑃(𝑥 ≤ 𝑘f) ≤ 5% 
⇔ 𝐵(𝑥 ≤ 𝑘f(𝑡)|ℱref(𝑡), 𝑠AD3+(𝑡)) ≤ 5% 
(4.12) 
ℱref can be found by conducting a numerical search or by using tables documenting the 
Bernoulli process. Before a first accident can be expected or before any distance is driven, 
there is no initial reference safety rejecting H1,soc. As a result, the requirements directly de-
mand a certain test drive before introduction that is added to the distance in equation (4.11). 
In the following, an initial testing distance of 10 million km is assumed without any fatal 
accidents. 
Figure 4-2 depicts the resulting safety level that is able to reject H1,soc with two different 
assumptions: First, a system, which is perfectly safe and will not cause any accidents is as-
sumed. Second, the assumption that the safety matches the society’s requirements after 30 
years is taken into account.  
Figure 4-2 assumes constant SP of the automated system. If the initial safety performance is 
worse, improvements of the system should be allowed as long as it seems promising that 
AD3+ will achieve the requirements with the improvements. For example, if the system 
initially fulfills only the user requirements, the society will reject the system after a short 
period of about four years so the successful deployment of such a system is only possible, if 
continues software updates improve the system over time. Figure 4-3 shows the development 
of ℱref under the assumptions that the accident rate fulfills the user requirements or that it 
initially fulfills only the requirements and improved by 10% per year. In the second case, 
society’s requirements are fulfilled permanently.  
The future safety of road traffic was analyzed by Kalra and Groves180. They conducted a 
parameter variation study with influence factors such as deployment of AD3+, improvement 
rate per distance and final safety performance (after improvement).  
Especially the improvement rate is a key factor, hence it is of extraordinary importance not 
only to improve the function after accidents but use critical scenes as well. An additional 
indicator for the safety performance is the occurrence rate of critical scenes that is extrapo-
lated towards crash risk. Those two use-cases for MiR metrics are addressed in the next 
chapter. 
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Figure 4-2 Introduction strategy assuming constant accident frequency and 10 million km of tests 
before introduction 
 
Figure 4-3 Introduction strategy assuming constant improvement factor and 10 million km of tests 
before introduction 
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ℱref  assuming ℱf,user and an improvement factor of 10% per year 
by society 
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ℱref  assuming zero accidents 
ℱref  assuming ℱf,soc at full field penetration rate 
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5 Microscopic Risk 
In this chapter, the research questions from subchapter 3.2 are addressed. 
The chapter’s structure follows a top-down approach. First, requirements are defined and 
test cases for verification and falsification deduced and applied with state of the art metrics. 
Then, possible approaches for a metric that complies with all requirements are discussed and 
an exemplary metric designed. Finally, the metric is applied on a dataset and the results 
discussed. 
5.1 Requirements for Metrics and Data 
To begin with the top-down approach, requirements shall be defined. They are separated into 
requirements for data and metrics. Data requirements are often neglected because recording 
highly detailed data is costly and therefore often reduced to lower quality and the metric then 
developed bottom-up. 
In this subchapter, these research questions are answered: 
Q 4 What are the requirements on microscopic risk metrics for extrapolation of MaR using 
EVT? 
Q 5 What are the requirements on data for application of microscopic risk metrics? 
Q 5 What are the requirements on data for application of microscopic risk metrics? 
5.1.1 Requirements for Metrics 
Q 4 What are the requirements on microscopic risk metrics for extrapolation of MaR using 
EVT? 
Q 6 What are the requirements on microscopic metrics for identification of scenarios? 
From literature, the requirements by Songchitruksa and Tarko for extrapolation are known181 
(see section 2.2.2.2). They are refined slightly in the following. There first requirement de-
mands that the metric is eligible to describe proximity to a crash of a certain type. 
Furthermore, the metric must be applicable in all scenes and describe crash-free operations. 
Collisions do not need to be covered by the metric because they could be detected by other 
means, e.g. reports by the user. However, the metric’s value must increase if the criticality 
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of the scene is increased. Otherwise the extrapolation might over- or underestimate the mac-
roscopic risk. Different kinds of scenarios must be comparable regarding the metric, mean-
ing that the identical value of the metric in two different scenarios must correspond to the 
same crash likelihood. Due to the lower occurrence of highly critical scene, an overestima-
tion of the metric is likely to have a severe impact on the result. The first requirement is 
formulated as follows: 
RM 1 In case of an increased crash likelihood, the value of the metric must increase, independent 
of the type of accident. 
In order to apply EVT, the value for a crash must exist and be known, so that the SP can be 
estimated using the return level of the observations (comp. section 2.2.2.2.3). The second 
requirement is formulated: 
RM 2 The value of the metric shall either increase or decrease strictly with increasing crash prox-
imity towards a known numeric value representing a collision. 
In order to describe risk and not just accident probability, the severity of the potential acci-
dent is required. As severity is dependent on many factors (collision angle, type of accident 
participant, occupants), it is questionable if it can be estimated in collision-free driving. Nev-
ertheless, it would be necessary in order to derive risk and not accident probability. It is 
further discussed in subchapter 5.4, which consequences for the extrapolation and the safety 
approval result from an imperfect severity estimation. The third requirement is formulated 
as follows: 
RM 3 The severity of the potential accident shall be estimated. 
For identification of critical scenarios, the most important requirement is the prevention of 
false-negative detection. As critical scenes are rare, missing those leads to an imperfect test 
suite despite the availability of data, so they remain known unknowns. To address this, crit-
ical scenes must not be missed and the fourth requirement is formulated. 
RM 4 The metric shall detect all critical scenes without false-negatives. 
These four requirements are mandatory in order to provide ideal metrics for safety valida-
tion. It is this discussed in the next section, if those metrics can be verified according to the 
requirements, or if they are at least falsifiable. Additional requirements that are not men-
tioned here might apply. For example, the computational effort is relevant, because a high 
data amount will be analyzed.  
5.1.2 Requirements on Data 
Q 5 What are the requirements on data for application of microscopic risk metrics? 
Besides metrics, the data they are applied on needs to fulfil requirements (RD). From insuf-
ficient data, the MiR cannot be derived because the proximity to an accident cannot be com-
puted, if important information is either missing or faulty. Obviously, MiR can be caused by 
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incorrect environment representation and metrics working on this level would describe like-
lihood of a fault on this level.  
The MiR metric on action level (comp. section 1.2.4) requires correct information about 
surrounding objects. This includes road boundaries or shoulders as well as moving or sta-
tionary objects on the road itself. As the metrics are not used for actual decision making, it 
is sufficient to detect objects later than normal, when the scene is already highly critical. The 
advantage for metrics on action level is that critical situations on other levels can result in 
critical situations on action level. For example, a faulty environment perception leads to a 
late reaction and therefore a high criticality on action level. As the metric will be applied in 
post-processing, it is sufficient to have the object information a posteriori. The environment 
could be corrected before applying the metrics as described in Junietz et al.182 
Two requirements follow addressing road geometry and the existence of objects: 
RD 1 The data should contain all information that increases the criticality of the scene concerning 
road geometry. 
Which objects are relevant is dependent on the implementation of the metric. If it is assumed 
that objects never decrease criticality but can only increase it, it follows: 
RD 2 No objects that are relevant for the current driving task and that increase the criticality of the 
used metric shall be missing in the data. 
5.2 Evaluation of Metrics 
In the following sections, an evaluation method for metrics is developed and existing metrics 
analyzed. These research questions are answered: 
Q 7 How can the eligibility of MiR metrics for the use cases MaR extrapolation and identi-
fication of scenarios be falsified? 
Q 8 Do state of the art metrics fulfil all requirements derived in Q 5 and Q 6? 
5.2.1 Falsification Strategy 
Q 7 asks for a falsification strategy in order to ensure refutability for the application of a 
metric especially in extrapolation with EVT but also for scenario identification. So it is dis-
cussed in the following if and how the requirements derived above can be falsified. First, the 
requirements are analyzed and a suitable falsification strategy is described. Then, state of the 
art metrics are evaluated following the developed strategy.  
                                                 
182 Junietz, P. et al.: Gaining Knowledge on Automated Driving’s Safety‐-The Risk-Free VAAFO Tool (2019). 
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RM 1 In case of an increased crash likelihood, the value of the metric must increase, inde-
pendent of the type of accident. 
In obvious cases, falsification is achieved by example scenarios. This can be done by chang-
ing details in a scenario that clearly must result in a different criticality. This could be an 
additional object that must be considered in an evasion maneuver or a reduced lane width at 
high velocity. Especially when comparing different accident types, it is not obvious which 
criticality is higher. Here, the metric’s applicability is only falsifiable in data analysis. As-
suming a correct metric, the true accident rate should correspond with the estimated accident 
likelihood using EVT (comp. Figure 2-5). If this is not the case, it could be caused either by 
an incorrect computation of the driving requirements or by an incorrect calibration of the 
driving skill. This falsification strategy leads to a dilemma because the true accident occur-
rence rate for AD3+ is unknown. For human traffic, the metric can be falsified because the 
accident statistic is known. For automation, there are no statistical data about accidents be-
fore the introduction, so the requirement is not falsifiable a priori. A correct functionality in 
human traffic is not necessarily transferable to automated traffic. Hence, design guidelines 
will be established in section 5.3.1 addressing Q 9. Following the guidelines will result in a 
metric that is likely to perform in EVT. 
RM 2 The value of the metric shall either increase or decrease strictly with increasing crash 
proximity towards a known numeric value representing a collision. 
If it assumed that RM 1 holds up, this requirement can be falsified easily as it requires a 
known limit, when an accident occurs. This could be any arbitrary real value of the metric. 
This will be covered by the design guidelines as well. Many metrics fulfill the requirements, 
for example the value zero for TTX metrics. 
RM 3 The severity of the potential accident shall be estimated. 
This requirement is formulated vaguely because the estimation of severity of a prevented 
accident can never be precise. Similar to RM 1, falsification could be done by analyzing the 
accident statistics including the severity. If the total number of accidents is correct, but the 
severity distribution not, the severity is not estimated correctly. However, even if RM 3 is 
falsified or simply not addressed, the metric might still be able to estimate the accident rate, 
just not the severity level and by this not the risk. 
RM 4 The metric shall detect all critical scenes without false-negatives. 
This requirement is essential if known unknowns shall be collected during real world driv-
ing. In some cases, falsification is achieved by a simple counter-example: a critical scene 
that is not detected by the metric. The requirement can never be fully achieved if the availa-
ble data does not meet the requirements. If metrics are not falsified by known example sce-
narios, the falsification in real world traffic is still possible. If accidents happen and the met-
rics show no increased criticality before the accident, while the accident can still be 
prevented, the requirement is not fulfilled. 
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5.2.2 Evaluation in Test Scenarios  
Metrics can be falsified according to RM 4 and RM 1 using exemplary test scenarios (TS). 
Exemplary scenarios are derived in this section. While additional scenarios are plausible, 
those suggested test scenarios are able to falsify the majority of existing MiR metrics as will 
be shown in section 5.2.3. Before, it needs to be defined which elements of a scenario are 
viable for the requirements. According to section 1.2.4 and 5.1.1, scenarios that impose in-
creased driving requirements are relevant. Obviously, this includes scenarios with high-re-
quired driving dynamics and/or quick and precise reactions. It is assumed that scenarios that 
include just two objects on collision course are detectable according to RM 4 with MiR met-
rics. Therefore, there will be no falsification attempts. This consideration would not cover 
driving scenes with small distance in lateral direction or small time gap in longitudinal di-
rection. However, in everyday driving, such a behavior is regarded as highly critical espe-
cially at high velocities. So, are these scenes critical according to the definition? 
Scenes with small time gap are commonly regarded as critical in daily driving because the 
time margin for successful reaction in case of sudden braking of the front object is small. 
Nevertheless, there will never be an accident if both objects hold their speed. To derive an 
accident likelihood in those scenes, a probabilistic prediction of the front object would be 
required because the scenes becomes critical as soon as the front objects decelerates because 
an imminent reaction is required. However, the model’s parameterization is highly challeng-
ing as the action of the front objects is influenced by many factors that might be out of scope 
of the recorded data and also subject to the objects driving mission (e.g. in case of a nearly 
missed exit on the motorway). Another possibility would be a posteriori assessment. As long 
as the front vehicle is not braking in the recordings, the scene is not critical. The downside 
is that more mileage is required to assess driving behavior with small time gap as dangerous 
(increased accident probability) because only the scenarios containing decelerating front ob-
jects at small time gap are assessed as critical.  
Lateral distances when passing objects however, are commonly considered critical because 
the requirements on the precision of the course angle are high. So even if the objects drive 
straight and do not approach the predicted ego path, driving requirements rise with increased 
ego velocity and reduced lateral distance. This should be covered by metrics. 
Apart from collision with moving objects, collision with road boundaries should be consid-
ered. Hence, a cornering scenario shall be part of the test catalogue (Figure 5-1). 
 
Figure 5-1 TS 1: Cornering Scenario 
Ego
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Depending on the velocity and the curvature of the corner, the test scenario cannot be solved 
without collision or only with very high lateral acceleration that would be difficult to handle. 
Additionally, scenarios in which vehicles are not on collision course, but drive with small 
lateral distance are tested (see reasoning above). With higher velocity, the accident likelihood 
increases, because disturbances in the trajectory have to be corrected faster. In case of dis-
turbance in the course angle, the velocity is integrated to lateral deviation. A suitable TS is 
depicted in Figure 5-2 (bottom). Metrics are falsifiable according to RM 1, when two sce-
nario that have obviously different accident likelihood, result in the same assessment by the 
metric. When two scenarios that are uncritical apart from the lateral distance are compared, 
the scenario with smaller lane width should be assessed as more critical, at least at higher 
velocities. At low velocities, both scenarios might be equally uncritical. In Figure 5-2, the 
bottom scenario is more critical. 
Another aspect is the combination of different influences on criticality, e.g. different objects. 
The two scenarios depicted in Figure 5-3 have different criticality, especially at higher ve-
locities. At higher velocities, an evasion can be conducted later than a braking maneuver. 183 
In the top scenario, evasion is impossible due to the second object on the left lane. Hence, 
the criticality is much higher. Depending on the velocities of the involved objects, the acci-
dent might not be preventable anymore at the top scenario, while the evasion is still possible 
at the bottom. 
 
Figure 5-2 TS 2: Scenario with limited lane width 
                                                 
183 Kühn, M.; Hannawald, L.: Driver Assistance and Road Safety (2016), p. 89. 
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Figure 5-3 TS 3: Traffic jam scenarios with static obstacle and different criticality  
5.2.3 Evaluation of Existing Metrics 
In this section, metrics that were introduced in section 2.2.2.2.1 are evaluated according to 
the requirements and the falsification strategy. Most metrics do not consider the severity 
estimation (RM 3). It is only addressed by a factor of the squared velocity because the avail-
able kinetic energy is proportional (e.g. CI). However, a true severity estimation is missing. 
This will be further discussed in section 5.4. 
5.2.3.1 Time-to-X Metrics 
The metric Time-to-Lane-Crossing (TTLC) describes closeness to accidents because the 
road surface is left and could pass TS1, though the criticality is not well described. The 
prevention of leaving the road might be dependent on other factors besides the remaining 
time. Facing a rectangular corner at a high speed is extremely critical because a deceleration 
is required. The same TTLC might apply at straight driving with a minor deviation in course 
angle, which is quickly corrected by a steering maneuver. However, TTLC might be suffi-
cient in highway driving, so it is not rejected due to TS1. 
All other TTX metrics focus on object collision. So a combination of metrics is required to 
address all types of accidents. As the collision occurs at TTX equal zero, RM 2 that demands 
a boundary when the collision occurs or is not preventable anymore is fulfilled. Time-to-
Brake (TTB) and Time-to-Steer (TTS) require the friction coefficient, at least as a worst case 
estimation. However, it is obvious that the criticality cannot be described without this infor-
mation, as the same scene changes its criticality dramatically if the friction is reduced to a 
minimum. Hence, this is not regarded as a disadvantage. 
Ego
Object 1
Object 2
a)
b)
Ego
Object 1
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The metrics Time-to-Collision (TTC) and TTB are only designed to be applied regarding the 
front object. In this case, they would be falsified according to RM 4 because sidewise acci-
dents would be neglected. If the metrics would be extended to side-objects (e.g. as in Mages 
et al.184), the metrics would not be falsified because collision with all objects are covered. 
However, falsification is achieved according to RM 1 using TS3 (see Figure 5-3). To pass 
the TS, the TS3 a) must be assessed with higher criticality than TS3 b), where a relatively 
uncritical evasion maneuver could be an accident-free solution. Especially with higher ve-
locities, the accident likelihood in the top scenario is higher because a hard braking is the 
only possible solution. However, TTX metrics only consider object-wise maneuvers. The 
simultaneous influence of several objects is not part of the metrics. TS 2 also falsifies the 
metrics as TTX metrics only assess scenes where objects are on collision course. To con-
clude, TTX metrics are not able to fulfill all requirements and their use for EVT is falsified.  
5.2.3.2 Other Time-based Metrics 
Time-based metrics apart from TTX metrics are namely Post-Encroachment-Time (PET), 
Time-Headway (THW) and Worst-Time-to-Collision (WTTC). Again, RM 2 is fulfilled due 
to the accident at zero. Different than TTX metrics, PET and THW evaluate scenes where 
vehicles are not on a collision course. PET is designed for rectangular trajectories scenes, 
while THW is designed for longitudinal traffic. Both metrics are falsified according to TS3 
because they do not assess lateral distance. TS1 is not passed as well because road bounda-
ries are not considered. RM 4 and RM 1 are not fulfilled. WTTC is designed to find all critical 
scenes, so RM 4 is not falsifiable according to the test cases. TS1 is only covered, if the 
metric also considers static objects. However, WTTC does not support ordinal classification 
of accident likelihood. The criticality of vehicles travelling in an adjacent lane is overesti-
mated because worst-case behavior is assumed. TS3 is not passed because the second object 
and also different types of scenario are not comparable, e.g. when comparing TS2 and TS3 
results. TS2 would be assessed with higher criticality even if strong baking is necessary. 
5.2.3.3 Acceleration-based Metrics 
Acceleration-based metrics describe the necessary acceleration to avoid collision with ob-
jects or road boundaries. If the friction coefficient can be estimated, RM 2 is fulfilled because 
the driving dynamic limit is known. Sometimes the coefficient is included in the metric, so 
the transition to an inevitable accident has a fixed limit (see BTN, section 2.2.2.2.1). This 
would be required, if large-scale data is evaluated that contains different friction coefficients. 
However, the metrics only work on objects that are on collision course in the same way TTX 
metrics do, so TS2 is failed and RM 4 not fulfilled. The metrics also do not consider multiple 
paths because each object is treated individually. As a result, TS3 is also failed, because the 
                                                 
184 Mages, M. et al.: Intersection Assistance (2016), p. 1274. 
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second object does not increase criticality further. Especially on highways, the majority of 
accidents is in longitudinal traffic. Hence, BTN might lead to acceptable results in EVT (as 
in Asljung et al.185,186). However, some accident types are bound to be missed systematically. 
5.2.3.4 Vehicle-movement-based metrics 
In NDS- and FOT-Studies, the measured vehicles movements are used together with thresh-
olds as an a posteriori assessment to find critical scenarios. As the environment is not further 
considered, RM 2 cannot be fulfilled. It is unknown if the driver decided voluntarily for the 
maneuver or not, and if not whether maneuver was unreasonable extreme. Near-miss sce-
narios, in which no extreme movements were necessary are not detectable, so TS2 is failed. 
The metrics only assess the strength of a reaction but not the necessary precision. 
5.2.3.5 Combination of several metrics 
All aforementioned metrics are falsified because they do not fulfill one or two requirements 
according to the three test cases. Especially for scenario identification, several metrics are 
combined to reduce false-negatives, so RM 4 can be fulfilled with state of the art metrics. 
However, when combining metrics and defining a threshold for each metric in order to re-
duce those, false-positive detection increase (Junietz et al.187). Nevertheless, TS3 is still not 
passed because the second object does not increase the criticality with any of the metrics. 
RM 1 cannot be fulfilled.  
5.2.3.6 Summary 
In the analysis of conventional metrics that were used on large scale data in past studies, TS3 
is not passed. A reason is the available data where only one front vehicle is recorded, so TS3 
would not be included in the data as two vehicles are required. So the data does not fulfill 
RD 2 because relevant objects are not included. Eligible metrics that fulfill the requirements 
must consider multiple objects together because the criticality from several objects cannot 
be superposed as only the combination increases the criticality. Metrics from the trajectory 
planning domain consider all available information. However, they are typically not used to 
compare different scenarios with each other. The goal is rather to give relative criticality of 
different trajectory decisions by predicting the objects in a probabilistic way. They are not 
falsifiable with the derived TS. However, it is questionable whether these metrics describe 
                                                 
185 Asljung, D. et al.: Comparing Collision Threat Measures using EVT (2016). 
186 Asljung, D. et al.: EVT for Vehicle Level Safety Validation (2017). 
187 Junietz, P. et al.: Metrik zur Bewertung der Kritikalität von Verkehrssituationen und -szenarien (2017). 
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accident probability as they are not designed for this purpose. In the next subchapter the 
design of a new metric is described using concepts from trajectory planning metrics. 
5.3 Design of a Criticality Metric 
Q 9 What are design guidelines for the development of MiR metrics according to the 
requirements derived in Q 5 and Q 6? 
According to the previous subchapter, multiple objects have to be considered simultaneously 
in order to fulfil the requirements. Metrics that origin from trajectory planning could not be 
falsified by simple test cases. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that those metrics would perform 
well according to RM 1 when applied on data, because they were not designed to compare 
different traffic scenarios. Instead, they are designed to predict the environment and find the 
trajectory with the least costs. Their costs typically consider the fulfillment of the driving 
mission coupled with the risk of a collision. The collision risk is thereby sometimes included 
by using constraints that prevent the vehicle from getting to close to surrounding objects. As 
derived previously, applicability of metrics especially for EVT might not be falsifiable be-
fore the introduction of AD3+ because of insufficient data. Application with data from cur-
rent traffic might be sufficient to gain trust in the metric regarding human traffic, but there 
is no guarantee that the metric will perform equally in AD3+ traffic. In order to find a metric 
that is likely to perform sufficiently in both, human and AD3+ traffic, design guidelines must 
be defined that aim towards the fulfillment of the requirements. 
In order to address RM 1, the metric must provide an orthogonal scale that describes accident 
likelihood. This adopts the definition of criticality from section 1.2.4, where criticality is 
defined as proximity to an accident due to high driving requirements concerning reaction 
time, precision and driving dynamic reserve: 
Precision is further refined as precision of course angle under disturbances. Longitudinal 
precision is neglected, because disturbances must increase the speed of the vehicle in order 
to increase criticality. As longitudinal distances are typically larger than lateral distances (at 
least at higher travelling speed) they are neglected in the following. Therefore, the focus is 
on lateral disturbances. 
The driving dynamic reserve can be described by the usage of driving dynamic potential / 
tire-road friction. These are the driving requirements or the requirements for the driver on 
action level. However, if the driving skill is unknown, the proximity to an accident cannot 
be determined. Only the limit, where an accident happens is known, because of limiting 
driving dynamics conditions. If the driving skill is known, calibration towards accident prob-
ability would be possible. If it would be known which percentage of scenes with the respec-
tive requirements are solved without accident, a direct link towards accident likelihood could 
be established. 
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The required reaction time is the third element of criticality. It is the time until a braking or 
evasion maneuver must start at the latest, assuming maximal acceleration. Similar to the 
driving dynamic reserve, it must be calibrated using the assumed driving skill. Here, large 
differences between human and machine are expected.  
It is of outmost importance to establish guidelines for the development of metrics because 
otherwise their applicability will likely be falsified only after the application on large scale 
data. As the driving skill is not precisely known, certain parameters of the criticality must be 
estimated. Whenever this is the case, they shall be justified in detail and arbitrariness shall 
be analyzed.  
5.3.1 Discussion of Concepts for a Metric 
In this section, different approaches for a metric are discussed. As falsification without the 
required data is not possible for advanced metrics, the theory behind the different concepts 
is analyzed in order to define a suitable approach. 
5.3.1.1 Object Prediction 
To assess the possible outcome of a scene, the future trajectories of the objects are required. 
This can be done without using information of the data recordings by different approaches. 
This is called a priori evaluation. In trajectory planning, probabilistic approaches are the 
most common that predict the movement of objects by underlying assumptions (e.g. by a 
statistic model such as Bayesian networks). When evaluating recorded data, it is also possi-
ble to use the true trajectories of the objects because the future of the scene in question is 
known. The possible ego-vehicle trajectories are assessed depending on the known outcome. 
However, this is only valid for a limited timespan as the objects movement might be influ-
enced by a changing trajectory of the ego-vehicle. A disadvantage of an a posteriori assess-
ment is that behaviors that are subjectively critical might be assessed differently because it 
did not turn out as critical in the future as it could have. One example is driving with very 
small time-gap on a motorway. From daily driving, it is well known that small time-gaps at 
high speeds are critical because the necessary reaction time on a deceleration of the front 
object is too small.  
In an a posteriori assessment, the scene is not critical as long as the front-object does not 
decelerate. Nevertheless, a behavior like this would be punished by the metric in the long-
run because deceleration will occur when enough data is analyzed. In other words, more data 
are required to assess this behavior with a lesser safety extrapolation. 
An a priori assessment of the same scene would require a calibrated behavior model of the 
object. The scene would be assessed as critical because the probabilistic behavior model 
predicts deceleration with a (low) likelihood. The advantage is, that it requires less data to 
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assess driving with small time-gap with a lesser safety extrapolation. Nevertheless, it re-
quires data to be parameterized, so the advantage is questionable. As there is only limited 
data available and further parametrization is necessary for an a priori approach, it is not 
favorable. Another aspect is that an a posteriori approach is extendable when new data is 
available. With existing data, a model could be built and the results of both approaches com-
pared. However, this might results in over-assessment of the criticality in scenes with small 
lateral distance. Without sufficient data, it is assumed that the driver’s mental model of the 
surrounding traffic is more accurate than a model that is just based on the existing data. 
To summarize it is stated that the advantage of an a posteriori assessment exceed their dis-
advantages. The fact that data about the future is available should be used with the benefit 
of relinquishing behavior models that are a source for errors is parameterization. This con-
cept is obviously not found in trajectory planning because the trajectory is decided upon in 
real-time. A similar concept is found in silent testing or VAAFO188,189, where incorrect envi-
ronment representation is corrected a posteriori. With insufficient data, the safety extrapola-
tion could underestimate the true safety compared to an a priori approach. However, the fact 
that additional data improves the extrapolation using a posteriori assessment, while all data 
must be reevaluate with an updated model in a priori assessment. This consideration also 
suggests using a posteriori assessment, as it is uncertain if enough data is available. 
5.3.1.2 Criticality Assessment 
From section 5.2.3.6 it is known that in order to fulfil RM 1, the criticality assessment shall 
consider different trajectories and assess the driving requirements in order to find their min-
imum. Different approaches known from literature that could be used with a posteriori as-
sessment of the scenario are discussed in the following. In section 2.2.2.2.1, multi-object 
metrics where introduced in the categories geometry-based, sample-based, potential-field 
and optimization. Here, their potential for the fulfillment of the requirements, especially RM 
1 is discussed. 
For simple evasion maneuvers, geometry-based methods find suitable trajectories. Though, 
there is no information whether the final solution is the least critical or not. The combination 
of different maneuvers is also not covered. Some scenarios might require parallel or serial 
combination of steering and braking maneuvers so the methods cannot be applied on every 
scenario. Hence, they are not eligible for EVT. 
Sampling-based methods generate trajectories based on random inputs, usually following a 
certain probability distribution resulting in a high number of possible outcomes. In the liter-
ature, either the number of accident free trajectories defines the criticality190 or the available 
                                                 
188 Junietz, P. et al.: Gaining Knowledge on Automated Driving’s Safety‐-The Risk-Free VAAFO Tool (2019). 
189 Wachenfeld, W.; Winner, H.: Virtual Assessment of Automation in Field Operation (2015). 
190 Stumper, D. et al.: Towards Characterization of Driving Situations (2016). 
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area around the trajectory191. These definition might fulfil RM 1 in some scenarios but not in 
every as the following example shows: When straight driving is possible but the area or the 
number of trajectories sampled in the available lane are small, the criticality would be as-
sessed as high. So only similar scenarios are comparable. Single trajectories could also be 
assessed according to their driving requirements but there might be a relatively uncritical 
trajectory that is not part of the sample.  
Potential-field and optimization methods on the other hand, both result in a single trajectory. 
Especially, optimization methods could find the trajectory with the least criticality according 
to a defined cost function. In trajectory planning, the driving mission is always included in 
the cost function. If the cost function is modified in order to suit the definition of criticality 
in section 1.2.4, RM 1 might be fulfilled. Hence, the cost function should contain the neces-
sary acceleration, the reaction time and the necessary precision of the maneuver. 
To conclude, out of all discussed approaches, optimization methods are likely most suitable 
for criticality metrics. However, the definition of the cost function that contains all criticality 
information into one equation without other information such as the driving mission ins un-
usual for trajectory optimization. Even though the approach seems promising, the fulfillment 
of the requirements cannot be proven but is falsifiable after being applied on data. 
A remaining challenge is the combination of the different aspects of criticality. In order to 
define the cost function, they shall be combined into one function with output costs that are 
minimized in an optimization. This requires the definition of at least two parameters (shape 
and weighting) per component resulting in six parameters. As derived above, this parametri-
zation and especially arbitrariness in the parametrization needs careful evaluation and justi-
fication. Ideally, the parameters are connected to the driving capabilities in a way that deri-
vation of accident likelihood is possible. However, modelling the driving capabilities 
requires data that might not be available. 
According to RM 2, the maximum value for the final metric shall represent a scene, in which 
the accident cannot be prevented. This could be used either by designing the cost function in 
a way that at each time step, the value range is below or equal to the maximum value, or by 
using part of the cost function as criticality assessment.  
As the range of value for the final metric is arbitrary, it is hereby defined between zero and 
one so scenes without increased criticality are described by the value zero and scenes, in 
which the collision is not preventable are defined by the value one.  
                                                 
191 Rodemerk, C. et al.: Development of a general criticality criterion (2012). 
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5.3.1.3 Summary 
As summary, these design guidelines can be concluded: 
 The metric shall consider the reaction time, precision of course angle and driving 
dynamic reserve. 
 The three components shall be combined to a value that describes proximity to an 
accident using the estimated driving skills. 
 Parameterization and weighting of the different factors shall be analyzed and justi-
fied. 
 If arbitrary parametrization is chosen, the influence on the risk extrapolation shall be 
analyzed. 
 Object trajectories should be assessed a posteriori, if there is no calibrated object 
prediction model available. 
 All possible accident free trajectories should be considered resulting in the trajectory 
with the least accident likelihood. Trajectory optimization is one feasible approach. 
In the following, a metric is developed according to these guidelines and the requirements 
derived above. 
5.3.2 Definition of the Trajectory Criticality Index 
In this section, a new metric for criticality assessment is developed based on trajectory opti-
mization. It is called trajectory criticality index (TCI). An overview about the computation 
of TCI is given in Figure 5-4. Following the design guidelines it is based on trajectory opti-
mization, finding the trajectory with the least driving requirements. The necessary require-
ments are then weighted according to the driving skill. As the metric will be applied on data 
of human driven traffic first, human driving skill is the basis for the parameterization. Nev-
ertheless, calibration for AD3+ must be possible as soon as a system is defined and its driving 
skill known. The trajectory will further be optimized using a model predictive approach re-
quiring a vehicle model (section 5.3.2.1) and a cost function that is dependent on the ele-
ments of criticality (reaction 𝐶𝑅, precision 𝐶𝑃 and acceleration 𝐶𝑎) according to the design 
guidelines. This is described in sections 5.3.2.2 to 5.3.2.6. The total TCI is then derived from 
the costs of the optimal trajectory. The duration of the prediction should be long enough to 
actively reduce the criticality of the situation. A longer time does not influence the result 
because the most critical part is covered but increases computational effort. 
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Figure 5-4 Overview of TCI computation 
5.3.2.1 Vehicle model 
In this section, it is discussed which vehicle model is used for the optimization. Parts of this 
section where previously published192. In addition to this paper, the different options and the 
influences on the final result are discussed.  
The model is the link between the inputs (acceleration in lateral and longitudinal direction 
or steering angle and longitudinal acceleration) and the trajectory of the ego-vehicle. As in-
put, the lateral acceleration is further used instead of the steering angle, because the trans-
formation from steering angle to acceleration might vary for different vehicles. For the com-
putation of criticality the position (including the yaw angle) in world coordinates (index w) 
and the velocity of the vehicle in natural coordinates (index v) are required. So the problem 
depends on the current ego velocity in natural vehicle coordinates 𝑣v , the yaw angle 𝜓𝑐𝑤 , 
and the accelerations 𝑎v 𝑥, 𝑎𝑦v  in natural vehicle coordinates. Therefore, a model with at 
least three degrees of freedom (DoF) is required. Additionally, the position in world coordi-
nates is needed because the position of the objects is not updated into vehicle coordinates 
once the prediction horizon is initialized.  
A state-space model with state vector 𝑥 = [ 𝑥w   w  𝑣v  𝜓𝑐v ]
T
 and input vector 𝑢 =
[ 𝑎v 𝑥 𝑎𝑦v ]
T
 is defined. For most MPC applications, a linear single-track-model is used. The 
simplest approach here would be a point-mass model with course angle as additional DoF. 
Compared to a more complex single-track or two-track model, it is more agile in lateral 
direction than a real car, because lateral acceleration directly results in a change in course 
angle because tire forces are not modeled and the wheelbase is infinitively small. As a result, 
the criticality computed by the metric is smaller in highly critical scenes than when using a 
more advanced model. The maximal lateral acceleration might be lower in reality as well as 
the model ignores load shift during cornering and self-steering effects. So the criticality in 
highly critical scenes is underestimated, which could be prevented using a more advanced 
                                                 
192 Junietz, P. et al.: Criticality Metric for the Safety Validation of Automated Driving (2018). 
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model. As the metric should be universally applicable and the driving dynamically relevant 
parameters might vary with different vehicle models, a simple model is used here. As the 
model does not include a slip angle, yaw angle and course angle are identical. For better 
readability the letter 𝜓𝑐𝑒  is used instead of 𝜈𝑐𝑒 . 
The non-linear vehicle model is described by: 
 
[
 
 
 
 
 
 ?̇?w
 ̇w
?̇?v
𝜓𝑐
̇
w ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
=
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 𝑣v ∙ cos ( 𝜓𝑐w )
𝑣v ∙ sin ( 𝜓𝑐w )
𝑎v 𝑥
𝑎 v
𝑣v ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (5.1) 
Assuming small course angle changes and small changes in velocity allows linearization of 
the model.  
Initializing the model at course angle zero and using the previous velocity 𝑣𝑒 ‐1 in each 
time-step results to: 
 
[
 
 
 
 
 
 ?̇?w
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?̇?v
?̇?w  ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
≈
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 𝑣v ‐1
𝑣v ‐1 ∙ 𝜓𝑐w
𝑎v 𝑥
𝑎v  
𝑣v ‐1 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (5.2) 
resulting in the system matrices: 
 
𝐴 =  [
0 0
0 0
1 0   
0 𝑣v ‐1
0 0
0 0
0  0    
0 0   
] , 𝐵 = [
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1 𝑣v −1 ⁄
] (5.3) 
and the system: 
 
ẋ = 𝐴 ∙ 𝑥 + 𝐵 ∙ 𝑢 (5.4) 
Note that instead of a constant velocity over all time steps, the velocity of the previous time 
step is used. This results in more accurate but more expensive computation (comp. Yi et 
al.193) due to time-variant system matrices. As computational effort is not the main issue, the 
velocity of the previous step is used. Especially in critical scenes, braking is often necessary 
and the velocity decreases. From equation (5.2) the effect in combined maneuvers with lat-
eral acceleration and braking is derived. Changes in course angle are smaller in the model as 
the previous velocity 𝑣‐1v  is used. For the computation of the lateral velocity  ̇w , this influ-
ence is compensated partly because the lower magnitude of the course angle and the higher 
                                                 
193 Yi, B. et al.: Real time integrated vehicle dynamics control and trajectory planning (2016). 
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velocity are multiplied. It is further assumed that the deviation is neglectable using typical 
stepsizes of about 0.1 s. However, the linearization might influence the performance in lane-
change scenarios, so a comparison of results according to (5.1) and (5.2) will be conducted 
in subchapter 6.2. 
5.3.2.2 Cost Function and Criticality – Preliminary Considerations 
As argued in section 5.3.1.2, the minimization of a cost function should result in a trajectory 
with minimal criticality including the aspect of reaction strength, precision and reaction time. 
The three aspects should be calibrated against each other according to the available driving 
skill. As the driving skill can only be roughly estimated, the three components will be nor-
malized to one to allow comparison. Requirements which result in the minimum value zero 
and the maximum value one, will be discussed in the following sections. The criticality as-
sessment must fulfill the requirements of section 5.1.1 and does not necessarily have to be 
the minimized value of the cost function. For example, the cost function typically minimizes 
the sum of all time-steps in a trajectory, because the whole trajectory should be in focus of 
the optimization. For the criticality assessment on the other hand the maximum value is of 
importance because otherwise a very critical moment could be compensated by several un-
critical following steps. What options remain in design of the cost function and the criticality 
will be discussed in section 5.3.2.6. 
In conclusion, the following steps are required: 
 Definition of the three elements including: 
o Highest Value 
o Value without criticality 
o Normalization and progression between lowest and highest value 
 Design of the cost function and the criticality including: 
o Weighting factors 
o Algebraic combination of the elements 
5.3.2.3 Acceleration 
As mentioned before, the required accelerations of the optimal trajectory have an influence 
on criticality. Not only because the driver has to act, but also because the acceleration is 
required in this scene and a smaller reaction would either be insufficient or would require 
increased requirements in the other domains (precision and reaction time). A normalization 
of the acceleration  can be done by dividing the acceleration by the available tire-road friction 
µ (that must be known or estimated) and the gravitational constant g. Neglecting aerody-
namic effects, the maximum achievable acceleration is 𝜇 ∙ 𝑔 according to Kamm’s circle 
(Figure 5-5a). However, due to the non-linear characteristic of tire-road friction, handling 
with lateral accelerations of more than 0.4 g is challenging and not mastered by most drivers. 
Assuming that automated functions will work best outside of combined maneuvers with high 
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absolute accelerations, especially because the available friction coefficient can only be esti-
mated. Hence, instead of a friction circle, a rhombus (Figure 5-5b) or a cross/star (Figure 
5-5c) could be used as a representation for the available friction coefficient in dependency 
of the acceleration in longitudinal and lateral direction. The driving dynamics of the vehicle 
could further influence the achievable accelerations especially in lateral direction, e.g. due 
to self-steering effect or in longitudinal direction for example due to limited available engine 
torque or two-wheel instead of four-wheel drive. 
 
Figure 5-5 Different options to assess the criticality of the required acceleration 
The formulas to calculate the criticality component acceleration Ca corresponding to Figure 
5-5 are shown in equations (5.5) to (5.7). Different approaches or combinations are possible 
as well, but would require in depth studying of the driving skill of the human driver or the 
automation.  
 𝐶𝑎,a =
𝑎𝑥
2
𝑒 + 𝑎𝑦
2
𝑒
(𝜇 ∙ 𝑔)2
 (5.5) 
 𝐶𝑎,b =
| 𝑎𝑥𝑒 | + | 𝑎𝑦𝑒 |
𝜇 ∙ 𝑔
 (5.6) 
 𝐶𝑎,c =
| 𝑎𝑥𝑒 | + | 𝑎𝑦𝑒 | + min(| 𝑎𝑥𝑒 |, | 𝑎𝑦𝑒 |)
𝜇 ∙ 𝑔
 (5.7) 
To not overestimate the criticality, especially in critical scenes approach a) is favorable as 
long as the metric is used universally and not for a specific vehicle or automated system. It 
will be used in the following chapters. Another approach is only advisable, if it is certain that 
the vehicle or the driver cannot achieve parts of the circle. 
5.3.2.4 Reaction Time 
The implementation of the necessary reaction time is manifold because the reaction might 
be in longitudinal (TTB) or lateral direction (TTS). However, for evasion maneuvers, free 
space must be available on the neighboring lane so there are two possibilities to calculate the 
reaction time: 
a) Assume only braking for the computation of TTB with the downside of overestimat-
ing the criticality in cases where evasion is possible. 
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b) Determine whether there is free space available and use the maximum of TTB and 
TTS with the downside that analytical computation is only possible for simple eva-
sion maneuvers (e.g. based on sigmoid trajectories; comp. section 5.2.3.1). 
As option b) results in uncertainty, because an analytical result of the free-space check is not 
trustworthy, option a) will be used later. This results in an increased criticality component 
reaction time based on TTB alone. To compensate this, optimizations resulting in an optimal 
solution of an evasion maneuver are detected and the ego trajectory is assed a priori to detect 
evasion maneuvers. If an evasion is detected, the optimization problem is reevaluated using 
option b) because the free space is available. The variable 𝜏𝑇𝑅 in equation (5.15) is used for 
TTR meaning the respective value of TTB for the initial optimization and the maximum of 
TTB and TTS for the reevaluation. 
As there is no further reaction time needed to use the current acceleration 𝑎𝑥,0, TTB and TTS 
are calculated assuming constant acceleration until the reaction. The geometric relations and 
variables are depicted in Figure 5-6. The formula for TTB is derived from the positions of 
ego and object vehicle assuming the braking duration 𝑡  and the brake reaction time  𝜏𝑡𝐵 and 
using the travelled distances s of both vehicles (comp. Hillenbrand et al.194).  
 
Figure 5-6 Geometric relations of an approaching scenario 
The ego vehicle travels constantly with the initial speed and the current longitudinal accel-
eration until the reaction. After that, the ego vehicle decelerates with maximum deceleration. 
For the object vehicle, the velocity is assumed to be constant. Equations for the travelled 
distances s and the velocities v are combined with the condition that no relative velocity 
exists when the initial gap dlong is zero, eliminating the brake duration and resulting in the 
quadratic equation (5.11). 
 
𝑠ego = 𝑣ego,0(𝑡 + 𝜏tB) +
1
2
𝑎𝑥,0𝜏tB
2 −
1
2
𝜇max 𝑔𝑡 
2 (5.8) 
 𝑠obj = 𝑣obj(𝑡 + 𝜏tB) (5.9) 
                                                 
194 Hillenbrand, J. et al.: Situation assessment algorithm (2005). 
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 𝑣obj = 𝑣ego + 𝑎𝑥,0𝜏tB − 𝜇max 𝑔𝑡   (5.10) 
 with 𝑠ego = 𝑠obj + 𝑑long and equation (5.10): 
1
2
(𝑎𝑥,0 −
𝑎𝑥,0
2
𝜇max 𝑔
)𝜏tB
2 − 𝑣rel𝜏tB − 𝑑long +
𝑣rel
2
2𝜇max 𝑔
= 0  
(5.11) 
Solving equation (5.11) for τtB results in two real solutions with the smaller one being the 
actual TTB and the larger representing overtaking (or driving through) and decelerating 
backwards.  
For TTS similar considerations apply, but now the last longitudinal evasion distance dlong,eva 
depending on the necessary lateral evasion distance Δ𝑑𝑦 and evasion time teva. When the 
lateral distance between the two vehicles is zero, the evasion must be completed (equation 
(5.13)). 
 
𝑡eva = √2
Δ𝑑𝑦
𝜇max 𝑔
     and      𝑑long,eva = (−𝑣rel + 𝑎𝑥,0𝜏tS)𝑡eva 
(5.12) 
 
𝑑long,eva = 𝑑long + 𝑣rel𝜏tS +
1
2
𝑎𝑥,0𝜏tS
2  (5.13) 
 Combining (5.12) and (5.13) results into: 
1
2
𝑎𝑥,0𝜏tS
2 +(𝑣rel − 𝑎𝑥,0√2
Δ𝑑𝑦
𝜇max 𝑔
)𝜏tS + 𝑑long + 𝑣rel√2
Δ𝑑𝑦
𝜇max 𝑔
= 0 
(5.14) 
Again, solving the quadratic equation results in the actual TTS as the minimum of the two 
solutions due to reasons identical to the ones above.  
For the normalization of the reaction time, different approaches are plausible. The upper 
limit is when no reaction time remains. In conclusion, the questions, which need to be ad-
dressed, are: What is the lower limit and how should the criticality increase with decreasing 
reaction time? Studies about brake reaction time of human driven vehicles are available and 
can be used as a basis for those considerations and for the calibration of the driving skill. 
Habenicht195 analyzed studies focusing on reaction time. Burckhardt196 found that the me-
dian of reaction times in his experiments was 0.86 s. Döhler and Nitsche found that that the 
2% percentile was between 0.3 and 0.5 s and the 98% percentile was between 1.0 and 
1.1 s.197 In a more recent study for the European Association for Accident Research and 
Analysis, Hugemann198 found that a Gamma-distribution would be the best fit for the data 
although more detailed experiments would be necessary to come to a profound fit.  
                                                 
195 Habenicht, S.: Entwicklung eines manöverbasierten Fahrstreifenwechselassistenten (2012), pp. 35–37. 
196 Burckhardt, M.: Reaktionszeiten bei Notbremsvorgängen (1985). 
197 Döhler, H.; NITSCHE, K.: New mathematical findings on reaction times (2008). 
198 Hugemann, W.: Driver reaction times in road traffic (2002). 
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Figure 5-7 Data for brake reaction time by Hugemann199a based on Burckhardt200 
A possible approach to normalize the reaction time into a criticality component reaction CR 
would be to fit a distribution function (e.g. Gamma-distribution as suggested above) to reac-
tion time studies. Its cumulative distribution function 𝛷𝜏 could then be approximated using 
the following formula that determines the likelihood that the reaction time of the driver 𝜏R 
is bigger than the required brake reaction time 𝜏tR. 
 𝐶𝑅,𝛷(𝜏𝑡𝑅) = 𝑃(𝜏𝑡𝑅 < 𝜏𝑅) = 1 − 𝛷𝜏(𝜏tR) (5.15) 
However, the available data is insufficient. Hugemann199b points out that in every day driv-
ing, reaction times of more than 1.5 s are common even when the driver is not distracted. 
For AD3+ reaction times, it is broadly assumed that the reaction times are faster, but object 
recognition and motion planning takes time as well and might be dependent on the scene’s 
complexity. Nevertheless, the distribution and dependencies with the scene are unknown and 
do not allow calibration of the driving skill. It is only certain that criticality decreases from 
a reaction time of zero and that the lower limit should be somewhere about 2 s of remaining 
reaction time for human traffic. Consequently, a linear decrease is used in the following, as 
more detailed data would be required to justify the selection of a distribution function. 
Hence, the following formula is used further on: 
 𝐶𝑅,lin(𝜏𝑇𝑅) = 1 −
𝜏𝑇𝑅
2 s
    for     0 < 𝜏𝑇𝑅 < 2 s (5.16) 
Linear representation of the cumulative distribution function according to equation (5.16) is 
probably a worse fit than a Gamma-distribution fit according to equation (5.15) regarding 
overall accuracy of the approximation. However, it underestimates criticality in the very 
critical region, which has a less severe influence than overestimating due to the low fre-
quency of highly critical events. Additionally, events of lower criticality are overestimated, 
                                                 
199 Hugemann, W.: Driver reaction times in road traffic (2002), p. 3.a: p. 3; b: p. 11 
200 Burckhardt, M.: Reaktionszeiten bei Notbremsvorgängen (1985). 
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so it also suits scenario identification purposes, where no critical scene shall be missed. In 
other words, there is a borderline 𝜏𝑡𝑅,lim where: 
 𝐶𝑅,lin(𝜏𝑡𝑅) > 𝐶𝑅,𝛷(𝜏𝑡𝑅)
𝐶𝑅,lin(𝜏𝑡𝑅) ≤ 𝐶𝑅,𝛷(𝜏𝑡𝑅)
     for     
0 < 𝜏𝑡𝑅 < 𝜏𝑡𝑅,lim
𝜏𝑡𝑅,lim ≤ 𝜏𝑡𝑅 < ∞
      (5.17) 
Above this borderline, the criticality is overestimated and below this borderline, criticality 
is underestimated. 
5.3.2.5 Precision 
The criticality component precision CP is not as straightforward as the previous two. Hence, 
it is first analyzed using exemplary scenarios.  
A high precision of a trajectory is required when the margins to other objects are small and 
minor disturbances to the trajectory would result in a collision. In theory, precision is neces-
sary for speed and for the course angle as both is controlled by the driver. A precision in 
speed is especially required when driving behind another vehicle at the same speed with very 
small distance (where the speed must not be increased) or when cutting in between in front 
of a vehicles (where the speed must not be decreased). The two scenarios are depicted in 
Figure 5-8. Both cases are relatively easy to handle as long as the other vehicle does not 
change its speed because disturbances in longitudinal direction (wind, road unevenness) 
have only minor influence and it is relatively easy to increase the margin by decreasing the 
own speed in the “following” scenario and increasing the own speed at the “cut-in” scenario.  
Is in conclusion the “following” scenario uncritical and if so, why is there a mandatory safety 
distance that must not be undercut? Obviously, the scenario becomes critical as soon as the 
preceding vehicle reduces its speed. However, this has nothing to do with precision but with 
reaction time. As soon as the vehicle brakes in the recorded data, CR increases. If the vehicle 
does not brake, the scenario is uncritical.  
Is therefore a behavior that favors small time-headway not considered critical? There are two 
approaches how a small time-headway influences the overall result and the frequency of 
critical scenes. To punish this driving behavior directly, a probabilistic trajectory prediction 
for the preceding vehicle could be used. The likelihood of braking with a certain deceleration 
would then be used to assess the criticality and short reaction time would lead to an increased 
criticality. The frequency of such a scene would then be weighted with the likelihood of such 
an event. However, this process would be error prone due to the calibration of the probabil-
istic model. Instead, an a posteriori assessment is used as discussed in section 5.3.1.1. In the 
long run, a systematic driving behavior that often drives with small time-headway will ex-
perience more scenes where the brake reaction time is low because of a decelerating preced-
ing vehicle, but sufficient data is required to come to a statistically profound estimation of 
the average frequency. As this is already covered by CR, there is no additional longitudinal 
component for CP. 
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Figure 5-8 “Following” and “cut-in” scenario 
As known from personal experience in every day driving, criticality from lateral margin is 
obviously dependent on the lateral distance and the velocity. It is obviously less demanding 
to drive through a gap at a lower speed compared to the same gap at a higher speed. So why 
is the velocity important to consider? It is typically not due to lack of steering ability or 
perception ability that causes the driver being unable to maneuver the vehicle through the 
gap. Instead, disturbances in the course angle due to side-wind, road unevenness, or non-
precise control of the vehicle’s system require quick corrective reactions. Additionally, the 
speed of the reaction might increase overshoot especially in steering. Incorrect estimation of 
the available lateral distance further increases control errors. The driver must be ready to 
compensate these disturbances at all time when passing through a gap. Different from CR, 
reaction time cannot be derived directly from data because disturbances are usually not rec-
orded and there is also no data available to allow parameterization of a statistical model. 
Normalization of the known available reaction time would be ideal, that is however unknown 
for a human driver. When the lateral distance is zero, CP should be maximal (CP = 1). Thus, 
are there other scenarios that should be assessed as equally critical? The reaction time for 
the component precision 𝜏𝑅𝑃 is the lateral distance divided by the lateral velocity that equals 
the velocity multiplied with the disturbance in course angle ∆𝜓. Ideally, the disturbance 
would be approximated with a statistical model as described above for preceding objects. In 
this case, an a posteriori assessment is impossible as well, because data about disturbance in 
course angle is usually not recorded. From personal experiences it can be derived, that driv-
ing on a highway with lane width of 3.5 m201 at the recommended speed of 130 km/h is not 
critical and starts to be more challenging with increased speed. As no additional data is avail-
able the corresponding reaction time is arbitrarily defined as four seconds in this scene, while 
four seconds is the reoccurring limit to filter uncritical scenes (comp. section 2.2.4.2 and 
appendix A). This is equal to an assumed disturbance in course angle of 1.4° (0.0244 rad). It 
has to be pointed out that this parameterization is arbitrary and other considerations might 
come to other results. When the ego vehicle is approaching an object with a lateral distance 
as depicted in Figure 5-9, the reaction time due to disturbances is obviously higher than when 
the vehicle is beside the ego.   
                                                 
201 Forschungsgesellschaft für Straßen und Verkehrswesen: Anlage von Autobahnen (2009). 
Ego Object
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In this case, the time until catching up must be added to the reaction time because the driver 
has more time to compensate the disturbance. It follows: 
 𝜏𝑅𝑃(𝑑lat, 𝑣) = −
𝑑long
𝑣rel
+
𝑑lat
𝑣 ∙ sin(∆𝜓)
≈ −
𝑑long
𝑣rel
+
𝑑lat
𝑣 ∙ ∆𝜓
 (5.18) 
Assuming that the occurring disturbance in course angle is small and not dependent on the 
velocity nor on the lateral distance, the reaction time is proportional to the lateral distance 
and anti-proportional to the velocity and the disturbance.  
 
Figure 5-9 Approaching with lateral distance 
The effect on the final result will be analyzed in subchapter 6.2.4. In accordance to equation 
(5.16), the following normalization will be used. As the parametrization is arbitrary and 
should not result in an overestimating in the region of higher criticality a weighting factor 
wP is introduced that will be analyzed in the sensitivity analysis in section 6.2.4. Firstly, a 
weighting factor of 1/10 is used that is increased in the sensitivity analyses. 
 𝐶𝑃(𝜏𝑅𝑃) = 1 − 𝑤P
𝜏𝑅𝑃
2 s
    for     0 < 𝜏𝑅𝑃 <
2 s
𝑤P
  (5.19) 
5.3.2.6 Cost Function 
In order to find the trajectory with the minimal criticality, a cost function must be formulated 
that contains the three elements: acceleration, reaction and precision. A straightforward ap-
proach would be the summation of the three elements with or without weighting factors. For 
the definition of the final criticality index there are basically two options: 
a) The final value of the cost function is the criticality index 
b) The criticality index is an algebraic combination of one or more components 
For both options, a value of one of each component means that an accident cannot be pre-
vented, so the criticality should be one as well. As reaction and precision are both time-based 
according to equation (5.16) and (5.19) and both describe a reaction time, the maximum 
value of both components could be used (as equivalent to the minimum reaction time). For 
O      
Ego Vehicle  
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the combination of acceleration and reaction time based components, the maximum function 
is insufficient because assuming constant required acceleration. The criticality should 
change with decreasing reaction time, also when the criticality from acceleration is domi-
nant. Therefore, the combination function shall always increase when one of the inputs in-
creases. When at least one input is already one, the combination function shall be one. Sim-
ilar as for equation (5.16), different equations fulfill these requirements. Without additional 
information, a linear approach is favored. If it serves a purpose (e.g. an increased sensitivity 
in highly critical scenes), the combination function could be adapted in future work. The 
following combination formula for total criticality Ctot (also depicted in Figure 5-10) fulfills 
all requirements: 
 𝐶tot(𝐶𝑎, 𝐶𝜏) = 𝐶𝜏 + 𝐶𝑎 − 𝐶𝑎𝐶𝜏 
with 𝐶𝜏 = max(𝐶P, 𝐶R) 
(5.20) 
As discussed previously, criticality should be the maximum of the predicted driving require-
ments. With i as the current discrete step during the prediction horizon of N steps, the final 
criticality, the trajectory criticality index ITC results: 
 𝐼TC = max(𝐶tot,1, … , 𝐶tot,N) (5.21) 
 
Figure 5-10 Combination function for criticality 
Following option b), equation (5.21) is used as the cost function, which is minimized to find 
the trajectory with the minimal criticality. As only the maximal criticality of all N steps is 
relevant for the optimization, the resulting trajectories look arbitrary because most compo-
nents of the input vector have no influence on the costs. As only the maximal criticality is of 
interest, this is not problematic. 
The cost function J concludes to: 
 𝐽 = max(𝐶tot,1, … , 𝐶tot,N) (5.22) 
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5.3.2.7 Programming Workflow and Parametrization 
The cost function J is a nonlinear multivariate function. Additionally, the problem is not only 
nonlinear but can also be non-convex. Convexity is trivially excluded with an example sce-
nario where a single object drives in front of the ego-vehicle on a three-lane road, where 
there is an additional vehicle on the right lane. When the first object vehicle is decelerating, 
staying in the center lane is most critical. Two local minima exist for passing on the left or 
right with passing left as the global minimum because the second object is on the right lane, 
so additional braking is required. Hence, the problem requires global optimization. Multiple 
initial trajectories are used to cover different emergency maneuvers including evasion to 
both sides, braking only and combined maneuvers. The used initial trajectories correspond-
ing to the initial input accelerations are depicted in Figure 5-11. They are described in Ap-
pendix B. Additionally, the a posteriori trajectory, meaning the trajectory that the driver or 
automation has decided for, is used as additional initial trajectory. Finally, the solution, which 
converges to the smallest costs is selected.  
 
Figure 5-11 Initial trajectories for global minimization 
Parameterization of the step size and the prediction horizon is highly relevant for the result 
as well. Both are also relevant for computational effort. The prediction horizon obviously 
influences the resulting TCI because a more critical scene might follow, if N is too small. 
However, this is compensated by analyzing a whole scenario and not just selected scenes. 
As the vehicle travels further, the optimization is started again with the short prediction hori-
zon and assessed accordingly. A disadvantage of a longer prediction time is that the environ-
ment cannot change its behavior as a reaction to the optimized trajectory, while in reality, 
each deviation from the original recorded trajectory might have interdependencies with other 
objects. So the prediction horizon should be as short as possible. So what is its minimum 
duration? The prediction must be far enough into the future to decide about the criticality of 
the scene. This cannot be shorter than the typical reaction time because constant driving has 
to be assumed for this duration after an event that causes increasing criticality (e.g. a preced-
ing vehicle at full brake). Also, it shall be long enough to execute a maneuver that reduces 
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the criticality afterwards, e.g. braking or lane-change. While braking reduces criticality in-
stantly due to equation (5.11), a lane change requires time to end the maneuver and criticality 
is reduced only after the whole maneuver. The minimum duration of lane changes on high-
ways was found to be at least 1 s202, so the prediction time should not be shorter. To allow 
the completion of slower lane changes, a duration of 2 s will be used further on. 
The choice of the step size is mainly an issue of computational effort, so it should not be 
unnecessarily small because with each additional step during the prediction horizon, two 
additional input variables are part of the optimization problem. The same sampling fre-
quency is also required for the data. However, the step size should be small enough, to cover 
the smallest reaction time that occurs as combination of the driver reaction time and the 
system delay (e.g. for braking). While the human driver typically does not react faster than 
0.5 s203, the reaction time of future systems is unknown. When hardware and software reac-
tion times are summed up, the reaction time is estimated in the region of 0.2 s, which is used 
as step size in the following. 
To avoid optimization outside of driving dynamic potential, constraints for the input argu-
ments are required for limiting the maximum acceleration. The input acceleration is limited 
by approximating Kamm’s circle with linear limitations as described by Yi et al.204. This 
allows for linear constraints for the optimization problem. Kamm’s circle is over-approxi-
mated, so acceleration values up to the costs of one according to equation (5.5) are allowed. 
Additional constraints to avoid collisions as in Ulbrich et al.205 are not required, as a collision 
check is included because the lateral and longitudinal distances in equations (5.11) and (5.13) 
become zero in case of a collision during the prediction horizon. 
To reduce computational effort further, the optimization is only run when the initial input 
vector leads to a TCI that is larger than a threshold. Most scenes on the highway are relatively 
uncritical and constant driving or slight braking is adequate. Subsequent scenes in one sce-
nario often have a similar criticality and similar TCI is expected. However, they should not 
be counted as separate occurring critical scenes. As an example: if once in 100 km of driving, 
a scenario occurs where TCI is 0.3 at the beginning and 0.5 in the next time step, this should 
only be evaluated as a scene of TCI 0.5 once in 100 km. The separation could be done by 
trigger events, e.g. driving without high acceleration or criticality for a defined timespan, or 
by using a defined length for each scenario and only using its maximum criticality. The ap-
plication on the highD Dataset206 in the next chapter, separate scenarios of 420 m travelling 
distance are available, so the maximum TCI of each of those scenarios is used further. The 
                                                 
202 Toledo, T.; Zohar, D.: Modeling duration of lane changes (2007), p. 71. 
203 Wolff, C.: Grundlegendes zum Bremsvorgang (2017), p. 19. 
204 Yi, B. et al.: Real time integrated vehicle dynamics control and trajectory planning (2016). 
205 Ulbrich, S.; Maurer, M.: Towards tactical lane change behavior planning for automated vehicles (2015). 
206 Krajewski, R. et al.: The highd dataset (2018). 
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flowchart of the used programming flowchart is depicted in Figure 5-12. The value of the 
threshold ITC,thr is discussed in the next chapter. 
 
 
Figure 5-12 Flowchart for the application 
5.3.2.8 Adaption to Curved Roads 
The equations developed in this section are designed for straight road geometry, as it is com-
mon on highways. Curved roads influence the criticality because a part of the available tire-
road-friction is used for holding the lane. Additionally, the reaction time is calculated under 
the assumption that the course angle is not changed before the reaction. However, in corner-
ing scenes, the course angle is changed continuously. To address this issue, curvilinear coor-
dinates are introduced and the data are transformed accordingly. The 𝑥𝑐 -axis follows the 
road curvature with a perpendicular  𝑐 -axis.  
Next Step
min(𝐼TC) at Initialization
Next Scenario
𝐼TC > 𝐼TC,thr
Start Optimization
Save Result
Save max(𝐼TC) for Scenario
Yes
No
End of Scenario 
Yes
No
 5.3 Design of a Criticality Metric 
  91 
 
Figure 5-13 Curvilinear vehicle coordinates 
Adaptions are now only required regarding TTS and because lane changes are not symmet-
rical to left and right side and to the assessment of lateral acceleration (because Kamm’s 
circle in curvilinear coordinates is shifted sidewise). Adaption of TTS is not trivial because 
the underlying assumption for equation (5.14) is that lateral acceleration in both directions 
is possible. However, higher acceleration potential (in curvilinear coordinates!) towards the 
outside of the corner is compensated by lower potential in the second part of a lane change. 
So it is further assumed that the duration of the evasion maneuver is not significantly influ-
enced by the curvature of the road. 
The evaluation of the required acceleration however, needs to be adapted and corrected by 
the baseline lateral acceleration 𝑎𝑦,𝜅𝑐 due to curvature 𝜅. Equation (5.5) is transformed to: 
 𝐶𝑎𝑐 =
𝑎𝑥
2
𝑐 + ( 𝑎𝑦𝑐 + 𝑎𝑦,𝜅𝑐 )
2
(𝜇𝑅 ∙ 𝑔)2
 
with 𝑎𝑦,𝜅𝑐 = 𝑣
2 ∙ 𝜅 
(5.23) 
A downside of this approach is that vehicle shapes that are approximated by rectangles in 
world- or ego-coordinates cannot be described in the same way in curvilinear coordinates 
because the rectangular shape is transformed to an arc segment. For small curvature on mo-
torways, the effect can be neglected or compensated by over-approximating the dimension 
(comp. Figure 5-14) in a trade-off between accuracy and computational effort. 
 
Figure 5-14 Comparison of ideal representation and the correct representation for cornering to left in 
curvilinear coordinates 
Ego
  
  
Ideal Representation
Correct Representation
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5.4 Discussion and Evaluation of TCI 
In this subchapter, the developed metric TCI is evaluated based on the requirements and 
design guidelines derived in sections 5.1.1 and 5.3.1. 
RM 1 In case of an increased crash likelihood, the value of the metric must increase, inde-
pendent of the type of accident. 
TCI is developed according to the design guidelines in section 5.3.1 and is therefore capable 
of assessing all types of accidents. The test scenarios defined in section 5.2.2 do not falsify 
the metrics eligibility: Cornering and narrow lanes are covered with equations (5.23) and 
(5.18). Multi-object scenarios are covered because the trajectory is optimized in a predictive 
approach including all present objects. In addition to those theoretic considerations, the test 
scenarios are applied in subchapter 6.1. 
Nevertheless, there is no proof for the fulfillment of the requirement. The arbitrariness of 
parametrization (e.g. in equations (5.16), (5.19) and (5.20)) suggest that the metric will need 
further calibration in order to fulfill the requirements for the most precise extrapolation of 
risk. However, verification is only possible using large amount of real world data and com-
paring the extrapolated accident risk with the occurring number of accidents. Before the 
introduction of AD3+, this is only achievable with human traffic and the application on 
AD3+ likely requires different parametrization (e.g. due to faster reaction time). When a 
final AD3+ function is available, the metric should be parameterized with functional 
knowledge and reevaluated during testing and market observation. Nevertheless, the metric 
should be able to fulfill the requirements if parametrized correctly because all design guide-
lines were followed. However, some parameters, e.g. regarding the extrapolation, will re-
main uncertain resulting in an uncertainty of the final result. 
RM 2 The value of the metric shall either increase or decrease strictly with increasing crash 
proximity towards a known numeric value representing a collision. 
This requirement is fulfilled, as the crash cannot be prevented at TCI of one increasing from 
a minimum value of zero. The direct link to crash proximity is established by following the 
design guidelines and implementing the three components of driving requirements. As ex-
plained above, the weighting and calibration of these three factors are still arbitrary but offer 
a basis for parameterization based on data or knowledge. 
RM 3 The severity of the potential accident shall be estimated. 
This requirement is not addressed by TCI. As mentioned before, the estimation of severity 
is manifold and depends not only on the velocity but also on collision angle, vehicle types 
and passengers. An estimation could be done by using the velocities of ego and object vehi-
cles at the highest criticality as a worst case and estimate the severity based on accident 
 5.4 Discussion and Evaluation of TCI 
  93 
statistics. Kusano et al.207 pursued a similar approach for collision mitigation brake systems, 
however, the actual collision speed is known in their study because the collision is only 
mitigated. At the point of the highest criticality, it is still likely that the velocity would be 
reduced if a collision would follow, so that the actual collision speed remains unknown and 
worst-case approximation is likely to overestimate the severity severely. Nevertheless, the 
statistics of velocity at the highest criticality value could be evaluated. Conclusively, the 
metric is not eligible to estimate severity dependably, so the crash risk extrapolation is either 
a worst case estimation or estimates only the crash likelihood without distinguishing between 
different severity categories. 
RM 4 The metric shall detect all critical scenes without false-negatives. 
This requirement addresses the second purpose of the metric, the identification of critical 
scenarios for test case derivation. It has to be pointed out that the metric does not assess a 
scene as critical, if the driver reaction was appropriate. As an example, hard braking is not 
assessed as critical if the remaining reaction time is not low. An issue is that the environment 
data must be correct and the available tire-road friction must be known in order to identify 
all critical scenes. If this is fulfilled, the metric identifies the scenes correctly assuming that 
the driving skill is constant and not compromised (e.g. by dizziness or system failures). The 
metric only addresses the action level of the driving task (comp Figure 1-5). This is sufficient 
for an extrapolation of the crash likelihood, as inadequacies in precious levels will lead to 
criticality on the action level. However, for identification of test cases, it might be useful to 
develop metrics that identify critical scenarios on all levels of the driving task because known 
unknowns are identified faster using less data.
                                                 
207 Kusano, K. D.; Gabler, H. C.: Potential occupant injury reduction (2010). 
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6 Application and Verification 
In this chapter, TCI is applied on artificial and real-world data. First, it is applied on the test 
cases from section 5.2.2 to verify its behavior by correctly assessing the criticality. Second, 
it is applied on the highD-dataset, which consist of recorded trajectories from motorway 
traffic in Germany. Thereby, the goal is to derive the distribution of scenes with different 
criticality and ultimately applying EVT to extrapolate crash risk. 
6.1 Verification in Test Cases 
In this subchapter, the metric is applied on the test cases introduced in section 5.2.2. As the 
metric was developed following the design guidelines, correct behavior in all three test cases 
is expected. 
The first test case is a test for cornering scenarios. The metric shall be sensitive to road 
geometry and increase the criticality with curvature due to equation (5.23). According to the 
guidelines for German motorways RAA208, the road curvature should be less than 1/(900 m), 
a small criticality is expected when travelling curvatures above this threshold. As test case, 
two different curvatures, above and below the threshold are selected. The test case is passed 
when the criticality increases. 
The second test case deals with passing objects at a small lateral distance. When the distance 
is small, the criticality increases due to the necessary precision in course angle (comp. equa-
tion (5.18)). In the test, two lateral distances are compared: one with 0.1 m lateral distance 
and the second with 1 m lateral distance. The test case is passed, if the smaller distance 
results in a higher criticality. In the scenario, the ego-velocity is 140 km/h and the relative 
velocity is 60 km/h resembling in overtaking a truck on the motorway. 
In Figure 6-1, the test results for the first two TS are presented. Both test cases are passed 
because the more critical variation of the TS is assessed correctly as more critical. The cor-
nering test cases results in TCI values of 9.9 and 13.3 respectively. However, constant cor-
nering at the given speed and curvature would require lateral acceleration of 1.5 and 1.9 m/s² 
and a respective TCI of about 15 and 19. The relatively short prediction horizon of 2 s pre-
vents a higher TCI because during the prediction the vehicle can move to the outside of the 
road resulting in a smaller curvature of the vehicle trajectory compared to the road curvature. 
The second TS is also passed because the criticality is increased at the smaller lateral dis-
tance. Before reaching the object, the criticality increases continuously as an early evasion 
                                                 
208 Forschungsgesellschaft für Straßen und Verkehrswesen: Anlage von Autobahnen (2009). 
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or a deceleration is still possible. The TCI for the higher distance that corresponds to a usual 
driving situation on the motorway is similar to the evenly typical cornering situation. This is 
a hint that the metric is in fact applicable on different types of scenarios. 
The third TS evaluates two similar scenarios, where the ego-vehicles approaches slower or 
static vehicles. This is typical when approaching traffic jams (vrel = 120 km/h) or trucks that 
drive at a lower speed (vrel = 60 km/h). In the first scenario, just the right lane is blocked, 
where the ego-vehicle is travelling, so an evasion would be possible. In the second scenario, 
both lanes are blocked, so braking is the only accident free solution. In the test scenarios, the 
ego-vehicle shows no reaction, ultimately colliding with the object on the right lane. The test 
is fulfilled when the first scenario shows lower (or equal) criticality at all time. Additionally, 
the crash can be prevented at a smaller distance, so the maximum value of TCI, which is 
equal to 100, should be reached later. Additionally, an increase in criticality over time is 
expected. In Figure 6-2, the evaluation of TCI in four different scenarios is evaluated. Addi-
tionally, TTB is applied for comparison. As discussed in section 5.2.3.1, TTB does not pass 
the test case because it results in the same assessment independent of the possibility for 
evasion. TCI performs as expected. The scenario with two blocked lanes is much more crit-
ical than the scenario with only one blocked lane at the same relative velocity. In addition, 
the last moment where the accident could be prevented is identified corresponding to zero 
TTB. The difference between the scenarios with possible evasion is small. This is because 
the evasion trajectory requires similar accelerations in both cases.  
 
Figure 6-1 Evaluation of TS1 and TS2 with two similar scenarios each 
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Figure 6-2 Evaluation of TS3; Approaching on a traffic jam with collision, comparison of one 
blocked lane (evasion possible) with two blocked lanes 
The development of TCI over time is not as smooth as it should be expected. Presumably, 
the choice of initial conditions for the global optimization is the reason. If the global mini-
mum is not found, an increased TCI is the result. The influence will be further analyzed in 
section 6.2.4. 
6.2 Evaluation of the highD-Dataset 
In this subchapter, TCI is applied on the data from the highD-dataset that is described by 
Krajewski et al.209. The data contains trajectories and object properties from over 110,000 
vehicles travelling in two direction of a 420 m section of six different sections of straight 
motorways in Germany. The trajectories were acquired by video surveillance of a drone fly-
ing above the motorway. Trajectories and object dimensions are derived by image processing 
(Figure 6-3). The authors do not provide information on the accuracy of the image processing 
except that the typical position error is less than 10 cm210. The calculations for the evaluation 
of the data were conducted on the Lichtenberg high performance computer of TU Darm-
stadt.211 The duration to analyze all vehicle trajectories was 1500 core hours, up to 70 cores 
were used simultaneously. The duration per vehicle was mainly dependent on the traffic 
density and the criticality of the scene with an average duration of 50 core seconds per vehi-
cle. 
                                                 
209 Krajewski, R. et al.: The highd dataset (2018). 
210 https://www.highd-dataset.com/details, accessed on 02.05.2019 
211 https://www.hhlr.tu-darmstadt.de/hhlr/index.en.jsp, accessed on 02.05.2019. 
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Figure 6-3 Data acquisition for the highD-dataset212 
As TCI is designed to assess the criticality for an ego-vehicle, each vehicle in the dataset 
was analyzed separately resulting in 110,000 scenarios of 420 m length, so the total mileage 
is about 5 ∙ 104 km. For each vehicle the environment data is transformed into vehicle coor-
dinates. Transformation into curvilinear coordinates is not required because all data is rec-
orded on straight roads. The data approximates all vehicles as rectangular objects giving the 
position, the dimensions and the velocities of all objects. Unfortunately, all yaw angles are 
assumed as zero because the image recognition could not determine the correct angle. As a 
course angle of zero overestimates the criticality especially in lane changing maneuvers, the 
angle must be estimated before application of the metrics. This could be done either by using 
information about the speed in lateral and longitudinal direction because the course angle is 
the direction of the velocity vector, or by comparing several subsequent positions. As the 
velocity information is already derived from subsequent positions, the latter approach is 
used. To prevent bias due to large jumps in one discretization step, the course angle is derived 
from linear approximation of the trajectory over five subsequent positions using the least 
squares method. 
In 2016, the average distance between two accidents on the motorway in Germany was 7.6 ∙
106 km. So the difference between recorded mileage and extrapolation distance is about two 
orders of magnitude, which is similar to the factor from related studies213. However, the 
highD-dataset is not representative for motorway traffic in general, as there is no curvature, 
no motorway access, no construction site and no bad weather. It cannot be approximated 
with certainty from the available accident data, what proportion of accidents falls into the 
recorded conditions. Schoenawa found that about 35% of accidents in the accident database 
of the German In-Depth Accident Study (GIDAS) database occurred in similar driving con-
ditions than the highD-dataset’s conditions (straight driving, no entry/exits, and available 
                                                 
212 Krajewski, R. et al.: The highd dataset (2018), p. 2119. 
213 Asljung, D. et al.: Comparing Collision Threat Measures using EVT (2016), p. 60. 
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lane markings).214 However, cornering and reduction of lane numbers are included here, so 
the percentage is likely reduced even more. In the following the extrapolation will be com-
pared with the average distance on motorways in general and additional to a best-case esti-
mate of the average distance of 108 km. Note that the issues of representative data also exist 
when recording data with AD3+ vehicles (comp. section 2.2.2), though of lesser relevance 
because data collection is not limited to few locations. 
6.2.1 Distribution of Critical Scenes 
In order to reduce the computational effort, scenes, where driving straight with constant ve-
locity, or slight braking results in a TCI of less than ten, no further optimization was con-
ducted. All other scenes were analyzed. Consequently, when the final TCI was less than ten, 
the scene was not considered further. The table of all results is given in Appendix B. The 
scenario of one vehicle driving through the observed area of about 420 m was considered 
independent and the maximal TCI in this scenario was further processed. Additionally, it is 
assessed if a lane-change is followed by the critical scene indicating that the driver chose 
evading instead of braking. It is further indicated, if the vehicle is a car or a truck based on 
the classification that is part of the dataset. As depicted in Figure 6-4, scenarios that include 
lane changes are more critical than straight driving. However, it is unknown, if the scenario 
would have evolved less critical, if the driver decided for braking instead. It could also mean 
that drivers in general prefer evasion instead of hard braking, if still possible. The scenarios 
where the ego-vehicle is classified as truck are less critical compared to the whole dataset. 
However, this difference is not observed when focusing on lane change. However, lane 
changes by trucks are rare with less than 1500 scenarios in the dataset, so there is little sig-
nificance. In total, 103 scenarios exceed the threshold of ten (< 0.1%). The highest criticality 
is at TCI 38%. The most critical scenes are analyzed in the next section. 
                                                 
214 Schoenawa; Stefan: Critical Scenarios for Humand Drivers (2017). 
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Figure 6-4 Cumulative distribution of TCI in the dataset 
6.2.2 Analysis of Critical Scenes 
In this section, the four most critical scenes are analyzed that all exceed a TCI of 30%. The 
scenes are depicted as a top-view in Figure 6-5 to Figure 6-8. The code for image generation 
is supplied together with the highD-dataset.215 All scenes include a vehicle approaching on 
a slower object. In all scenarios, the driver decides to change lanes instead of a relatively 
hard braking. Subjectively, all scenarios are critical, however it is unknown, if the driver 
planned the maneuver long ahead. In this case, the reaction time should be assessed differ-
ently, resulting in a different TCI.  
Furthermore, all four scenarios would probably not occur in an AD3+ system. Figure 6-6 
and Figure 6-8 show relatively aggressive driving behavior of merging between two other 
vehicles. In the other scenes the distance to the front object before the evasion is smaller than 
the mandatory safety distance, which is legal to undergo for short timespan but not to be 
expected as a typical driving behavior for an AD3+ system as they would probably either 
change lanes earlier or decelerate. 
                                                 
215 Krajewski, R. et al.: The highd dataset (2018). 
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Figure 6-5 Most critical scene in most critical scenario with TCI 38%, vehicle 76 is overtaking with 
vrel = 18 km/h. 
 
Figure 6-6 Most critical scene in second most critical scenario with TCI 37.7%, vehicle 104 is over-
taking with vrel = 7 km/h and merging between two other vehicles. 
 
Figure 6-7 Most critical scene in third most critical scenario with TCI 34.6%, vehicle 87 is approach-
ing with vrel = 10 km/h and later overtaking after vehicle 93 has passed. 
 
Figure 6-8 Most critical scene in forth most critical scenario with TCI 34.16%, vehicle 769 is ap-
proaching with vrel = 63 km/h, scenario is later solved with combined braking and evasion to the left 
with total acceleration of 5 m/s². 
6.2.3 Application of Extreme Value Theory 
To estimate the accident occurrence rate, EVT is applied on the observations of TCI. The 
equations used in the section are given in appendix C based on state of the art EVT intro-
duced in section 2.2.2.2.3. The average distance between two accidents on German motor-
way is about 8 ∙ 106 km216. The distance covered in the highD-dataset is about 4.5 ∙ 104 km 
without any accidents. A distance factor for statistical proof of three is derived from Figure 
2-4. So the accident per distance information in the highD-dataset gives statistical evidence 
with 95% confidence, that the average distance between accidents is higher than 1.5 ∙
                                                 
216 Destatis: Verkehrsunfälle - Fachserie 8 Reihe 7 - 2015 (2015). 
 6.2 Evaluation of the highD-Dataset 
  101 
104 km. Using EVT and data that is enriched by TCI, a higher worst-case estimate should 
be achieved. However, the data only represents a small part of the actual road network. The 
true accident frequency on these small extracts is unknown. Nevertheless, the extrapolation 
is compared with the average accident frequency in the following. It is expected that the 
statistical worst-case estimation of accident distance using EVT is between 1.5 ∙ 104 km as 
a worst-case assumption based on the statistical evidence and 108 km, as best-case estimation 
for the true accident distance for those sections. 
To select a threshold over which the observation are used in the parameter estimation for 
EVT, the Mean Residual Life Plot is used (comp. section 2.2.2.2.3), plotting the mean of all 
excesses over the threshold. The plot should be approximately linear until the maximal valid 
threshold. Based on Figure 6-9, a threshold of 12.5 is further used, indicated by the vertical 
line. Until this value, the Mean Residual Life Plot is approximately linear. A higher threshold 
(e.g. until 23, leaving only eleven exceedances) would be justifiable as well based on line-
arity alone due to the confidence interval. However, increased variance would be the conse-
quence, reducing bias from relatively uncritical scenarios. 
 
Figure 6-9 Mean residual life plot for TCI, dotted lines are 95% confidence intervals; selected thresh-
old of 12.5 marked with vertical line 
Using the threshold and the observations of TCI, the parameters estimations and 95% confi-
dence intervals for 𝜉 and ?̂? are derived maximizing equation (2.6) resulting in 𝜉 = 0.059 ±
0.35 and ?̂? = 5.5 ± 1.7. To estimate the distance between accidents, the return level plot, 
and especially the return period on a value of 100 is of interest. As the confidence interval 
of 𝜉 includes positive values, a standard deviation for the return level of 100% cannot be 
derived by the delta method, because it is unbound towards higher distances. Instead, max-
imizing and minimizing equation (2.8) with values of 𝜉 and 𝜎 that fulfill the following con-
dition of equation (6.1) and varying m, leads to the confidence intervals for 𝐼TC,m(𝑚) de-
picted in Figure 6-10. According to Coles217, all values of 𝜉 and 𝜎 must have a likelihood 
that is only half of the 95% quantile of the 𝜒1
2-distribution smaller than the maximum likeli-
hood:  
                                                 
217 Coles, S.: An introduction to statistical modeling of extreme values (2001), p. 42. 
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 ℓ(𝜎, 𝜉) ≥ ℓ(?̂?, 𝜉) − 0.5 ∙ 𝜒1,0.05
2  (6.1) 
The resulting extrapolation and confidence intervals are depicted in Figure 6-10. The worst-
case estimation for the distance between two accidents is 4.0 ∙ 105 km, which is about 15 
times higher, than derived from accident frequency directly. The extrapolated maximum like-
lihood distance of 1.3 ∙ 107 km has little significance and is not considered further. 
 
Figure 6-10 Return level plot for TCI with extrapolation and confidence intervals (dotted); red 
crosses are observations in the data, the diamond at TCI 100% marks the average distance between 
accidents on German motorways. 
The results do not falsify the applicability of the metric. Furthermore, the lower bound of the 
95%-confidence interval is more than one order of magnitude higher than by the statistical 
evaluation of driven accident-free mileage alone, indicating that less mileage is required for 
the estimation of safety performance compared to accident data alone. 
6.2.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
As demanded by the design principles, arbitrary or uncertain parameterization of the metric 
and the extrapolation method should be analyzed. Hence, a sensitivity analysis is conducted 
varying parameters in TCI and varying the threshold selected in the extrapolation.  
6.2.4.1 Parameterization of Reaction Time 
Here, the equation for reaction time (5.15) is used, which results into the criticality compo-
nent CR based on an assumed normal distribution of available reaction time instead of a 
linear representation of the CDF as suggested by equation (5.16). Based on the studies ana-
lyzed in section 0, the cumulative distribution is parameterized using the mean value 𝜏̅ =
0.86 s and standard deviation 𝜏𝜎 = 0.2 s. Both approaches are compared in Figure 6-11. For 
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reaction times larger than 0.8 s, the criticality is now lower compared with the previous pa-
rameterization with a steeper increase between 1.4 and 0.4 s of reaction time. As a result, all 
scenarios evaluated before are now assessed with a lower criticality, because very critical 
scenes are not part of the dataset. With the new parameterization, only 37 scenarios excess 
the threshold of TCI ten or higher. Therefore, the extrapolation of distances between acci-
dents results in increased safety as depicted in Figure 6-12. Even the worst-case estimation 
based on the 95%-confidence interval results in a distance higher than the average on Ger-
man motorway. However, the average distance of the observed sections of the motorway are 
unknown so there is no definitive falsification. As derived in the beginning of this subchap-
ter, an estimation of the accident distance for the selected road sections up to 108 km is rea-
sonable.  
Due to the shape of the CDF, very steep increase in criticality occurs, when the scene de-
mands smaller reaction time. This is an advantage, if it holds true that reaction times of 1.4 s 
and higher are handled by almost all drivers, as most studies suggest. As pointed out by 
Hugemann218, larger reaction times are common in every day driving different from common 
studies. Due to the shape of the CDF, increased TTR might lead to a very different extrapo-
lation result because the criticality increases steeply. As a worst-case estimation it can be 
concluded, that the distance between two accidents should be above 107 km, if the available 
reaction times are distributed as expected. Judging by the available data, the previous used 
parameterization with the linear approach seems less biased compared to the real reaction 
times. However, the analysis of additional data might help finding the best parameterization. 
 
Figure 6-11 Comparison of different evaluation of reaction time 
                                                 
218 Hugemann, W.: Driver reaction times in road traffic (2002). 
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Figure 6-12 Return level plot for reaction time based on normal distribution CDF 
6.2.4.2 Weighting of Precision 
The weighting of the reaction time from precision in equation (5.19) was discussed previ-
ously in section 5.3.2.6. A careful parametrization of 1/10 was used before, also to reduce 
increased criticality based on uncertain object representation in position and yaw angle. 
Now, a weighting factor of one is used comparing the results.  
As expected, the overall values of TCI are higher because of the increased weighting. Scenes 
with small lateral distances are most critical. The scene with the highest criticality of 63 is 
depicted in Figure 6-13. Here, an incorrect approximation of the course angle might lead to 
an increased assessment of TCI. As both vehicles trajectories are almost parallel during their 
lane changes, the scene might be less critical, though the data might suggest otherwise be-
cause the yaw angle is not directly measured. 
 
Figure 6-13 Most critical scene with higher weighting of precision; vehicle 687 is overtaking truck 
number 682 after he is changing lanes. 
Despite the higher assessment of TCI in individual scenarios, the extrapolation results in an 
increased safety comparing Figure 6-14 to Figure 6-10. The reason is the decreasing trend 
of higher TCI values that results in a shift of the shape factor estimation towards negative 
values. Based on the results, the parametrization is not falsified, but re-evaluation with data 
including correct course angle is advised as an erroneous course angle has a high influence 
on the result as derived from Figure 6-13. 
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Figure 6-14 Return level plot for higher weighting of precision; Ithr = 20. 
6.2.4.3 Acceleration weight 
In this section, the influence of the acceleration weighting is analyzed. Instead of the radius 
of Kamm’s circle, a rhombus is used now, so combined accelerations are assessed with 
higher criticality. The implementation is done using equation (5.6) instead of (5.5), which is 
the 1-norm of the acceleration vector instead of the 2-norm. In general, the criticality will be 
higher compared to the previous parametrization. For scenes with minor criticality, the ab-
solute influence is small because no increased combined accelerations are required. 
A total of 217 scenarios reached a criticality of TCI ten or higher. Hence, an increased thresh-
old of 20 was used for EVT following the linear development in Figure 6-15. In Figure 6-16, 
it is observed that some scenarios have a highly increased criticality. The scenario with max-
imal criticality of 50 is the combined braking and lane-change described by Figure 6-8. The 
application of EVT did not falsify the parameterization as the average accident distance is 
within the extrapolated 95% confidence interval. The more critical assessment of combined 
accelerations leads to an estimated shape parameter 𝜉 = 0.22 ± 0.25, which is greater zero 
with higher certainty compared to previous results, leading to a smaller 95%-confidence in-
terval for TCI 100. 
However, the results also show that the found maximum likelihood parameterization is not 
a great fit for the values of increased criticality, so it should be re-evaluated with more data. 
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Figure 6-15 Mean residual life plot for TCI, dotted lines are 95% confidence intervals; selected 
threshold of 20 marked with vertical line 
 
Figure 6-16 Return level plot for reduced combined accelerations; Ithr = 20. 
6.2.4.4 Initial Conditions 
To analyze the influence on initial conditions the data evaluation is repeated using less eva-
sion trajectories to investigate the assumption that especially lateral evasion requires several 
initial conditions. Now, the initial conditions are parameterized including only one evasion 
maneuver (both sides): a fast evasion with maximal lateral acceleration.  
An evaluation with additional initial conditions could be conducted as well, however, the 
computational effort increases with every additional initial condition. 
In Figure 6-17 and Figure 6-18, the results of the evaluation are displayed. In total, 142 
scenarios exceed the threshold of ten (0.14%) with a maximal TCI of 78. So at least in some 
cases, the global minimum was not found because the evaluation with more initial trajecto-
ries resulted in lower criticality. The strong lateral deceleration at the initial condition results 
in a collision with another object, so the optimization could not iterate towards a crash-free 
 6.2 Evaluation of the highD-Dataset 
  107 
trajectory requiring a minor lateral acceleration. Nevertheless, the maximum likelihood es-
timation predicts an accident distance of 1010 km, despite the higher criticality. The reason is 
of course the different shape of the extrapolation suggesting a decreasing trend in criticality. 
Nevertheless, the worst-case extrapolation based on the 95% interval suggests more frequent 
accidents, but only by a factor of about two. 
It is not surprising that despite having very different assessments in each single criticality 
values, the overall assessment is comparable. When crash-free evasion trajectories are diffi-
cult to find due to initial conditions, scenes, where braking is not possible or high braking is 
required, are highly critical. 
 
Figure 6-17 Mean residual life plot for TCI, dotted lines are 95% confidence intervals; selected 
threshold marked with vertical line 
 
Figure 6-18 Return level plot for TCI with extrapolation and confidence intervals (dotted); red 
crosses are observations in the data, the diamond at TCI 100 marks the average distance between 
accidents on German motorways. 
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6.2.4.5 Threshold Selection 
The selection of a threshold for EVT is usually not definitive and is discussed in the follow-
ing. The threshold of 12.5 as suggested above already has a relatively small number of ex-
ceedances resulting in a high variance. Nevertheless, thresholds from 10 to 17 are evaluated 
in Figure 6-19. At a threshold of 12 and higher, especially the shape parameters estimation 
𝜉 changes with different thresholds, resulting in very different maximum likelihood estima-
tions of average accident distances. However, the distance between accidents for the lower 
95% confidence interval changes only between 105 and 106 km, indicating that at least this 
result is reliable. Nevertheless, more data is needed to reduce the variance and allow higher 
thresholds to reduce bias from uncritical results at the same time. 
The results imply that different thresholds should be compared when evaluating the safety 
of AD3+, where the true average distance is unknown. While the maximum likelihood esti-
mation has little significance, the 95% confidence interval could be used similar to the sta-
tistical proof of safety based on accidents alone. 
 
Figure 6-19 Comparison of different thresholds 
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6.3 Summary 
To conclude, the application of EVT did not falsify TCI as a suitable metric for the extrapo-
lation of average accident distances. This was expected as TCI was developed following the 
design principles derived in section 5.3.1. Nevertheless, the increase in trust in the metric’s 
eligibility is limited as the statistical variance and the variance from uncertain parameteriza-
tion is large. The sensitivity analysis shows that the maximum likelihood estimation is de-
pendent of parameterization and threshold selection, but there is a certain robustness in 
worst-case estimation for average accident frequency based on the 95% confidence interval 
for TCI 100. Independent of the parameter choice, the minimal estimated distance of two 
accidents lies between 105 and 106 km, which is about one order of magnitude higher than 
based on the accident-free mileage alone. As soon as more data is available, the sensitivity 
analysis should be re-evaluated reducing uncertainty in parameterization because some pa-
rameter sets might be falsifiable when applied on more data from human driven vehicles. 
For AD3+ vehicles, TCI computation should be adapted because parameters can be chosen 
based on the knowledge of the systems driving capabilities that are not available for human 
drivers. The correct TTR is derivable from the path planner as well as the required precision 
of the trajectory control. Additionally, the available reaction time will be known based on 
the time that is required by data processing and action. As a result, a metric is designed that 
is tailored to the specified driving function. Assuming that uncertainties based on arbitrary 
parameters do not remain, only statistical uncertainty influences the result that is deduced 
from data alone and thus produces reliable worst-case estimations. With more driven dis-
tance, the uncertainty will shrink, which could be compliant with the introduction strategy 
from subchapter 4.5. 
Applying the metric with reduced initial conditions showed that the optimization function 
has several local minima. It is not guaranteed that the global minimum is found with the used 
initial conditions. Future research should also focus on improving optimization investigating 
the trade-off between computational effort and precision of the result. A pre-selection of 
suitable initial conditions could also accelerate the computation. 
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7 Reflection 
In the following, the progress of this dissertation regarding the research questions is ad-
dressed. The key contributions are highlighted and remaining research questions are derived.  
7.1 Macroscopic Risk 
The three research questions that were derived in subchapter 3.1 are the following: 
Q 1 Which viewpoints are necessary to be considered for a sufficient derivation of 
requirements for macroscopic risk? 
Q 2 Which acceptance criteria result, if all viewpoints identified in Q 1 are analyzed scien-
tifically? 
Q 3 What is the influence on introduction concepts due to the acceptance criteria derived 
in Q 2?  
 
The state of the art discussion about safety requirements lacked quantitative measures for 
macroscopic risk requirements involving all relevant viewpoints. In subchapter 4.1, the 
viewpoints of user, society and individual passers-by were derived. The viewpoint of an in-
dividual passers-by is often ignored because he is also part of the society as a whole. Never-
theless, it should be addressed individually because the society is a group of users and pass-
ers-by and its requirements might vary from individuals because the average safety of the 
whole group is addressed. It is impossible to derive risk requirements for each individual 
person because their individual requirements might vary by personal experience, personal 
benefit and affinity towards new technologies. Nevertheless, requirements can be derived, if 
each viewpoint is analyzed scientifically addressing the second research question. 
To derive quantitative risk requirements, acceptance in other technologies and studies about 
general risk acceptance are analyzed to address the viewpoints of individuals. As personal 
risk acceptance varies with the experienced benefit, different requirements based on the type 
of exposure (voluntary/involuntary/job-related) are deduced. For passers-by, new risks that 
are unique to the technology are of importance because without personal benefit, those risks 
must be minimal also if another risk is reduced. Society’s requirements focus on the risk 
reduction over time and total accident numbers in a time period. So an increase in accident 
numbers can be compensated by a stronger decrease afterwards. This temporary increase 
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motivates Kalra et al.219 to analyze how fast safety performance must increase to reduce the 
total number of accidents even if a system with lower safety is introduced at the beginning. 
While this concept might not function because of the user’s requirements, which does not 
allow increasing risk, a similar idea that monitors the rate of market introduction while re-
evaluating the risk based on new information from the field might be beneficial. The risk-
limited introduction was formulated by Wachenfeld220 and is motivated by the fact that cur-
rent test methods are unable to determine the safety performance without a large uncertainty. 
The impact for total safety is diluted when the field penetration rate of AD3+ vehicles is low. 
The dilution of risk is used for the quantitative risk requirements for passers-by and society 
resulting in lower requirements at the beginning of introduction. Assuming an increase in 
penetration rate comparable to other mechatronic automotive systems, the society’s and 
passers-by’s requirements become stricter than the user’s at a field penetration rate of about 
12% or higher. Quantitate requirements for an accident occurrence rate with lesser than fatal 
severity cannot be derived in the same way. Comparison with today’s traffic is possible due 
to detailed accident statistics, but other risk studies and principles such as the minimal en-
dogenous mortality are only available for fatal risks. To derive requirements for other sever-
ity categories as well, a reduction of the accident rate equivalent to the reduction of fatal 
accidents is demanded. As it is questionable, if different severity categories can be weighed 
against each other, it is suggested that a decrease in one accident category can reduce re-
quirements in categories with less severity but not vice versa. Weighting factors such as the 
factor ten as used in ISO26262 or a monetary balance based on the costs are possible candi-
dates. However, further studies about risk acceptance or discussions with representatives on 
how to handle the different severity categories are advised. 
Addressing the third research question, it is analyzed if the requirements, the risk-limited 
introduction, and the expected field penetration increase fit into an introduction scenario, 
where the uncertainty about the driving function’s safety performance decreases fast enough. 
As the safety performance of the first AD3+ vehicles must comply with their requirements, 
an initial test distance of about 10 million km is required. If the system is in fact safe enough, 
the uncertainty is reduced due to field observation so that the requirements of society are 
fulfilled at all time. However, if the system’s safety performance is lower (e.g. as required 
by the user who has benefits), an increase in performance over time (due to updates of the 
system or infrastructure) will be required to comply with all requirements. Assuming that 
the user follows the hypothesis of sufficient safety and rejects it only under sufficient statis-
tical evidence, an introduction is possible as soon as a system is available that tests in an 
unsupervised field test with 10 million km without accident.  
                                                 
219 Kalra, N.; Groves, D. G.: The Enemy of Good (2017). 
220 Wachenfeld, W. H.: Dissertation, How Stochastic can Help to Introduce AD (2017), pp. 102–138. 
7 Reflection 
112 
The scope of this dissertation was the derivation of acceptable MaR requirements based on 
different viewpoints, other technologies and risk acceptance studies. However, it is not guar-
anteed if those risks are later accepted. The subjective assessment of risks by individuals is 
often not fact-oriented as described in section 2.1.2. Especially if accidents happen shortly 
after the introduction, or if two accidents happen within a short mileage, general acceptance 
is questionable, though the statistical evidence might still hint towards an increased safety 
and the fulfillment of acceptable MaR requirements.  
However, it is unknown if the user and the industry will accept the high uncertainty after 
introduction. Here, other test strategies might increase trust but the effect on a decreasing 
uncertainty is unknown or not sufficiently researched yet.  
7.2 Microscopic Risk 
The second part of this dissertation focusses on microscopic risk metrics that evaluate the 
occurring critical scenes with the goal to extrapolate the occurrence rate of accidents. The 
derivation of uncertainty is in focus as well. 
The idea to derive information about road safety from critical scenes started with the first 
large scale FOT and NDS studies (e.g. 100-Car-Study221). All past studies only record a cer-
tain amount of data, so the information about environment objects is incomplete. Hence, the 
application and development of metrics followed a bottom-up approach based on the avail-
able data. Critical scenes were identified using the front object and the reaction of the driver 
that was monitored (comp. appendix A). As the driver’s reaction is often stronger than nec-
essary, false positive detection is the consequence and manual annotation is required. 
Songchitruksa et al.222 applied extreme value theory to extrapolate crash occurrence rates 
from critical scenes and concluded that the metrics that describe the criticality must fulfill 
certain requirements. The metric PET that describes criticality by time-based closeness to a 
collision was not eligible presumably because difficulty of collision avoidance was different 
depending on the scene even if the value of PET was identical. The metric BTN showed 
promising results in a study by Asljung et al.223,224 but is only applicable on longitudinal 
traffic. Other types of accidents are ignored. Again, the metric is defined in a bottom-up 
approach based on the available data. Without additional information on environment and 
other objects, a top-down approach defining a metric that describes criticality regarding all 
types of accidents is impossible. With the current advances in environment perception and 
more and more AD3+ prototypes, the possibility to develop and apply a metric in a top-down 
                                                 
221 Dingus, T. A. et al.: The 100-car naturalistic driving study (2006). 
222 Songchitruksa, P.; Tarko, A. P.: The EVT approach to safety estimation (2006). 
223 Asljung, D. et al.: Comparing Collision Threat Measures using EVT (2016). 
224 Asljung, D. et al.: EVT for Vehicle Level Safety Validation (2017). 
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approach rises. Another source of data is video monitoring by drones such as the recent 
highD-dataset225 that was evaluated in this thesis. As explained in the previous subchapter, 
the derivation of uncertainty of the risk extrapolation method is a key factor. The computa-
tion of the statistical uncertainty is state of the art and was already done in previous studies. 
However, additional uncertainties rise from the parameterization of the metric and uncer-
tainties of the data itself. In the following sections, the findings on the top-down methodol-
ogy, the uncertainty of result, and the development and evaluation of the new metric are 
discussed. 
7.2.1 Findings on the Top-Down Methodology 
As explained above, the availability of detailed data motivates the development of metrics 
in a top-down approach. Based on the analysis of the state of the art, four requirements on 
metrics and two requirements on data are deduced. Verification of the requirements is only 
feasible by application on large scale data and if the true accident occurrence rate is known 
as it is for human traffic. For AD3+ systems, the true accident occurrence rate is unknown 
so verification before introduction is impossible. Hence, a falsification strategy is developed 
based on the requirements. A falsification for advanced metrics is again only possible in data 
evaluation. In a first step, falsification based on human data is suggested. If falsified, their 
eligibility for AD3+ is at least questionable. Otherwise, trust in the metric increases but ver-
ification for AD3+ vehicles cannot be achieved. Hence, design guidelines for metrics are 
derived from the requirements that lead to a metric that should fulfill the requirements. The 
progress in each research question is summarized in the following. 
Q 4 What are the requirements on microscopic risk metrics for extrapolation of MaR using 
EVT? 
Q 5 What are the requirements on data for application of microscopic risk metrics? 
Q 6 What are the requirements on microscopic metrics for identification of scenarios? 
For all three research questions, requirements were defined. Identification of critical scenar-
ios must prevent underestimation of criticality in scenes that have already an only slightly 
increased criticality. Otherwise, false-negative detections will occur meaning that critical 
scenes are missed. As critical scenes are rare events, missing those, results in a higher driving 
distances required for collecting the scenes. For EVT application, the orthogonal character-
istic between metric’s value and criticality is most important. If the same value corresponds 
to different criticalities, EVT is not applicable. Especially in different types of scenes that 
are critical due to different reasons (e.g. lateral and longitudinal approach), this is difficult 
to establish. To retain the metric from subjective assessment, design guidelines are required 
and discussed below. Other requirements are the existence of a known limit that corresponds 
                                                 
225 Krajewski, R. et al.: The highd dataset (2018). 
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to an accident and the estimation of the crash severity. If the last requirement is not fulfilled, 
only accident occurrence rates, but not the risk (that includes severity) can be extrapolated. 
This would be a relevant contribution towards safety validation but not a proof that the MaR 
requirements are fulfilled. 
Q 7 How can the eligibility of MiR metrics for the use cases MaR extrapolation and identi-
fication of scenarios be falsified? 
Q 8 Do state of the art metrics fulfil all requirements derived in Q 5 and Q 6? 
As verification of a metric regarding the requirements cannot be achieved using single test 
cases, a falsification procedure is established. For the first requirement that demands an or-
thogonal characteristic towards crash likelihood, test cases are derived that contain two sim-
ilar scenes, where it is obvious which scene is more critical. Only if the metric assesses the 
scenes correctly meaning that the more critical scene is also assessed with increased critical-
ity, the metric passes the test case. Otherwise, it is falsified. In addition, falsification could 
be done by evaluating data as described above. If the true accident occurrence rate lies out-
side the statistical error bandwidth, the metric is not eligible. While most state of the art 
metrics are falsified using test cases, more advanced metrics that consider all relevant objects 
and the road geometry could not be falsified. Especially metrics from trajectory optimization 
seem eligible. Nevertheless, it is questionable if they are able to fulfill the orthogonality 
requirement because they are typically not designed to compare the criticality in different 
types of scenarios. To enable a development of metrics that fulfills this requirement, design 
guidelines are deduced. 
Q 9 What are design guidelines for the development of MiR metrics according to the 
requirements derived in Q 5 and Q 6? 
In order to describe criticality with an orthogonal connection towards accident occurrence, 
it shall derive the driving requirements in a scene and calibrate them with the driving skill. 
Theoretically, a metric could be applied on each level of the driving task decomposed ac-
cording to Amersbach et al.226. However, as mistakes or failures on lower level will become 
critical on action level as a consequence, it is sufficient to describe the criticality on action 
level. The criticality is further separated into the three components: reaction time, precision 
of course angle, and driving dynamic reserve. All three components must be combined into 
a criticality value. Hence, a total of at least six parameters is required to define shape and 
weighting of each component. Based on the current scene and an a posteriori evaluation of 
all object trajectories, the possible trajectories of the ego vehicle shall be assessed and the 
trajectory with the least criticality selected. The requirements for this trajectory build the 
basis for the criticality assessment. A priori assessment and model based prediction of object 
trajectories is another option. However, model parametrization would require extensive 
amount of data. If the data is instead evaluated directly, different outcomes of very similar 
                                                 
226 Amersbach, C.; Winner, H.: Functional Decomposition (2017). 
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scenes will be part of the data without additional assumptions and parameterization of mod-
els. 
The parameterization of the three criticality components has severe influence on the result, 
as was shown in a sensitivity analysis. For human traffic, available studies about the perfor-
mance of human drivers are insufficient to derive the parameterization from. Faulty param-
eterizations can be falsified because the true accident occurrence rate is known. Based on a 
set of feasible parameters for human driver, a first working hypothesis for AD3+ metric be 
established. Before data on AD3+ systems is available, parametrization cannot be falsified. 
Nevertheless, deviation to human traffic is likely e.g. regarding reaction time. The careful 
parameterization of parameters and the discussion of effects of arbitrary parameterization 
should be discussed. 
7.2.2 Findings on Uncertainty of Risk Extrapolation 
Uncertain parameterization again results in additional uncertainty of the extrapolation. In the 
state of the art, the focus is on uncertainty due to the statistic evaluation, while the criticality 
of each scene that is evaluated is regarded as ground truth. However, arbitrary parametriza-
tion that can only be determined with a certain accuracy has an influence on the results. One 
example is the normalization of reaction time to a criticality value using a cumulative distri-
bution according to equations (5.15) and (5.16). Depending on the parameterization, the tra-
jectory optimization results into different behavior because a smaller criticality caused by 
the reaction time component leads to later brake reactions. The threshold selection in EVT 
is another source of uncertainty that is often ignored. Asljung et al.227 showed that different 
thresholds lead to very different results. If the working hypothesis that similar parameteriza-
tion for AD3+ and human drivers can be used, holds true, the metric and extrapolation 
method could be parameterized using the known human accident rate as calibration. Never-
theless, the true AD3+ accident rate might be over extrapolated when this parameterization 
is used, if the driving skill of a system is higher or at least more reliable. 
The sensitivity analyses showed that the size of the uncertainty due to uncertain parameter-
ization is in the same order of magnitude as the statistical uncertainty and should be consid-
ered always when applying EVT based on critical scenes. With more data and a higher mile-
age, the statistical uncertainty can be reduced. Additional data might also lead to better 
understanding of TCI parameters. When adapting TCI for AD3+, knowledge about the sys-
tems driving capabilities will be helpful parameterizing TCI. Nevertheless, the quantification 
of uncertainty from uncertain parameters is challenge. Re-assessing the whole dataset is nec-
essary to compare different parameters, which requires high computational effort.  
The estimation of the severity is not included and it is questionable, if the severity can be 
estimated with sufficient certainty. A worst-case assumption based on the kinetic energy is 
                                                 
227 Asljung, D. et al.: EVT for Vehicle Level Safety Validation (2017). 
7 Reflection 
116 
possible but will overestimate the severity. Hence, the method might be part of the total 
safety estimation but cannot extrapolate to determine if all MaR requirements will be met.  
7.2.3 Developed Metric and Data Evaluation 
Developing a metric according to the requirements and design principles revealed two major 
challenges. First, the description of the driving requirements for the criticality component 
“precision”: While it is obvious that the requirements increase with velocity and decrease 
with lateral distance, the exact parameterization is challenging. The strength of disturbances 
is unknown and usually not part of recorded data. Second, the comparison with the driving 
skill is challenging because the description of driving skill is manifold. Distribution func-
tions of reaction times might be used but it is unknown if the reaction time is dependent from 
additional parameters, e.g. the complexity of the scene. 
Evaluating the metrics on the highD-dataset228 shows that late overtaking maneuvers are 
assessed as most critical. The criticality in those cases might be overestimated because the 
course angle is not part of the data but was interpolated, using several subsequent positions. 
Nevertheless, the information on the object’s position in relation to the driving direction of 
the ego-vehicle might be compromised. Additionally, it is difficult to detect if an evasion 
maneuver is initialized, as the steering angle is unknown. This might result in too small re-
action times because in reality, the reaction already started. Especially for trucks, the correct 
representation of the lane change is difficult because the reaction of the trailer is delayed, so 
it is difficult to observe from above. Further improvement of the course angle estimation 
might be advised for future work. As TCI includes the remaining reaction time, the decision 
and planning of the driver would influence the result. When the driver already planned the 
correct path and is aware that an action will be required, the criticality is reduced. However, 
the planned path is unknown from data. For human driver, this information is difficult to 
record, but should be implemented when applying on data from AD3+ systems using infor-
mation from the path planner. 
These results show that the quality of data is crucial. Especially overtaking with relatively 
small lateral distance results in inaccurate criticality when positions and orientation of vehi-
cles are inaccurate. The difficulty of deriving a course angle from the drone video is a down-
side of the dataset. 
In the data evaluation, a limited set of initial condition was analyzed due to the increasing 
computational effort. Here, the computation of the metric should be further improved, as the 
evaluation of the test scenarios show. In order to find the global minimum, more initial con-
ditions or a better pre-selection of candidates is required. A derivative-free optimization 
method such as the simplex method229 that is used by matlab’s fminsearch is an alternative 
                                                 
228 Krajewski, R. et al.: The highd dataset (2018). 
229 Lagarias, J. C. et al.: Convergence properties of the Nelder‐Mead simplex method in low dimensions (1998). 
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but cannot guarantee to find the minimum. Additionally, it requires a higher computational 
effort. 
To conclude, a method for the top-down development of MiR metrics was designed includ-
ing requirements, design guidelines and a test and falsification strategy. Based on the design 
guidelines, the metric TCI was developed that was not falsified by evaluation on the highD-
dataset. However, uncertainties from arbitrary parameterization remain. As it is questiona-
ble, if the accident severity can be estimated for critical scenes, the extrapolation methods 
estimates the distance between accidents without categorization of severity.
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8 Conclusion and Outlook 
Figure 8-1 concludes the overall method discussed in this dissertation. Today’s traffic and 
studies about acceptable risk in other technologies as well as the three principles GAMAB, 
MEM and ALARP are used to define quantitative macroscopic risk (MaR) requirements for 
AD3+. To extrapolate MaR based on the microscopic risk (MiR) in single scenes, a new 
metric called Trajectory Criticality Index (TCI) is proposed. 
The developed metric is able to assess human and automated test drives. Using the require-
ments and design principles, it should be improved further, depending on the available data. 
For data recorded by AD3+ vehicles, additional information might be used, e.g. information 
from the path planner to achieve more precise information on reaction time. The analyzed 
highD-dataset includes over 45.000 vehicle km. Nevertheless, application with EVT has a 
high variance due to the extremely rare occurrence rate of critical scenes. Hence, the eligi-
bility of TCI as a metric is not falsified and trust in the metric based on the dataset is gained. 
However, uncertainties due to arbitrary parameterization still exist and should be reduced in 
future work. Hence, more data should be used to test the metric further and reduce arbitrar-
iness from parametrization of the metric. 
 
Figure 8-1 Overview of the part of safety validation discussed in this dissertation (modified from 
Junietz et al.230) 
                                                 
230 Junietz, P. et al.: Criticality Metric for the Safety Validation of Automated Driving (2018), p. 61. 
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Risk extrapolation could support the supervision of MaR requirements during approval or 
field monitoring in order to provide additional evidence for safety besides the occurring ac-
cidents. If the extrapolation suggests a higher risk than accepted, an update for the vehicle 
could be developed to avoid high-risk observations in the future. The identified critical 
scenes help improving the driving function. An early identification of system improvement 
potential is crucial, gaining time for the development, testing and deployment of updates. An 
identification based on accidents alone, delays the information and might result in legal con-
sequences such as mandatory updates or even prohibition of the system itself. For the online 
supervision of the fleet, an online calculation of the metric in the AD3+ vehicle is necessary. 
If computed offline, large amount of data must be saved instead of just saving critical scenes. 
To achieve real-time applicability, the computational effort must be reduced further. An al-
ternative would be a preselection of scenes with increased criticality without determining 
the exact value. Data could be saved and post-processed offline. 
With knowledge of the system design, the metric should be improved and recalibrated be-
cause it cannot be calibrated based on existing data about the average accident distance as it 
can be done for human drivers. However, the method only extrapolates risks, when the un-
derlying scene that causes the accident risk sometimes results in a critical situation and not 
an accident. The metric and the method are not eligible to extrapolate the risk for scenes that 
always lead to an accident. For human driver, this problem does not exist. As far as we know, 
human drivers are capable handling unknown unknowns that they experience for the first 
time based on their prior experience. So the method is applicable as long as the data acqui-
sition is able to detect and record the scene correctly. It cannot be assumed that an AD3+ 
system will handle rare and unknown scenarios in all cases because of lacking knowledge 
about the system and about the possible environment conditions. As a hypothetical example, 
a static object on the road that is not detectable by the environment perception system always 
leads to an accident. Every time, this object is on the road in the path of the AD3+ vehicle, 
an accident is the consequence, so there are no accident-free critical scenes at least when the 
sensors recording a dataset do not detect the object as well. 
The ultimate goal is to proof that the developed system’s safety complies with the derived 
MaR requirements. The statistical evidence that can be generated from accidents per distance 
and the occurrence rate of critical scenes increase with additional distance. Dependent on 
the actual AD3+ systems performance, the requirements from society’s and passers-by’s 
viewpoints can be proved statistically. However, the passenger’s requirements that are no 
diluted directly after the introduction cannot be proven because the statistical evidence is not 
significant enough due to lack of data and the remaining uncertainties from arbitrary param-
eterization. Knowledge based parametrization can lead to an improved estimation of about 
one order of magnitude, as the sensitivity analysis showed. Nevertheless, statistical uncer-
tainty remains. 
The MaR requirements from passenger’s viewpoint cannot be proven at introduction, at least 
not with the presented extrapolation approach or the state of the art safety approval. As dis-
cussed in subchapter 4.5, the passenger might accept the hypothesis of higher safety as long 
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as not proven false. Nevertheless, additional evidence suggesting a sufficiently safe system 
would increase confidence. The presented MiR approach only contributes towards one of 
the discussed testing strategies (comp. Figure 2-9). For test approaches other than real world 
testing (with or without EVT), the uncertainty of the test result cannot be derived. It is un-
known how many miles of driving a scenario-based test covers or how uncertainties of model 
inaccuracies can be described. Nevertheless, all test approaches should be considered to-
gether before the market introduction.  
To conclude, the following research questions need to be addressed in the future: 
 Regarding the method of macroscopic risk estimation: 
o Development of a method or process to gather evidence for safety according 
to the passenger’s requirements 
o Research quantitative uncertainties from test methods 
 Regarding the definition of MaR requirements: 
o Which risk will be accepted in a final product and could this be derived before 
introduction?  
o Do other approaches for the derivation of risks for lower accident severities 
exist besides reduction proportionally to the risk for fatal accidents? 
o Are there requirements to address the uncertainty of safety in the new tech-
nology that cannot be eliminated before introduction? 
o What exactly are the requirements for field observation after introduction? 
 Regarding the improvement of MiR metrics: 
o Reduction of uncertainties from arbitrary parameters in the developed MiR 
metric 
o Improvement of MiR metrics for AD3+using knowledge about the system 
o Improvement of numerical optimization concerning accuracy of the identi-
fied minimum compared to the global minimum and computational effort 
Especially the quantitative description of uncertainties from other test methods will be a 
challenge. Otherwise, AD3+ systems must be evaluated in expensive real-world driving tests 
with uncertain outcome. Alternatively, the uncertainty in the presented approach should be 
reduced further to reduce the testing effort. 
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A Trigger Conditions in NDS 
A.1 100-Car Study231 
No. Trigger Type Description 
1. Lateral Acceleration |𝑎𝑥| ≥ 0.7 𝑔 
2. Longitudinal Accelera-
tion 
𝑎𝑦 ≤ −0.52 𝑔  
3.   Event Button Driver can push a button to mark an event 
4. Forward Time-to-Col-
lision 
|𝑎𝑥| ≥ 0.5 𝑔 before or after (±3 s) around 𝑇𝑇𝐶
≤ 4 s event 
𝑇𝑇𝐶 ≤ 4 s and 𝑑𝑥,𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑡 ≤ 30 m 
5. Rear Time to Collision  Ignored targets with a speed >44.7 m/s (100 mph) 
 rear range <15.2 m (50 ft) and the peak longitudi-
nal acceleration of the following vehicle <-0.4 g.  
 Used a trigger value of two seconds or less 
6.  Yaw rate  The trigger criterion for yaw rate was any set of 
values that went from neutral (i.e., ~0) yaw rate to 
+4 degrees/s, oscillated back to -4 degrees/s (or 
vice versa: -4 to +4), and then returned to neutral 
within a 3-second time window.  
 minimum speed of 6.7 m/s (15 mph) 
A.2 SHRP2232 
No. Type of Triggers Threshold 
1. Longitudinal Acceleration  ax ≤ -0,65 g or ax ≥ 0,5 g  
                                                 
231 Dingus, T. A. et al.: The 100-car naturalistic driving study (2006), pp. 331-333. 
232 Hankey, J. M. et al.: Description of the SHRP 2 Naturalistic Database (2016). 
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3.  Freeway acceleration  ax ≤ -0,3 g; only on freeway 
4. Lateral Acceleration  0,75 g ≤ ay ≤ -0,75 g 
5. Swerve  ?̈? ≥ 15°/s²  and ?̈? ≤ −15°/s²  during a 2 s 
interval 
 v ≥ 5 m/s 
6. Yaw rate  ?̇? ≥ 8°/s and ?̇? ≤ −8°/s during a 0.75 s in-
terval  
 v ≥ 13.4 m/s 
7. Advanced Safety Systems  Monitoring activation of systems such as ABS, 
airbag, ESC and so on 
8. Longitudinal Jerk  ?̇?𝑥 ≤ −𝑔 
 v ≥ 5 m/s 
9. Steering Evasive Maneu-
ver  
 |𝑎𝑦| > 𝑔  for 0,8 s 
 v ≥ 5 m/s 
A.3 Critical Scene according to Benmimoun 
Benimoun developed heuristics to decide about the criticality of a scene based on driving 
dynamics233a, longitudinal distance233b, driver’s reaction233c using velocity-dependent 
thresholds of yaw rate, deceleration, lateral acceleration, TTC and THW.
                                                 
233 Benmimoun, M.: Automatisierte Klassifikation von Fahrsituationen (2015).a: p. 106; b: p. 108; c: p. 110 
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B Information on TCI computation 
B.1 Parameters for Optimization 
The following parameters were used during optimization: 
Parameter Value 
Prediction horizon 2 s 
Step size 0.2 s 
Optimization Algorithm interior-point 
Core hours for data evaluation ~1400 
Lower TCI Limit 10 
B.2 Initial Conditions 
The following initial conditions are used for the optimization. Six Trajectories are generated 
based on the current vehicle speed. The duration of the deceleration is adapted at lower ve-
locities, so backward driving is excluded.  
In addition to the six trajectories described below, the a posteriori acceleration that were 
recorded are used as a seventh initial condition. 
Full de-
celera-
tion 
 medium 
decelera-
tion 
 Fast eva-
sion 
 Medium 
evasion 
 
𝑎𝑥 in m/s 𝑎𝑦 in m/s 𝑎𝑥 in m/s 𝑎𝑦 in m/s 𝑎𝑥 in m/s 𝑎𝑦 in m/s 𝑎𝑥 in m/s 𝑎𝑦 in m/s 
-10 0 -5 0 0 -5 0 -2.5 
… … … … … … … … 
-10 0 -5 0 0 -5 0 -2.5 
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C Extrapolation 
C.1 Equations for EVT 
With the number 𝑛thr of measurements 𝐼𝑖 that exceed a threshold 𝐼thr, the mean of the ex-
cesses 𝜀 over the threshold is given by: 
 𝜀 =
∑ 𝐼𝑖 − 𝐼thr
𝑛thr
𝑖=1
𝑛thr
 (C.1) 
And the standard deviation 𝜀𝜎 is given by: 
 𝜀𝜎 = 𝜀/√𝑛thr (C.2) 
𝜀 is then calculated for different thresholds 𝐼thrand plotted over the thresholds. The resulting 
curve must be approximately linear until the threshold that is selected and used further.  
All measurements over the selected threshold are used to determine the parameters of the 
distribution function. The following likelihood function is maximized to find the parameters 
(comp. section 2.2.2.2.3): 
 ℓ(?̃?, 𝜉) = −𝑛log?̃? − (1 +
1
𝜉
)∑log(1 +
𝜉𝐼𝑖
?̃?
)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (C.3) 
The 95% confidence intervals of the parmeter pairs are determined maximizing the follow-
ing formula with the 95% interval of the chi-squared distribution 𝜒1,0.05
2  (comp. section 
6.2.3): 
 ℓ(𝜎, 𝜉) ≥ ℓ(?̂?, 𝜉) − 0.5 ∙ 𝜒1,0.05
2  (C.4) 
The Return Level Plot is given by the following equation, where the input variable m de-
scribing the number of measurements between two events that can be transformed into the 
average distance between two events, if its multiplied with the distance of one scenario 
(420 m in case of the highD-dataset): 
 
𝐼𝑚(𝑚) = 𝐼thr +
?̃?
𝜉
[(𝑚𝛾thr)
𝜉 − 1] (C.5) 
C.2 Results of Data Evaluation 
The following table shows the results of the data evaluation of the highD-dataset. The dataset 
is divided in 60 parts, each containing about 2000 vehicles: 
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dataset 
number 
vehicle 
number 
maximal TCI timestamp  
in s 
vehicle type 
1= car 
2= truck 
Lane Change 
2 136 21,23172 1880,16 1 1 
2 720 12,38297 9900,44 1 1 
3 733 12,75638 9757,8 1 1 
3 753 17,07243 10012,2 1 1 
3 792 11,51233 10531,28 1 1 
4 196 22,65369 2596,84 1 1 
4 692 10,73161 9317,36 1 1 
4 905 12,94895 12158,24 1 1 
5 103 16,03585 1251,72 1 1 
5 159 11,95298 1990,48 1 1 
5 578 12,75638 7667,16 1 1 
6 676 13,48447 9080,44 1 1 
6 1006 11,93716 13506,36 1 1 
6 1096 14,87581 14692,36 1 1 
7 473 17,76028 5793,92 1 1 
8 330 19,34367 3931,32 1 1 
8 1006 23,11586 12023,24 1 1 
9 658 10,92191 8061,72 1 1 
9 971 12,75638 11930,8 1 1 
9 1015 12,75638 12467,96 1 1 
9 1270 12,23689 15726,6 1 1 
10 399 17,46344 4934,84 1 1 
10 499 10,67332 6107,64 1 1 
12 1230 10,37848 21767,08 1 0 
12 1322 11,22741 23611,6 1 1 
13 1609 28,12887 22995,52 1 1 
13 2843 16,51785 40572,76 1 1 
16 76 38,0071 1047,48 1 1 
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dataset 
number 
vehicle 
number 
maximal TCI timestamp  
in s 
vehicle type 
1= car 
2= truck 
Lane Change 
16 153 12,75638 2152,08 1 1 
16 630 21,98829 8574,2 1 0 
16 643 11,12615 8763,84 1 1 
21 115 15,30434 1510,08 1 1 
21 124 12,23689 1622,88 1 1 
21 947 12,75638 12449,08 1 1 
23 433 14,16216 5947,6 1 1 
23 1142 11,528 16323 2 1 
25 1034 11,12615 29653,28 1 1 
26 729 12,23689 20238,76 1 1 
26 1856 10,10442 47610,68 1 1 
26 2288 16,51785 55873,6 1 1 
26 2454 12,23689 59029,12 1 1 
29 1576 10,21353 21955 1 1 
30 2240 14,78655 32070,12 1 1 
31 756 12,75855 10712,64 1 0 
32 296 14,87133 4000,72 1 1 
32 474 12,30916 6589,64 1 1 
32 615 21,23172 8504 1 1 
32 1267 12,75638 17723,84 1 1 
32 1383 27,47434 19345,24 1 1 
33 357 11,97358 5144,76 1 1 
33 1583 19,34367 22790 1 1 
34 417 17,81569 5810,16 1 0 
36 349 11,12615 5001,68 1 0 
36 417 19,14605 6047,04 1 1 
36 891 25 12872,76 1 1 
36 1680 14,62602 24477,84 2 1 
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dataset 
number 
vehicle 
number 
maximal TCI timestamp  
in s 
vehicle type 
1= car 
2= truck 
Lane Change 
36 2158 16,41325 31466,24 1 1 
36 2252 12,75638 32956,2 2 1 
36 2320 11,39644 34066,16 2 1 
36 2389 12,75638 35275,48 2 1 
36 2396 10,37848 35389,32 2 0 
36 2531 10,94038 38026,48 1 0 
37 104 37,65021 1298,72 1 1 
39 1247 10,07419 16552,8 1 1 
39 1254 12,332 16651,52 1 1 
40 12 10,37848 60,12 1 1 
40 687 11,48243 9117,2 1 1 
40 1257 19,34367 16793,88 1 1 
40 1369 15,60414 18288,44 1 1 
40 1598 12,65908 21230,24 1 1 
41 852 19,51229 11151,16 1 1 
42 769 34,16339 10542,28 1 1 
42 2012 13,37678 27203,6 1 1 
42 2253 18,19022 30542,28 1 1 
43 230 25,96531 2983,84 1 1 
43 791 22,05526 10283,24 1 1 
43 1321 10,60041 17575,68 1 1 
43 2244 10,11919 29979,72 1 1 
44 1078 14,09509 14245 1 1 
44 2283 14,11744 30524,52 1 1 
46 343 17,98727 7386,28 1 1 
47 2238 13,394 31331,8 1 1 
48 79 17,30619 909,8 1 1 
51 219 14,37232 2830,32 1 1 
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dataset 
number 
vehicle 
number 
maximal TCI timestamp  
in s 
vehicle type 
1= car 
2= truck 
Lane Change 
51 666 17,85901 8920,6 1 1 
51 968 15,11027 13015,24 1 1 
51 1587 12,75638 21391,56 1 1 
51 1703 12,72911 22972,08 1 1 
51 2131 19,18285 28852,52 1 1 
51 2260 21,17992 30576,16 1 1 
54 87 34,64602 1056,96 1 1 
54 449 12,75638 5912,88 2 1 
54 585 19,94063 7874,44 2 1 
55 919 14,52679 12348,08 1 1 
55 1388 16,50904 18803,76 1 1 
55 1643 14,65173 22226,6 1 1 
56 33 15,49139 286,56 1 1 
56 107 11,15946 1307,48 1 1 
56 1471 23,39749 20012,72 1 1 
57 835 11,48243 11165,12 1 1 
59 247 17,72402 3100,28 1 1 
59 309 11,09642 3935,52 1 1 
60 178 28,85808 2291,96 1 1 
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